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Abstract 
The existing literature about the causes of welfare state change, including health care reform, 
emphasizes stability, yet there is evidence of remarkable changes taking place in welfare 
systems in much of the developing world. This study analyzes health care reform in Ghana, a 
country which has experienced significant path-departing changes in just four decades (1957-
2003).  These changes – the establishment of a National Health Service system with deep (first-
dollar) coverage, the introduction of a user-fee system, and the transition to a social health 
insurance scheme – have been pursued despite key countervailing factors, especially the high 
political costs associated with them. The study argues that to adequately account for these 
changes, the policy process should be given special consideration, particularly through the 
examination of how new policy proposals moved onto the agenda; how they were formulated, 
adopted, implemented and sustained; and how the reformers managed the entire reform process 
over time. Based on this analysis, I identified three main interconnected contextual and agential 
explanatory factors: (a) conjunctural factors, which created windows of opportunity for the 
changes to occur; (b) policy entrepreneurs, whose leadership, commitment and strategies 
helped in taking advantage of these opportunities to propel, sponsor, design, adopt, implement 
and sustain the policy changes; and (c) the concentrated institutional configuration of Ghana, 
which limited the number and scope of the veto points available to interest groups opposed to 
the proposed changes. While these three factors contributed to why and how the changes 
occurred, I identified policy entrepreneurs’ commitment, leadership and strategies, including 
the feedback effects of those strategies, as the most crucial factors. The study contributes to 
existing health policy literature by showing how perspectives such as the window of 
opportunity thesis, the dynamic political process model, the historical institutionalist approach 
to radical policy change and, finally, the ideational scholarship on framing processes can be 
combined to enrich our understanding of radical policy change. The study also introduces 
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additional mechanisms of policy change that involve the use of repressive strategies before 
suggesting some modifications to a number of widely-shared assumptions within the welfare 
state literature focusing on path dependency, globalization, partisan ideology and vested 
interests.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
The spate of health care reforms across the globe since the 1980s has inspired numerous studies 
on the causes of health care policy change and stability. These studies have yielded several 
theoretical models and concepts that seek to explain how change occurs. Despite the growth in 
the health care literature on policy change, more work is needed to understand how and why 
health policy change actually occurs (Starke, 2010; Béland, 2010). One reason many scholars 
appear to agree that additional research is required is that most existing literature about policy 
change focuses primarily on stability rather than change (Béland & Hacker, 2004; Béland, 
2010; Brown, 2010; Feder-Bubis & Chinitz, 2010; Hassenteufel, Smyrl, Genieys, & Moreno-
Fuentes, 2010; Sitek, 2010; Starke, 2010). 
 In his widely cited article, Pierson (1996) introduced the “new politics of the welfare 
state” approach. Here, Pierson (1996) argued that the unpopularity of and high political costs 
associated with radical reform makes the welfare state, including health care, “far more resilient 
than other key components of national political economies and far more durable than existing 
theories of the welfare state would lead one to expect”(Pierson, 1996, p. 144). In Politics and 
Time, Pierson (2004) introduced what he referred to as “reproduction mechanisms". Defining 
reproduction mechanisms in relation to coordination problems, veto points, asset specificity 
and positive feedback, he argued that they are as crucial in explaining policy stability as they 
are in explaining change. However, as claimed by Béland (2010, p. 620), “his book focuses on 
self-reinforcing mechanisms rather than change”.  
Another key factor is that many researchers who study policy change fail to conduct 
their studies in ways that explain policy change, rather than simply describing it. Béland (2010) 
argues that, to enhance the explanatory power of their studies, scholars must incorporate ideas 
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into their analytical frameworks. Ideational analysis would enable scholars to properly define 
what they mean by policy change; how the idea of change emerged, as well as how solutions 
were devised, designed, championed, implemented and sustained over time. Starke (2010), in 
turn, emphasizes that, since policy change may not be caused by a single factor, scholars should 
be able to show how various causal factors interact to shape policy change.  
Yet aside from the inadequate attention paid to, and the theorizing of, policy change, 
many theories and models formulated in existing health care studies are both quite diverse and 
relatively recent. This creates opportunities to empirically assess the adequacy of these theories 
and models in explaining policy change in health care, especially path-departing change, which 
is the focus of this dissertation. This study is based on the premise that extending the focus 
beyond developed countries will advance the understanding of policy change in health care 
both empirically and theoretically. Currently, the policy change literature is skewed towards 
the developed world, especially towards members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). This focus is paradoxical because health care change, on 
average, is taking place at a faster pace in developing and less-developed countries than in 
OECD member countries. Thus, significant health policy change, including radical change, is 
ever present in the developing world. This mismatch between the “OECD-centric” nature of 
the literature on policy change in health care and the constant burst of activity witnessed in the 
Low-Income Countries (LICs) limits the ability to explain change, both empirically and 
theoretically. 
Since both health care system and policy change are context-dependent, extending the 
focus from the developed world to LICs can strengthen existing explanatory frameworks 
dealing with health policy change and stability (Collins, Green & Hunter, 1999). It may also 
serve as a good context in which to test, as well as to enrich, the general literature on health 
policy change. Additionally, given that LICs face severe human resource and health care 
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challenges, studying policy changes in those countries yields findings that health policymakers 
and stakeholders in those regions may find useful. For instance, such research may help them 
to better shape the process of health policymaking in order to improve its effectiveness (Walt 
& Gilson, 1994; Grindle, 2000). Finally, studies about health care reform in the developing 
world would go a long way toward enhancing the international community's potential for 
reaching the health-based Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the United Nations 
in 2000 (Buse, Booth & Harmer, 2008). These goals include reducing child mortality, 
particularly the under-five mortality rate, by two-thirds; improving maternal health with a focus 
on reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters; and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other 
diseases. All of these goals are to be achieved by 2015 (Nayyar, 2012). However, recent 
evaluative studies about the MDGs show that many LICs are unlikely to meet the targets, 
particularly those related to maternal and under-five mortality (Easterly, 2009; Bello & 
Suleman, 2011; Bhattacharya, Khan, Salma & Uddin, 2013), 
In order to address the limitations of the health care literature outlined above, this study 
analyses radical changes in Ghanaian health policy with a particular emphasis on the three 
major health system reforms the country has pursued since attaining political independence in 
1957. As illustrated in Table 1, these major, path-departing changes involve the establishment 
of a National Health Service (NHS)-style system with deep (first-dollar) coverage in the 
1950s/1960s, the introduction of an extensive user-fee system in 1983/1985, and the shift away 
from user fees to the introduction of a social health insurance (SHI) system, officially referred 
to as the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), in 2003/2005. 
 There are excellent reasons to focus on the Ghanaian case in the context of the debate 
about policy change in health care. The most fundamental reason is the fact that studying health 
care changes in Ghana addresses the main problems identified in the mainstream literature on 
policy change: the inadequate attention to path-departing policy change and the lack of focus 
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on the developing world. Generally touted as a “beacon of Africa” (World Bank, 1993, p. ix), 
Ghana is a good starting point for understanding policy change in LICs, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), which is the least developed continent in the world. In addition, Ghana 
provides an appropriate medium for probing further into other factors that may explain health 
policy change, such as political ideology, globalization, and path-dependency. The study's 
findings would, therefore, be a crucial source of information and a capacity building tool for 
health care scholars, policy makers and other stakeholders in Ghana and elsewhere in SSA to 
better grasp, and perhaps shape, the process of health policymaking to improve health outcomes 
(UNDP-Ghana & NDPC/GOG, 2012; Commonwealth Foundation, 2013).  
 
Table 1 Ghana's three regimes of health care policy 
          CRITERIA NHS  
(1957-1982) 
USER-FEE  
(1983/5-2003) 
SHI  
(2003-present) 
 
Mode of Payment  
 
 
Public revenue 
(free at point of 
 delivery) 
 Public revenue 
 Out-of-pocket payment at point 
of delivery 
 
 
 
Exempted groups (supposed) 
 Indigents 
 Pregnant women 
 Babies 
 Health workers 
 
National Health Insurance Fund 
 Public (grants, investment, budget, NHIS 
levy) 
 Contribution 
 Formal workers (2.5% SSNIT) 
 Informal workers (premium) 
Exempted groups 
 Indigents 
 Pensioners & dependents 
 Pregnant women 
 Children (under 18) 
 
Spending levels 
 
 
Public (100%) 
 
Public (40%) 
Private (60%) 
User fees (15% of MoH budget & 8
0% of hospital non-salary 
 expenditure) 
 
Public (60%) 
Private (40%) 
National Health Insurance Fund (16% and 30
-41% of total and public health expenditure  
respectively) 
 
Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Universal 
 
-All (e.g. consultation, laboratory,  
medical, surgery, dental, medical  
examination, hospital accommodation, 
drugs) except those with  
exemptions 
 
 
Exempted services (supposed) 
 
Treatment of tuberculosis, leprosy,  
psychiatric, immunization,  
antenatal and postnatal, treatment  
at child welfare clinics 
Basic Benefit Package (BBP) 
(E.g. Outpatient Services, Inpatient Services, Or
al Health, Maternity Care, Emergencies etc.) 
 
 
 
 
Exempted services 
 
Appliance and prostheses Cosmetic surgeries,  
Assisted Reproduction, Echocardiography,  
Photography and Angiography, Dialysis for  
chronic renal failure, Organ transplantation, All 
drugs not listed on the NHIS list, Heart and  
brain surgery other than those resulting from  
accidents, Cancer treatment other than breast  
and cervical, Mortuary Services, Diagnosis and 
treatment abroad, Medical examinations for  
purposes other than treatment in accredited  
health facilities (e.g. Visa application, Educatio
nal, Institutional, Driving licence, etc.), VIP  
ward (accommodation) 
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Delivery 
 
Government and 
religious organization
s 
own, provide and paid 
almost all services 
through the Ministry o
f Health (MoH) and 
Religious-based 
providers (RBP) 
respectively 
Government own and provide health  
service, but the public pay for use of service
.  
 
Private provision is earnestly  
encouraged, while user fee is  
increased significantly at  
implementation level 
 
With the encouragement of private pr
ovision, the government (MoH & NH
S) lost its supremacy in overall health 
service provision to the  
private sector (RBP & FPPP) 
 
The responsibility to purchase health care on behalf of 
the public was taken away from the MoH to the newly 
created National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA)  
 
Hence, the NHIA contract accredited providers (public 
& private) and pay them for their services 
 
MoH - policymaking for the health sector. . 
NHIA – purchaser of health services. 
NHS – public service providers 
RBP- non-profit private providers 
FPPP - For-profit private providers 
Population Coverage Universal Exempted group, but exemptions  
were usually not implemented by  
providers 
Hence, 51-56% of the sick ceded it 
Universal coverage is the goal, but as at 2012, 
active membership hovered around 35% of  
Ghana’s population, while cumulative  
membership hovered around 70% by 2011  
 
1.2. Overview of Health Policy Change and Stability in Ghana  
As Table 1 demonstrates, Ghana’s health care system, like that of many other former British 
colonies in SSA, operated as a British-style NHS until the 1980s. The Ghanaian NHS consisted 
of government-owned health care facilities, including hospitals, clinics and health centres, 
whose activities were entirely financed through general tax revenue. All NHS employees, 
including doctors, nurses, health service administrators, accountants and pharmacists worked 
(and still do work) directly for the state, providing tax financed health care services to citizens 
as a matter of right. Although some private health care institutions (mostly mission hospitals) 
also operated in Ghana prior to 1980, the government owned and operated NHS provided most 
of the health care services in the country.  
 With the economy deteriorating from the late 1960s, general state tax revenues were 
insufficient to sustain this system (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008). Hence, user (dispensary) fees 
were introduced in 1969 to complement the fiscal efforts of the state (SEND-GH, 2010), but 
were immediately withdrawn due to massive public protests (SEND-GH, 2010). During the oil 
crisis and in the face of high drug costs in the 1970s, the government was compelled to 
reintroduce the user fee policy (SEND-GH, 2010). Nevertheless, this reform also failed to reach 
the implementation stage, as the government was toppled in a coup d'état as a consequence of 
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the poor state of the Ghanaian economy in general, and including the health sector1 (Baidoo, 
2009; Wahab, 2008). After that, as Coleman (2011) notes, user fees did not reappear on the 
policy agenda until the 1980s, when the country adopted the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment and Economic Recovery Programme (SAERP).  
The SAERP was meant to resuscitate the Ghanaian economy after the 1980s global 
recession and, allegedly, to protect the basic needs of the people (Frimpong, 1997; Aryeetey & 
Harrigan, 2000; Baidoo, 2009; Ohemeng & Ayee, 2012). Under this programme, the NHS was 
restructured and the private sector was encouraged to actively complement state efforts in 
health service provision. The government, led by the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC), also reduced its spending levels, which strongly affected the health sector. As a 
consequence, the user fee policy, popularly referred to as “cash-and-carry”2 in Ghana, was 
reintroduced to generate additional revenues to support the health sector. However, the user 
fees led to significant underutilization of the health care system, as it was unaffordable for 
many people. Oppong (2001) reports that due to inadequate funding, some of the public health 
care facilities closed down, while many others had to operate without adequate resources (cited 
in Baidoo, 2009). In view of the plight facing the health care system, various stakeholders (e.g., 
communities, the government and several international stakeholders in the health sector) began 
to explore alternative means of health care financing and delivery, including different types of 
health insurance policy. However, most of these alternatives failed because of poor leadership 
and a lack of consensus and direction (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008).  
                                                          
1 A modicum of nominal fees was introduced, but its purpose was to eliminate frivolous use rather than to 
generate revenue. 
2“Cash-and-carry” was initially coined to describe the situation whereby healthcare providers were required to 
make cash payment before receiving drugs from the National Medical Stores. In turn, the service providers 
demanded cash payment before delivering services to the public. Thus, overtime, the policy became publicly 
known as Cash-and-Carry, which is currently more popular than its actual name -user fees or cost recovery. 
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In 2001, the newly elected New Patriotic Party (NPP) government took the final 
decision to remove the financial barrier to health care accessibility in Ghana. The decision 
resulted in the enactment of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) Act in 2003 which 
was implemented in 2005 and amended in 2012. The NHIS is a social insurance system, 
managed independently by the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) and financed 
through the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF). Its main goal is to replace the cash-and-
carry system. Under the NHIS, approved private and public health care providers are usually 
reimbursed for services provided to members of the scheme3. The impact of the NHIS on health 
care accessibility is largely reported and believed to be positive (Dixon, 2011), but others have 
crucial reservations, leading to series of proposals for reform (Baidoo, 2009; Apoya & Marriott, 
2011; Moszynski, 2011). In the 2008 elections, for example, the social democratic National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) promised to transform the system into a “one-time premium” 
policy; since assuming office in January 2009, it has yet to fulfil this promise. 
 
1.3. Problem Statement  
As indicated above, the literature on changes in the welfare state, including health care reform, 
focuses largely on institutions4, particularly path-dependency5 (Pierson, 1996). This tendency 
has created the broad assumption that radical changes in welfare systems, including health care 
policies, are unlikely to succeed even when perceived economic and political windows of 
opportunity emerge. As the discussion above suggests, however, since independence Ghana 
has transitioned across all the world’s three major health care policy regimes (National Health 
                                                          
3 In 2012, the capitation system of paying service providers was explored and piloted in the Ashanti Region, but 
it faced a high levels of resistance from providers. Consequently, its implementation countrywide remains 
limited. 
4 Formal and informal rules and customs and how they constrain or facilitate ability to cause policy change.  
5The contention that past policies significantly shape later policies so that policy change tends to retain much 
semblance with the past rather than being a significant departure from it. 
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Service, User Fees, and Social Health Insurance) Schmid et al. (2010) identified. This situation 
suggests that path departing policy change in health care might be more prevalent than what 
existing institutionalist theories claim.  
Second, the Ghanaian reforms have occurred within just four decades of independence 
(1957-2003). Although policy scholars have yet to specify the precise timeframe within which 
radical policy changes tend to occur, the literature on radical policy change inspired by 
historical institutionalism, particularly the punctuated equilibrium6 approach (Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2005), suggests significantly longer periods of institutional stasis before radical 
policy change could occur. Empirical experiences in countries such as the US, Switzerland, 
Britain, Sweden, Germany, Canada and Israel, among others, also reinforce the above 
assumption, suggesting that the three broad health care policy changes that took place in Ghana 
in these four decades occurred during an unusually short period of time. For instance, since the 
creation of Medicare and Medicaid in the United States in the 1960s, all efforts to radically 
transform the US system into a national health insurance system have failed (Feder-Bubis & 
Chinitz, 2010). Since its establishment in the 1950s and 1960s, Canada’s health care system 
has also remained largely the same (Bhatia & Coleman, 2003). The same remark applies to 
Israel, where its 1995 national health insurance legislation is said to have taken over 45 years 
of debates to pass (Feder-Bubis & Chinitz, 2010). Even in Britain, Sweden and Germany, 
where economic and fiscal pressures led to important social policy changes, the magnitude of 
these changes, according to Pierson (1996), was limited rather than radical7.  
Finally, these reforms succeeded despite the presence of countervailing forces, vis-à-
vis opposition from vested interests and, at times, ideological conflict and hostility from 
powerful actors in the global system, including the World Bank and the International Monetary 
                                                          
6 The perspective that once in a blue moon, a long period of policy stability or stasis is upset by an abrupt event 
or conjuncture, leading to policy reversal or path-departing change. 
7 This argument, however, has been challenged by more recent social policy scholarship (see Gilbert, 2002; 
Hacker, 2004). 
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Fund (IMF). As well, in spite of the failure to implement the NHS in the colonial period, after 
independence, (Arhinful, 2003), politicians sought to implement this model despite resistance 
from the vested interests that orchestrated the said failure (Coleman, 1999). Beyond resistance 
from vested interests, including labour groups, the general public8 and the military9, the user 
fee policy was also pursued even though it conflicted with the ideological orientation of the 
PNDC government that introduced it10 (Møgedal, Steen & Mpelumbe, 1995; McIntyre, Gilson 
& Mutyambizi, 2008; Baidoo, 2009). In addition to opposition from vested interests11 and 
being counter to the ideology of the government12, the NHIS reform was also pursued at a time 
when Ghana was a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), which would make it financially 
difficult to sustain the policy. What appeared even more startling with respect to the NHIS is 
that it was pursued against the wishes of key foreign donors, including the World Bank and the 
IMF, who have been frequently depicted in the global social policy literature as the prime 
movers of radical reforms in the developing world (Batley, 1995; Cassels, 1995; Neuman, 
1998; Grindle, 2000; Clapp & Swanston, 2009; McCarthy-Jones & Turner, 2011). Tackling 
these puzzles present interesting opportunities to further advance the ongoing debate on health 
care policy change, in SSA and elsewhere around the world.  
                                                          
8 Whereas constituencies opposed to user fees were successful at preventing their implementation in the late 
1960s and the 1970s (Coleman, 2011), they were not successful in the 1980s. 
9 Also, given that almost all previous attempts to introduce similar policies had resulted in coups d’état 
(Coleman, 1997; Wahab, 2008; Baidoo, 2009), such a reform should have been “unthinkable”. 
10 In particular, many Ghanaians were also perplexed by the user fee policy, because the government that 
introduced it was on the left of the political spectrum, and would have thus been expected to oppose user fees. 
11 It was also pursued in the face of and resistance from well mobilized domestic interests such as the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) and the Ghana Network of Mutual Health Organizations (GNEMHO), among others 
(Coleman, 2011). 
12 While leaning towards the left of the ideological divide, the NHIS was introduced by the NPP government, 
which was on the right of the ideological and political spectrum. 
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1.4. Purpose/Objective and Research Questions 
1.4.1. Purpose 
This dissertation focuses on Ghana and seeks to explain why and how the country could achieve 
these path-departing changes in health care policy in such an unusually short timeframe, despite 
the countervailing forces mentioned above. In the process, the study also pays particular 
attention to the magnitude of the changes, the causal factors underlying them and the 
mechanisms through which the various causal factors interacted to produce these changes 
within the said timeframe. 
1.4.2. Research Questions 
This dissertation explores five key questions: 
a) What makes Ghana’s transition from the NHS-type model of health care to user 
fees and the shift away from user fees and the advent of social insurance 
significant? 
b) What factors made the shift from the colonial system of health care to the NHS-
type model in the 1960s, the shift away to user fees in the 1980s and finally the 
advent of social insurance in the 2000s possible?  
c) How did the various causal factors interact to produce such successive policy 
changes at specific moments in time?  
d) Why were the policy changes (the user fee and the NHIS in particular) 
successful, despite the evidence of clear countervailing forces such as vested 
interests, financial setbacks, ideological conflicts and political risks?  
e) What made those changes possible within the relatively short timeframe in 
which they occurred? 
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1.4.2.1. Rationale and Explanation of Research Questions  
When studying policy change, it is crucial to first examine what exactly changed before trying 
to explain it (Campbell, 2004). For instance, Cacace and Frisina (2010) note that “though we 
recognize the need to move away from mere description if we want to achieve explanation, 
sound description must not be missed: the dependent variable, health care system change, needs 
clear specification before the roots of this empirical phenomenon can be identified” (p. 450). 
Beyond enabling us to understand what exactly changed, specifying the dependent variable 
also enables us to ascertain the magnitude and significance of the change involved. A better 
way to achieve this, as indicated by scholars such as Pierson (1996), Esping-Andersen (1990) 
and O’Connor (2002), is to go beyond the common emphasis in the institutionalist literature 
on quantitative or spending changes to explore, most importantly, qualitative and institutional 
factors such as change in benefits (comprehensive vs. targeted), change in allocation 
responsibility (government vs. private sector) and shifts in eligibility criteria (universal vs. 
targeting and means-testing). As Esping-Andersen (1990) notes, focusing on spending could 
be “misleading”, as “expenditures are epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare 
states” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 19). Rather, scholars should focus on “de-
commodification”, which measures the extent to which social policies enable individuals to 
obtain benefits on the basis of citizenship rather than on the basis of charity, merit, 
conditionality or market forces (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 22). Thus, as O’Connor (1998) 
notes, “de-commodification is central to the welfare state project” (p. 158). Question (a) was, 
therefore, posed to enable this study to address the above limitations in the literature.  
Additionally, health policy change is caused by both political and technocratic factors 
(Parsons 1995; Fischer 2003). The technocratic factors involve the role of expertise, 
appropriate policy content, research evidence, adequate finance, technical advice and methods 
of administration. The political factors, on the other hand, include the broad historical, social, 
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cultural, economic and institutional contexts within which reforms are carried out, and the 
number of actors (e.g., formal and informal, internal and external) who have an interest in the 
reform, as well as the processes (agenda setting, formulation, implementation and evaluation) 
through which these reforms are carried out. Although most studies about the causes of health 
care system change and stability in SSA often neglect the political factors, they are the most 
relevant for analysing both health policy change and stability in the region (Walt & Gilson, 
1994; Gilson et al, 2003; Agyepong & Adjei, 2008; Buse & Booth, 2008; Gilson & Raphaely, 
2008; Hercot, Meessen, Ridde & Gilson, 2011; Meesen et al., 2011). In addressing the above 
gap in the literature, question (b) takes interest in both the political and the technocratic factors 
underpinning the reforms. For example, this question allows this study to examine the reform 
process to ascertain how the various causal and contextual factors manifested themselves over 
time, from agenda setting to formulation, legislation and implementation, and identify the key 
actors involved in the reform process and the roles they played. It also forces us to examine the 
extent to which technocratic factors influenced the reforms the way they did.  
Question (c), on the other hand, asks how exactly various causal factors interacted to 
produce policy change at a specific point in time. This is also important because several 
scholars have observed that one-dimensional explanations are typically problematic in offering 
a comprehensive or full account of health policy change (Collins et al, 1999; Kingdon, 2003; 
Parsons, 2007; Béland, 2010; Starke, 2010). Starke (2010) argues that health policy scholars 
should explore how various causal factors interact in order to strengthen their explanatory 
power. Question (c), therefore, allows the study to draw ideas from the qualitative literature on 
causal and interactive mechanisms (for example, Hall, 1993; Collins et al., 1999; Kingdon, 
2003; Campbell, 2004; Parsons, 2007; Weyland, 2008; Béland, 2010; Starke, 2010) to establish 
a framework that explains how the radical health policy changes occurred in Ghana. 
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 In questions (d) and (e), the occurrence of radical policy changes are further explored 
to ascertain whether any of the existing analytical perspectives on policy change, such as 
institutionalism, globalization, functionalism and partisan politics and ideology, fits with the 
observations made in the case of Ghanaian health policy. This point is also significant because 
it helps to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of these existing perspectives, and it suggests 
ways to rethink some of their fundamental underpinnings. The fundamental difference between 
questions (d) and (e) is that the latter focuses on why the changes occurred within the relatively 
short timeframe in which they occurred, while the former emphasizes the partisan politics 
approach and reminds us of how these changes took place despite the presence of 
countervailing factors, especially the high political costs associated with such changes.  
 
1.5. Main Argument of the Study 
Based on analysis of the data for this study, none of the mainstream perspectives on policy 
change mentioned above (and explained in detail in the next chapter) is found to adequately 
explain the radical health system shifts in post-independence Ghana. Rather, to account for 
these changes, one must pay particular attention to the policy process and, particularly, to how 
certain contextual and agential factors interacted. The fundamental factors identified as 
critically important include (a) the role of conjunctural factors in creating windows of 
opportunity for the changes; (b) policy entrepreneurship by key policy actors that propelled the 
changes onto the agenda, instituted and sustained them over time; and (c) the concentrated 
institutional configurations of the Ghanaian state, which minimized the veto point for interest 
to oppose all the changes as well as facilitated the goal of the reformers, at least at the adoption 
stages. 
First, conjunctural factors such as the state of the Ghanaian economy, the position or 
crisis of the health system, and changes in government interacted at the beginning of each phase 
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of the health policy process to create the urgency for change or windows of opportunity for the 
changes. The establishment of the NHS system, for instance, resulted from the window of 
opportunity created by the economic boom of the late 1950s/early 1960s, combined with three 
other factors: political independence and attaining republican status around the same time: the 
election of a socialist and nationalist leader, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah; and the global trend towards 
welfare state expansion. The user fee model had its roots in the economic bust of the 1980s and 
its adverse effects on the fiscal situation of the health care sector. Aggravating factors included 
the political transition (from the Limann PNP constitutional government to the Rawlings 
PNDC military regime in 1981/2), the failure of the earlier populist measures of the PNDC 
government, the 1983 expulsion of Ghanaian emigrants in Nigeria and, finally, the failure of 
efforts to solicit help from the Eastern Bloc. In turn, the introduction of the NHIS was 
precipitated by the crisis of the user fee model, coupled with the change in government in 2001 
and, particularly, the election of the Kufour NPP government, which had campaigned on the 
promise of abolishing the user fee system. 
Second, key policy entrepreneurs took advantage of these windows of opportunity and 
then instituted and jealously guarded the changes. Six kinds of policy entrepreneurs were 
identified in this respect. The first group of entrepreneurs encompassed those actors who 
propelled the policy changes onto the agenda of the governments in power. They were made 
up of officials of the Maude Commission of enquiry during the transition to the NHS system; 
the Ghana Medical Association (GMA), the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana (PSoG), the 
Ministry of Health (MoH), and the World Bank and the IMF, during the introduction of the 
user fee model; and the MoH and the Community-based Health Insurance Schemes (CBHISes), 
during the establishment of the NHIS.  
After making it onto the agenda, the policy changes had to be designed, adopted, 
implemented and sustained. Doing so, however, involved difficulties. For instance, vested 
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interests, partisan actors and, in the case of the NHIS, powerful international agencies resisted 
the changes. Sailing through those obstacles required additional policy entrepreneurship by the 
governments in power, among others. The governments in power are the second category of 
policy entrepreneurs. They acted as sponsors, leaders, supervisors or coordinators of the entire 
reform processes. The extent to which they were committed to the reforms and the strategic 
choices they made were what mattered. The key actors were President Kwame Nkrumah during 
the transition to the NHS system, Chairman and President Jerry John Rawlings during the 
establishment of the user fee model, and President John Agyekum Kufour at the time the NHIS 
came about.  
Also, in all the reforms, the government put together design teams to develop the new 
policies. Representing the third category of policy entrepreneurs, the design teams determined 
the content of the policy changes. Together with their composition, expertise, and experiences, 
which were fundamental to their work, the commitment and strategies of the design teams was 
also crucially important to how the agenda for the changes was sustained at the formulation 
stage. These actors included Dr. Brachott, Dr. Adibo and the seven-member design team for 
the NHS system, the user fee model, and the NHIS, respectively.  
Sometimes, particularly during the establishment of the NHIS, the role of the design 
team was extended to the adoption and implementation stages. However, adoption processes 
was usually championed by key policy entrepreneurs at the presidential, cabinet and 
parliamentary levels. Champions included parliamentary committees and members of the 
majority side of the legislative assembly, whose arguments, defence and votes, were critically 
important in overcoming opposition to the changes. On the other hand, the implementation 
stages were shaped by special teams of implementation and service providers. Sustaining the 
changes also required governmental commitment and the support of new constituencies 
generated by the new policies overtime. Mainly, these actors defended the changes against 
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immediate reversal. In this respect, the fourth, fifth and sixth categories of policy entrepreneurs 
were mainly composed of the key actors involved in the adoption, implementation and 
sustenance of the policy changes at hand, respectively.  
Finally, all the health care changes were favoured by Ghana’s political system and 
institutions, which minimized opportunities for interests to oppose policy changes and helped 
policy entrepreneurs push through their ideas with ease, at least at the adoption stages13. For 
instance, the NHS system and the NHIS were pursued within a democracy by governments 
with a majority in a parliament largely shaped by party discipline. The user fee policy, on the 
other hand, was pursued by an authoritarian government which did not have a legislative body.  
To explain the path-departing changes underlying this study, one must pay attention to 
all three factors discussed above. That said, the commitment and strategies of the policy 
entrepreneurs were fundamental to explaining why the changes occurred despite the 
countervailing factors. This is because, as indicated in the subsequent chapters, even those 
policy proposals that failed also faced windows of opportunity and institutional configurations 
that should have favoured their success.  
The strategies of the policy entrepreneurs in this study were diverse, but they can 
nevertheless be classified as either soft or hard. The soft strategies embodied the use of 
compensations (financial remuneration and other rewards), ideational tools and mechanisms 
(framing, public education, consultations, and negotiations and compromises), underground 
approaches such as layering (adding new policy elements alongside existing ones), and other 
tactical measures (incremental versus rapid rollout of the policy, the use of narrow versus broad 
                                                          
13 The ease with which institutional configurations offered reformers the opportunity to push through their 
agenda, however, should not be construed as if the institutions played independent roles. This is because interest 
groups utilized different venues, including street demonstrations, to oppose change. Thus, reformers almost 
always had to complement institutional opportunities with political strategies before they could adequately 
overcome pressures from vested interests and push through their proposals. In fact, the reformers would have 
failed if they had not strategized in seizing the opportunity provided by the concentrated political institutions.  
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design teams, decentralizing the authority of implementation, using political associates, 
accommodating interests of diverse interests, and strategic timing of reform). Hard strategies 
included the use of repressive mechanisms (brutalizing, arresting, detaining or banning 
opponents and media censorship).  
This study, therefore, contributes to the dynamic or actor-centered institutionalist 
literature by showing how the window of opportunity thesis formulated by Kingdon (2004) 
may be combined with Grindle’s (2004) dynamic political process model. Both frameworks 
emphasize the central role of policy entrepreneurs in ensuring path-departing policy change; as 
suggested, the two theories complement one another nicely. In combining these two 
approaches, this dissertation also engages with other concepts and theories, such as Hacker’s 
(2003) concept of policy drift, Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) concept of layering, and 
Campbell’s (2004) concept of translation, as well as the ideational scholarship on framing (for 
example, Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 2004; Béland, 2010). However, this study introduces 
additional mechanisms of policy change—the use of repressive strategies such as banning 
existing political parties and introducing media censorship, among others. It also reveals that 
the use of political strategies may create challenges, which can generate a new momentum for 
an immediate reversal of path-departing policy changes. Finally, it suggests some 
modifications to a number of common perceptions within the welfare state literature that 
focuses on path dependency, globalization, partisan ideology and interests. 
 
1.6. Plan of the Dissertation 
The next chapter reviews the theoretical literature on policy change to explore its strengths and 
weaknesses, particularly when it comes to explaining the radical changes in Ghanaian health 
policy. Drawing on the critique of this literature, the chapter lays out an analytical framework 
that focuses on windows of opportunity, political commitment, reformers’ strategies and 
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institutional processes to explain radical health policy changes in Ghana. Chapter Three focuses 
on the research design and methodological framework of this study, including their strengths 
and weaknesses and the justifications for using these methods. Chapters Four, Five and Six 
examine, in chronological order, the three main episodes of radical health policy change in 
Ghana since independence. They do that by analysing both grey and published literature on 
health policy change as well as the semi-structured in-depth interviews I conducted in Ghana 
concerning the key actors, process and factors underlying the changes. These chapters are 
structured in ways that not only explain the occurrences of the radical changes, but also seek 
to address the fundamental weaknesses associated with much of the existing literature on policy 
change, identified above. Hence, each of these chapters begins by exploring the nature and the 
magnitude of the change before expanding to the analysis of how and why the change occurred, 
among other issues. Chapter Seven summarizes the main findings of this study. In particular, 
it interprets the results discussed in the analytical chapters in light of the purpose and research 
questions that underlie this study before stressing its relationship and contribution to the 
existing literature on health care policy change. Based on the observations made, the analytical 
framework is reassessed using examples from the three cases of policy change discussed above. 
The outcome of the above exercise then informs the key lessons drawn from the study and their 
implications for public policy practice, particularly for domestic and international actors 
interested in shaping health policy and ultimately health outcomes in Ghana and other LICs 
facing similar challenges. The final section of the chapter explores the implications of the 
dissertation for future research on policy change in health care. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
While the health care literature on the causes of policy stability and change was initially 
dominated by frameworks and concepts that emphasized stability, it has since developed 
several sophisticated perspectives and models that explain change. As far as health care reform 
in SSA is concerned, as suggested below and indicated in the preceding chapter, these 
perspectives include functionalism, interests, institutionalism, partisan politics and 
globalization.  
In this chapter, I examine these five main perspectives and then develop an analytical 
framework that explains how and why the radical policy changes in the Ghanaian health system 
occurred within the relatively short time frame of four decades. By examining these 
perspectives, the chapter observes that due to the failure of contemporary analyses of policy 
stability and change to adequately focus on the dynamism embedded in policy change, accounts 
of how radical policy change could take place even within an unusually short period of time 
and in contexts theoretically expected to make such changes unlikely are sidelined. For 
instance, by emphasizing vested interests, path-dependency or institutional friction, the above 
perspectives largely fail to account for instances where change may be pursued in the absence 
of crisis, or in the presence of strong vested interests and path-dependency.  
The study complements existing perspectives to better explain the radical changes in 
the Ghanaian health policy and how they could be attained within an unusually short period of 
time and despite certain countervailing factors. The study draws ideas from the dynamic or 
actor-centered institutionalist literature, particularly focusing on Kingdon’s (2003) window of 
opportunity thesis and Grindle’s (2004) dynamic political process model. The advantage of 
combining the two approaches is that the window of opportunity thesis enables us to ascertain 
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the factors that trigger policy change, and the dynamic political process model focuses on what 
happens afterwards. Besides enabling us to ascertain the extent of dynamism embedded in the 
process of institutional change, Grindle’s (2004) analytical approach also provides an 
opportunity to explain path-departing change that occurs despite the odds. This study 
complements both analytical approaches with the historical institutionalist approaches to 
radical policy change involving policy drift, layering and translation, as well as the framing 
school and additional strategies employed by reformers in Ghana, including the use of 
repression.  
The emphasis on the reformers in the analytical framework that underlies this study is 
also reflective of (a) the recent trend in the institutionalist literature to view institutions as 
dynamic, actor-centered, reflexive and mutually constitutive of actors and rules, and as a “non-
deterministic context for action” (Jackson, 2010, p. 80; see also, Scharpf, 1997; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005; Pancaldi, 2012) and; (b) the peculiar politics of policy change in the developing 
world where, because of the less developed nature of institutions and the centrality of 
implementation to the policy change process, reformers have become far more important 
players in policy change than in the developed world, where those structures are relatively 
developed (Grindle, 2004; Carroll & Ohemeng, 2012).  
The next five sections examine each of the perspectives mentioned above, stating their 
basic claims, and exploring their strengths and weaknesses based on the existing literature and 
a discussion of Ghanaian health policy. Then, in the final section, the analytical framework of 
this dissertation is put forward. 
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2.1.1. The Functionalist Perspective 
 
As Weyland (2008) indicated, the functionalist perspective has been one of the prominent 
frameworks used to explain radical policy change. With its undertones in sociology, the 
functionalist perspective views policy change as essential for system improvement. 
Particularly, it considers policy change as a systemic response to policy challenges or 
deficiencies (Weyland, 2008). Thus, for the functionalists"[a]s challenges were bound to 
trigger responses, problems would find resolution" at all costs (Weyland, 2008, p. 285).  
 This traditional functionalist perspective emphasizing that problems trigger corrective 
responses has attracted the attention of many policy scholars particularly those from the rational 
choice school (Weyland, 2008). However, it is criticized for failing to specify the causal agents 
and mechanisms through which problems trigger reforms (Weyland, 2008). According to 
rational choice theorists, for instance, "only individuals are political actors – and individuals 
do not necessarily care about the system’s survival needs" (Weyland, 2008, p. 285). 
 In much of this debate, health care scholars have been relatively silent. However, as 
Wilsford (2010) argued, a more sophisticated functionalist perspective has been introduced 
into the health care arena more recently. Rothgang, Cacace, Götze and Schmid (2008), and 
Schmid, Cacace, Götze and Rothgang (2010) note that policy convergence may serve as the 
starting point of this renewed interest in functionalism. In these studies, the authors show how, 
in a response to similar problem pressures, Britain, the US, and Germany developed solutions 
specific to their health care systems. Thus, the British NHS, the US market-based health care 
system, and the German, Bismarckian social health insurance system reached a state of 
institutional convergence in terms of policy objectives. 
 Indeed, the new approach to functionalism that Schmid et al. (2010) and Rothgang et 
al. (2008) provide useful insights for both present and future health care research. The novelty 
of the approach they used - popularly referred to as the “heuristic model of health care system 
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change” - is that it introduces some causal mechanisms and agency in the policy change 
process. They argue that 
adaptive responses to system deficiencies do not develop automatically. Within a 
competitive environment, efficient answers to problem pressure may spread via 
evolution. For health care systems that hardly compete with one another in a given area, 
an additional mechanism for structural innovation and diffusion is needed. Adaptive 
responses may require decision of policymakers and subsequent implementation 
through local actors…This may include considering the perception of problems by 
relevant actors and also their beliefs about strategies that may improve the efficiency 
of health care (Schmid et al., 2010, p. 463).  
 Despite these insights, the new functionalist perspective still lacks adequate 
incorporation of agency. In concluding their study, for instance, Schmid et al., (2010, p. 480) 
simply indicate that it is “policymakers and their perception of functional deficit that trigger 
reforms”. In general, the new functionalist perspective simply locates health care systems 
between problem pressure and policy change, reducing the impact of both actors and ideas on 
policy change. By construing agency in system-specific terms, the ultimate challenge of this 
approach to health policy change is that it can hardly explain radical health system shifts that 
occur within a short time, such as those that occurred in Ghana. In explaining the policy shifts 
in Ghana’s health system and why and how they occurred within this unusually short period of 
time despite countervailing factors, a complete view of policy actors and their agency is 
required. Hence, the functionalist perspective is inadequate to explain radical change in 
Ghanaian health policy. As a consequence, although the importance it accords to problems 
remains crucial for the analysis of policy change, turning to other approaches to explore how 
to explain the Ghanaian situation is equally crucial. 
 
2.1.2. Interests-based perspectives 
The interest-based perspective views policy change as being shaped by vested interests (Bleich, 
2002). In the area of health care, for instance, the emphasis is often placed on the role of 
organized medicine in health policy change (Naylor, 1986; Wilsford, 1994; Maioni, 1998). The 
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ability of the medical profession to influence policy change is largely based on the fact that it 
is directly involved in its implementation. Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that whenever 
medical professionals go on strike, people experience insecurity (Marchildon & Schrijvers, 
2011). Another reason is that the medical profession generally has significant public trust and 
legitimacy, which gives it the necessary political and social capital to influence health policy 
change (Starr, 1982; Lawrence, 2003). Furthermore, because medical professionals directly 
depend on the health care sector for their salaries and other revenues, they also tend to feel the 
pecuniary impact of significant health policy change the most, which makes them react 
immediately whenever a radical policy change is proposed. Lastly, medical professionals are 
generally endowed with the necessary economic and the political capital and connections to 
veto important health policy changes (Marchildon &  Schrijvers, 2011).  
In their study “Physician Resistance in Canada and Belgium in the 1960s,” for instance, 
Marchildon and Schrijvers (2011) portray how organized medicine in both countries went to 
every length, including holding long periods of strike actions (23 days in Canada and 18 days 
in Belgium) and engaging in profligate spending, just to ensure that the fee-for-service and the 
contract-based system of health care (as opposed to the salary-based system) were maintained. 
In his study involving health care reforms in Germany, France, Britain and the United States, 
Wilsford (1994) also shows the extent to which the alliance between the medical profession 
and the Free Democrats in the German coalition government of 1989 contributed to the failure 
of the "Blum" reform, which would have significantly reduced the high costs of health care in 
Germany. Dahlgren (1990) and Mwabu (1993) also explain how Tanzania’s user fee policy 
was resisted by organized interests (cited in Walt & Gilson, 1994, p. 364). Buse and Booth 
(2008) similarly demonstrate how local and international interests cooperated to persuade the 
president of Uganda to overrule the Ministry of Finance and the Global Budget Support’s 
opposition to the Global Fund programs (that were supposed to be organized outside the 
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budgetary framework) in the country. The role of the Mozambican medical elites in shaping 
health care reforms in the 1980s has also been emphasized (Walt & Gilson, 1994). Also, Ghana 
was said to have implemented the most aggressive decentralization and user fee programs in 
Africa in the 1980s and 1990s because of the support it obtained from the medical profession 
(Russell, Bennett & Mills, 1999, p. 770).  
The strength of the interest-based perspective is that it brings to light how collective 
actors impact policy change. It also highlights the political dimension of the role of these policy 
actors in policy change, suggesting that actors may also be ultimately concerned about 
protecting their interests rather than finding rational solutions to systemic problems, a 
perspective that characterizes the functionalist literature.  
Despite its strengths and inherent ability to explain radical change, however, most 
analyses of health policy change, focusing on the role of interests, overemphasize the power of 
vested interests. This assumption neglects instances whereby the perceived interests of policy 
actors may change with respect to changes in ideas and circumstances (Béland, 2010). It also 
ignores situations that are common in many transitional and developing economies, including 
SSA, where the medical profession is less organized and less focused on the broader policy 
dimensions than in the examples above (Cunningham, Mitchell, Narayan & Yusuf, 2008; 
Munyaradzi, 2010; Siket, 2010). The inability of organized medicine to shape the trajectory of 
policy change in developing countries may be explained by a number of factors. First, unlike 
their counterparts in developed countries, medical professionals in the developing world lack 
a history of autonomy from the state. This situation generally makes them perceive the state as 
an institution to obey rather than a partner that can be opposed when specific policy decisions 
are concerned. This perception may have arisen because in many developing countries, the 
state usually bears almost the full costs of educating medical professionals (Hagopian et al., 
2005). Medical professionals in many developing countries also lack the required 
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organizational, economic and political capital to veto health care reforms (Siket, 2010). 
Agyepong and Adjei (2008), for instance, note that the Mutual Health Organizations (MHO) 
in Ghana were unable to influence the 2001 national health insurance policy, which was 
perceived to be unfavourable to their interests, because of ineffective organization. That is, 
since most of their membership were poor rural people, the MHOs were unable to forge any 
strong united force that would have effectively opposed the new policy. Similarly, until 
recently, health workers in Tanzania were forbidden from engaging in strike actions to pursue 
their interests (Buse & Booth, 2008, p. 14-15).  
In view of the above problems they face, it is argued that many medical professionals 
in SSA usually adopt the “exit” option (Hirschman, 1970) to address their grievances: they 
migrate to developed countries instead of pursuing their interests at home, within the political 
arena (Hagopian et al., 2005). Hagopian et al. (2005) reveal that about 11,000 physicians 
trained in SSA are practicing medicine in the US, Canada and the UK alone, with a significant 
number of them migrating in the last 20 years, after IMF/World Bank SAERP was introduced 
in the region. The SAERP was a factor because it reduced budgetary support for the health 
sector of many African states (Møgedal, Steen & Mpelumbe, 1995). And, although user fees 
were expected to generate new financial revenues for the health sector in SSA, they were found 
to be limited, possibly because the utilization rate of health care reduced drastically after the 
policy was implemented (Møgedal et al., 1995). Above all, the SAERP led to a reduction in 
the salaries of public-sector workers, including physicians, thereby creating a strong incentive 
for physicians to leave their national health care sector for “greener pastures” elsewhere 
(Hagopian et al., 2005). Nevertheless, despite the above evidence, there are clear instances in 
Ghana where labour related interests have been successful at averting radical health policy 
changes (Arhinful, 2003). 
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By focusing on vested interests at the expense of interests that are dynamic and 
changing, most interest-based studies tend to overstate the role of structure at the expense of 
agency, which is a crucial aspect of the role of interests in policy change. Focusing on the 
structural dimension of the role of interests, therefore, most interest-based studies are able to 
explain how interests obstruct rather than facilitate change (Grindle, 2004). With respect to the 
cases underlying this study, the interests against change were later brought on board to pursue 
the same changes they had opposed. Thus, while being important, the interest-based 
perspective may have significant limitations in explaining radical changes in Ghanaian health 
policy.  
 Despite these limitations, the interest-based perspective cannot be completely 
neglected. For example, while ineffective in having a direct impact on the policy trajectory, the 
exit option usually employed by medical-profession interests in SSA may indirectly impact 
health reforms over time (Hirschman, 1970). Furthermore, although organized medicine in the 
developing world is usually unable to influence health policy change in the early stages, it is 
usually powerful in shaping those changes during the implementation stage (Béland & Ridde, 
2014). As the analysis chapters will show, in the absence of a strong organized medicine, other 
interests, such as trade unions, may emerge as forces to reckon with in pursuing shifts in the 
health policy trajectory even in a developing world. Thus, despite its limitations, the interest-
based perspective could offer some assistance in explaining changes in Ghanaian health policy, 
as long as the focus moves away from only doctors, at least, during the adoption process. 
 
2.1.3. The Institutionalist Perspective 
 In contrast to the interest-based perspective, the institutionalist perspective argues that interests 
do not operate in isolation from established institutional structures. Rather, institutions regulate 
all political activities, including those of interest groups and the very strategies they tend to 
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employ in pursuing their interests. In this respect, explanations of policy change should be 
based on the nature of the political system in place – that is, whether it is centralized or 
decentralized, parliamentary or presidential, unitary or federal and democratic or 
nondemocratic – and the extent to which it allows interest groups to veto policy change 
(Pierson, 1996). Institutionalist literature commonly assumes that a radical policy change is 
more likely to occur under a centralized political system with minimal veto points than a 
decentralized system with a significant opportunity for interest groups to veto reforms 
(Immergut, 1992). Hence, path-departing changes are more frequent under a unitary system of 
government than a federal system of government, under a unicameral democracy than a 
bicameral democracy, and in a Westminster or parliamentary system than a presidential system 
(Immergut, 1992; Pierson, 1996; Maioni, 1998; Tuohy, 1999).  
This perspective has gained significant currency in the health care literature (Immergut, 
1992; Wilsford, 1994; Maioni, 1998). Immergut (1992) shows how different institutional 
configurations in Switzerland, France and Sweden shaped the activities of organized medicine 
and the divergent policy outcomes in these three countries. For instance, the institutional 
emphasis on referendums in Switzerland, unlike in France, created a wider window of 
opportunity for Swiss organized medicine to veto health insurance proposals it opposed. 
However, with the support of their parliamentary system that created only a minimal veto point, 
the reformers in France were able to prevent organized medicine from vetoing their national 
health insurance proposal. Sweden was able to establish both a national health insurance policy 
and a national health service because its executive-dominated system happened to have fewer 
veto points than in France or Switzerland. Combining institutionalism and partisanship, Maioni 
(1998) shows how the US and Canada parted ways regarding their journey toward a modern 
health insurance system. She observes that Canada, unlike the US, was able to institute a 
universal health insurance because of its Westminster model and the multi-party system, which 
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contrasts with the US presidential and bi-party system. She notes that Canada's Westminster 
model of democracy, which allows minimal veto points for organized medicine to oppose 
reform proposals, enabled it to pass a comprehensive health insurance system as opposed to 
the US presidential system, which allows a significant veto point for interests to block reforms.  
In the health care literature on the developing world, the veto point thesis has centred 
on a comparison between authoritarian and democratic regimes. According to Buse and Booth 
(2008), the ability of organized interests to influence policy change in the developing world 
has improved after many of these countries transitioned to democracy in the 1990s, as 
compared to when they were under authoritarian rule. In Uganda, the transition to democracy 
enabled health workers to influence policies as the country got close to elections (Buse & 
Booth, 2008). Also, although health workers are prohibited from undertaking strike action in 
Tanzania, this law failed to prevent them from embarking on industrial action over pay after 
the country transitioned to a democracy (Buse & Booth, 2008).  
 North (1990), Pierson (2000) and other institutionalists have also explored policy 
legacies and path dependency. According to this perspective, a previously legislated policy can 
create lock-in effects, which serve as a path for subsequent policy changes (Pierson, 2000). In 
path dependency, it is argued that structural forces dominate the process of policy change, 
leading to either stability or incremental change (Wilsford, 2010). A typical path-dependent 
health care system is that of the US. In his study on path dependency, Wilsford (1994) 
demonstrates how the longstanding structural factors embedded in the US political system put 
the US health system on a track-dependent path. These factors include the US presidential 
system, coupled with the principle of separation of powers, the bicameral legislature, and 
federalism. Using the example of Clinton's 1993 health insurance plan, which sought to extend 
insurance coverage to all Americans and to create regional alliances and competitive provider 
networks in order to reduce costs, Wilsford (1994) reveals how the above institutional logics, 
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associated with strong vested interests within the existing health care system, made path-
departing change unlikely. Regarding the US and using a similar perspective, Pierson (1994, 
1996) shows how path dependency shaped changes in the Medicare program, and why 
Medicare retrenchment policies have proven to be so unpopular in the US. Whereas it is mostly 
applied in analysing policy change in the public sector, path dependency has also been observed 
to be applicable to the analysis of the development of private health care and social benefits 
(Hacker, 2002; Klein, 2003; Béland & Hacker, 2004; Béland, 2010). For example, a 
fundamental reason why the Truman government's proposed national health insurance policy 
failed to gain adequate political support was high public confidence in the ability of the private 
sector to provide effective health insurance coverage at the time, and in the predictable future 
(Béland, 2010).  
 In the developing world, including SSA, the path-dependent literature has focused on 
institutional colonial legacies (Alubo, 1990; Mogedal, 1995). For instance, citing the user fee 
policies in Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Alubo (1990) suggests that a colonial or 
elite-centred understanding of health care has reshaped policy change in the post-colonial era, 
leading to the marginalization of the poor. Batley (2004) also shows how the public provision 
of health care in India, Ghana, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe has been shaped by a colonial system 
of health care where the government was the main actor. The author indicates that the 
fundamental principles of both the colonial and the post-colonial health systems are basically 
the same, the only difference being that post-colonial governments have added “redistributive 
and nation building intentions” to these colonial systems (Batley, 2004, p. 36).  
Despite the emphasis on veto points and path-dependency, a major weakness of the 
institutionalist literature, as Wilsford (1994) acknowledges, is its inability to explain radical 
change (i.e., change outside the existing institutional logics). To address this gap, Wilsford 
(1994) draws our attention to events or conjunctures, such as economic crises or changes in 
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government. These “focusing events” (Kingdon, 1984) can create a window of opportunity for 
a path-departing policy change to occur (Haggard & Webb, 1993; Wilsford, 1994; Pierson, 
1996). For example, Wilsford (1994) shows how factors such as skyrocketing social security 
deficits, a global recession, high hospital expenditures and the appointment of a resolute 
reformer, Jean de Kervasdoue, as the new Director of Hospitals contributed to the French 
government's ability to initiate a radical reform that led to a significant reduction in health care 
costs in the post-1984 period. Similar conjunctural factors aided in the sea change that 
characterized Germany's health care system in 1992. This reform benefitted from the 
appointment of a new and committed minister of health, Horst Seehofer, in 1992; the grave 
economic recession; the high costs of the German unification agenda; the overwhelming 
dominance of the Christian Democrat-led coalition in the Bundestag and Seehofer's effective 
lobby of the Social Democrats who had won the Bundesrag; and high wage costs, which was 
driving away German exporters, such as BMW and Mercedes, to other countries. 
Recessions in many parts of Africa were also described as the fundamental cause of 
health care change in SSA in the 1980s and 1990s (Møgedal, 1995; Batley, 2004). Gilson et al. 
(2003, p. 36), reveal the way the political transition in the 1990s in South Africa and Zambia 
presented a great opportunity in both countries to pursue sea changes in health policy. Apart 
from bringing a new authority to power, the transitions brought the widespread problems facing 
the health systems of both states to the fore. The delay in implementing SAERPs in Zambia 
compared to Ghana can be attributed to the fact that the latter had an earlier transition than the 
former. The transition from civil war to political stability in the 1990s is also believed to have 
triggered health sector reforms in Mozambique during that decade (Møgedal, 1995).  
Despite the introduction of conjuncture, the institutionalist literature is criticized for 
limiting the sources of significant policy change to exogenous or structural factors (Mahoney 
& Snyder, 1999). In this respect, the institutionalist perspective significantly neglects the role 
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of endogenous factors in radical policy change. Institutionalist studies such as those of 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010), Streeck and Thelen (2005), and Hacker (2004) have incorporated 
endogenous variables into their analytical frameworks. These variables include layering, 
conversion, displacement, and policy drift. Layering is about how an incremental add-on to the 
existing institutional structure can sometimes transform an existing institution (Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005). Conversion occurs when the goals and actors of the existing institution are 
changed through a review or a reinterpretation of the principles underlying its sustenance 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Displacement takes place when the existing policy or institution is 
phased out and replaced (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). As a mechanism of policy change, policy 
drift emphasizes how legislative or policy inaction can foster deep transformations related to 
changes in the social and economic environment (Hacker, 2004).  
An advantage of this new institutionalist approach to policy change is that it 
incorporates a greater amount of agency into the analysis of policy change than the path-
dependency literature does. Particularly, it shows how policy actors can devise strategies to 
pursue policy change despite the existence of structural factors. This approach, nevertheless, 
has some limitations. As Béland (2010, pp. 621- 622) demonstrates, "it is not always clear 
whether concepts like conversion, layering, and policy drift explain policy change... they 
describe concrete episodes of incremental change without really explaining them". According 
to him, the historical institutionalist approach needs to show the mechanisms through which 
actors select and develop strategies of incremental changes in a particular policy environment.  
Looking at the Ghanaian case points to some of the strengths of the institutionalist 
perspective. First, all three policy changes occurred under political institutions that were largely 
centralized – a purely presidential-unitary system in the case of the NHS system, an 
authoritarian in the case of the user fee system and a hybrid-unitary democratic system in the 
case of the NHIS. Second, they occurred during critical junctures – the economic boom and 
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transition to self-government in the 1950s/1960s in the case of the NHS system, the economic 
crisis and the transition from the PNP democratic regime to the PNDC military regime in the 
1980s in the case of the user fee system and the debt problem and the transfer of power from 
the NDC democratic regime to the NPP democratic regime in the 2000s in the case of the 
NHIS. Also, while it could be useful to describe the episodes of change at hand, the punctuated 
equilibrium framework cannot really explain how the changes were pursued by the key actors 
behind them. In other words, it fails to meet the explanatory logic of this study. Finally, the 
radical changes were not as abrupt as described by the punctuated equilibrium thesis, which 
may partly vindicate the historical institutionalist perspective by Thelen and others. But, on 
their own, are the veto point and the historical institutionalist perspectives enough to explain 
how a policy change occurs?  
Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that in many instances historical 
institutionalism may not be powerful enough to explain path-departing policy change. Haggard 
and Webb (1993, p. 146), for instance, find the institutional veto point thesis too simplistic in 
its assumption that authoritarian regimes are immune to pressures from interests. As they argue, 
“authoritarian regimes may not be accountable to the electorates, but they may ... remain 
vulnerable to interest-group pressures”. Authoritarian regimes also care about their legitimacy, 
and, therefore, “are likely to initiate reforms aimed at increasing...benefits as a way of 
appealing to the working class” (Kpessa, 2009, p. 10) rather than introducing a user fee policy, 
which is potentially agonising to them (Pierson, 1996). Focusing on the inability of the British 
government to pursue radical retrenchment in its social policy during the 1980s, despite its 
centralized political institutions, Pierson (1996, p. 145) also challenges the institutional veto 
point thesis. 
While cohesive systems concentrate authority, they also concentrate accountability. 
The former tendency facilitates retrenchment [radical change], but the latter impedes it. 
Where authority is centralized, the public knows that the government of the day can 
prevent groups from suffering cutbacks. Strong governments, anticipating the high 
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political cost of retrenchment, may forgo the opportunities provided by concentrated 
power. Thus, the theoretical basis for believing that government cohesion facilitates 
retrenchment [radical change] is weak.  
Pierson (1996, p. 145) further notes that “advocates of retrenchment must persuade wavering 
supporters that the price of reform is manageable”, a task that requires more than mobilizing 
institutional forces. This factor will be more fully described in Chapter Five. 
The above critiques of the institutionalist perspective are on full display in the trajectory 
of Ghana’s health policy. For example, as indicated in the preceding chapter, although it was 
an authoritarian regime, the National Liberation Council (NLC) withdrew its user fee policy in 
the face of opposition during the late 1960s (Arhinful, 2003). Also, although the NDC 
government has the institutional capacity to pursue its "one-time premium" policy, as indicated 
above, it has yet to do so since it regained power in 2009. Ghana has also experienced a series 
of crises and multiple changes in government since independence, though most of them never 
resulted in radical policy changes (see Haggard & Webb, 1993).  
In view of the above limitations, this study suggests that the analysis of radical policy 
change must move beyond the analysis of institutions to account for how other factors may 
have complemented the role of institutions in achieving change, including why and how it may 
have occurred within a relatively short time frame despite the odds. 
 
2.1.4. The Partisan Politics Perspective 
The partisan politics perspective explains policy change based on the ideals and the interests 
of the political party in power. Political parties are formed through an amalgamation of 
individuals whom, as a result of sharing similar beliefs or ideology about life, coupled with a 
perception or experience of not being able to realize those ideals outside of government, have 
come together as a group to pursue those ideals for the common good of all people, particularly 
their own members. Thus, like many social groups, the members of a political party are united 
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by the ideals or ideology they share. Unlike other social groups, however, political parties 
believe that they can pursue their ideals only through capturing the political power of the state. 
Thus, apart from being the prime motivator of their existence and, of course, their ultimate 
goal, the ideology of the party serves to dictate the actions of the government in power and the 
medium through which the parties interact with their respective constituencies. Hence, Hick 
(2011) argues that ideologically left governments support and pursue significant social policies, 
while ideologically right parties establish minimal social policies. Starke (2010), for example, 
shows how the pro-market reforms of the right-based National Party of New Zealand were 
reversed after 1999 when the left-oriented Labour Party assumed power. 
 Over time, however, the partisan politics perspective has been interpreted in other ways, 
which divert from its original focus on ideology. Most of these interpretations put power at the 
centre of the analysis. For instance, Haggard and Webb (1993) argue that policy change is 
conditioned by the amount of political capital the change is expected to generate for the party 
in power. Thus, if it is perceived that a particular reform agenda would generate political 
support for the government, then it will be carried out (even where there is evidence that it is 
inefficient). However, a reform would not be pursued if it is perceived to be unpopular and 
likely to result in shrinking the existing support base of the party (Pierson, 1996). In order to 
increase political support, Haggard and Webb (1993) argue that incumbent governments 
generally pursue the enactment of large social programs close to elections when votes are 
needed rather than when elections are in the distant future. Alternatively, newly elected 
governments pursue reforms immediately after the election in order to establish their own 
constituencies and build legitimacy.  
A significant amount of evidence also exists about the political-electoral dimension of 
reforms. For instance, in the 1990s, due to partisanship, both Zambia and South Africa chose 
to introduce user fee and user fee removal policies instead of creating prepayment mechanism 
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and a social health insurance scheme, respectively (Gilson et al., 2003). The study revealed that 
although they were found to be more technically superior to their alternatives, both the social 
health insurance and the prepayment schemes were rejected because there was inadequate 
political and partisan support for them.  
In their five-country comparative study (Ghana, Zimbabwe, India, Sri Lanka and 
Thailand), Russell et al. (1999) also show how politics played a role in the implementation of 
the New Public Management (NPM) reforms such as decentralization and cost-sharing in SSA. 
They concluded that the governments merely paid superficial attention to the reforms because 
they were found to require not only political leadership and administrative competence, but 
also significant changes in organizational culture, which were believed to be politically 
suicidal. Focusing on Uganda, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, Burundi and Liberia, Meesen et 
al. (2011) also showed how politics affected the implementation of user fee elimination policies 
in SSA in the 2000s. They found that in many of the countries, the removal of user fees was 
actually a vertical process, involving high level government officials (usually the president or 
prime minister and a few bureaucrats) making the decision, sometimes not only to the surprise 
of ordinary people, but also the very ministries and ministers officially responsible for 
implementing those policies, as in Burundi. In Uganda, on the other hand, although several 
empirical studies had revealed the need to remove user fees, the decision was delayed until the 
1991 elections, when the opposition parties pushed it onto the agenda (Meesen et al, 2011). 
Having seen that his re-election was at stake, the president quickly consulted with the Ministry 
of Health and Finance on how much it would cost to remove the user fees and, shortly 
thereafter, the user fee removal policy was announced (Meesen et al, 2011). Agyepong and 
Adjei (2008) also show how partisan and electoral politics shaped the process of introducing a 
national health insurance policy in Ghana in 2001. They observe that because experts' 
knowledge was not in favour of national health insurance at the time, most were sacked from 
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the committee responsible for drafting the insurance bill, leaving only political actors to make 
all the fundamental policy decisions.  
The partisan political perspective is limited in terms of explaining the radical health 
policy changes that occurred in such a short time in Ghana. The reasons, as indicated above, 
include the fact that both the user fee policy and the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), 
in particular, were introduced by governments that belonged to the side of the ideological 
divide which should generally avoid such policies. Also, they were somehow unpopular among 
the general public, including the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the lower class, who form 
the largest section of the voting public and whose support, according to the existing literature 
(Herbst, 1991; Hutchful, 2002), is crucial for sustaining the government in power. In fact, it 
was not only democratic governments such as the CPP, NDC and NPP that needed the support 
of these actors; dictatorial governments such as the PNDC also required their support to 
maintain legitimacy and sustain themselves in power (Haggard & Webb, 1993).  
Despite the above limitations, however, some partisan political calculations may have 
taken place, given the politico-economic conditions surrounding the changes. This study, 
therefore, provides an opportunity to unearth these factors and show how they interacted with 
other factors in the policy change processes.  
 
2.1.5. The Globalization Perspective  
The globalization perspective appears to have been the commonly employed theory of 
institutional change in the developing world, particularly after the 1980s (Ohemeng & Ayee, 
2012). This perspective focuses on how the unbalanced nature of the international system 
allows transnational actors and institutions to have a disproportionate impact on domestic 
policy (Selin & Linnér, 2005). In the developing world, the globalization perspective often 
focuses on the influence of major international actors such as the United Nations, the 
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Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD), the World Health 
Organization (WHO), and more especially, the IMF and the World Bank on public policies of 
sovereign states (Grindle, 2000). Generally, transnational actors shape domestic policies 
through expert advice; however, in developing countries including those in SSA, their role 
extends beyond just advisory services to financial assistance (Batley, 2004, p. 39). Whereas 
international assistance made up an average of 2.8% of total health care spending of developing 
countries in the 1990s, it represented about 20% of health care spending in Africa (excluding 
South Africa) (Cassels, 1995). Due to high levels of international support for health policies in 
developing countries, particularly in Africa, donors are said to play a significant role in 
domestic health policy making. Møgedal’s (1995) study on the health care reforms in Tanzania, 
Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia in the 1990s, for instance, suggests that international 
actors are usually the agenda-setters of domestic reforms. 
 Although the globalization perspective has gained significant currency in the literature 
on SSA, a number of scholars overemphasize one of the mechanisms through which 
transnational actors shape policy – the use of conditional aid (Ohemeng, Carroll & Carroll, 
2012). This is generally referred to as the imposition thesis (Selin & Linnér, 2005). While it 
makes an important contribution to the policy change debate, the imposition thesis is 
problematic in many respects. For instance, as Collins et al. (1999, p. 78) indicate, apart from 
the conditionalities, an international actor like the World Bank also partakes in foreign aid 
coordination in developing countries. Acting as a proposal actor and a global think tank, the 
Bank also provides expert assistance to developing countries (Orenstein, 2008; Béland & 
Orenstein, 2013). In support of this assertion, Meesen et al., (2011, p. 25) in particular, reveal 
the extent to which transnational actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
advocated (rather than imposed) user fees removal in countries like Liberia and Burundi. In 
fact, international actors also appear to have a more developed and systematic model of reform 
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than many countries, as exemplified by the World Bank's World Development Reports in 1993 
and 1996 as well as its yearly reports about sovereign countries all over the world. This may 
appeal to various states (Collins et al., 1999, p. 78). In addition, the World Bank’s reform 
agenda is often extensive, covering a wide range of sectors beyond health care. The Bank also 
works in collaboration with domestic governments, officials, civil societies, think tanks and 
research institutions in the form of broad policy networks that do not involve imposition in the 
traditional sense of the term (Collins et al., 1999, p. 78). Batley (2004) observed that in reforms 
in developing countries’ social sectors (e.g., water and health), including SSA, “core 
government officers, together with international agencies, were … the main initiators of 
change” (p. 50). As well, the Bank helps domestic policy actors travel abroad with the objective 
of exposing them to best practices elsewhere (Collins et al., 1999). It must also be noted that 
the Bank's ideas are themselves unstable (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). For instance, it promotes 
different policy ideas at different times, suggesting that the Bank itself might be an agent rather 
than the principal in the policy change process.  
In contrast with the popular imposition thesis, Collins et al. (1999) also suggest that 
significant policy changes in developing countries sometimes occur without the interference of 
the World Bank or other international organizations. This is true because, on their own, policies 
being implemented in one country can influence governments in other places to follow suit. 
For instance, many Latin American countries implemented market-based health systems in the 
1990s without the influence of the World Bank (Collins et al., 1999). A number of reform 
initiatives and ideas have also been introduced in many developing countries since the 1990s 
by domestic actors and institutions, rather than through external imposition (Ohemeng, 2005). 
Batley (2004) indicates that South Africa and Argentina implemented market-based reforms in 
the early 1990s, mostly without pressure from international actors, but for internal reasons such 
as the end of Apartheid and inflation, respectively (Batley, 2004). Botswana was also free from 
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external conditionality, but pursued reforms much like the ones implemented in Tanzania and 
Mozambique, which did have some external influences (Møgedal, 1995). Outside Africa, it is 
believed that Thatcher’s reforms in the UK and Reagan’s in the US influenced many parts of 
Western Europe and New Zealand, without any imposition from international organizations 
(Collins et al., 1999). A similar situation is reported to have occurred in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the 1980s and 1990s as most of them adopted a common policy – health insurance 
(Collins et al., 1999).  
In addition to from being a mere actor in the international system, Ghana generally 
occupies a weak position in the international economy, making the impact of globalization on 
Ghana's health care reforms a real possibility. Despite this fact, however, the extent to which 
international actors influenced the policy changes under study while reducing the agency and 
policy autonomy of national actors was not uniform. For instance, global actors appeared to 
have influenced the user fee policy more than the health insurance policy, and probably had 
similar levels of influence in the case of the NHS system. Also, the extent of their influence 
varied across regimes and processes; while global actors were crucial to the introduction of 
user fees, they were less influential during the policy’s implementation. Also, the government 
pursued the health insurance reform, even though key international actors such as the World 
Bank and the IMF were opposed to it. After pursuing the reforms, however, these international 
actors appeared to have gained much influence over the policy's implementation and 
sustenance. The complexities surrounding the globalization perspective, therefore, create the 
need to further question its applicability to the Ghanaian case of radical health policy change. 
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework 
The limitations of the above perspectives point to the need to search for a better explanation 
for how the radical changes in the Ghanaian health policy occurred, particularly within such a 
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relatively short time frame and despite many potential countervailing factors. To arrive at this 
explanation, I draw on ideas from recent developments within the institutionalist literature, 
according to which policy change is a dynamic political process where various factors interact 
in both complex and dynamic ways to bring about major policy changes. From the perspective 
of dynamic or actor-centred institutionalism, actors rather than institutions or structures are the 
drivers of policy stability and change (Jackson, 2010). As Pancaldi (2012) emphasizes, “even 
though institutions – broadly intended as formal rules and social norms – undoubtedly influence 
actors’ perception of reality, structure their interaction, and therefore condition policy outputs, 
it is simply actors that make policies” (p. 2). Thus, while it does not discount the significant 
role contextual factors played in policy change, the dynamic institutionalist literature depicts 
them as non-deterministic and as more dynamic than usually considered in much of the 
theoretical frameworks discussed above.  
 Following this perspective, a number of scholars have directed attention to the role of 
reformers, who may be referred to as design teams (Haggard & Webb, 1993), change teams 
(Grindle, 2000, 2004), programmatic actors (Hassenteufel et al., 2010), or policy entrepreneurs 
(Kingdon, 2003). Members of such teams might be tied to the political arena, the state 
bureaucracy, international organizations or the private sector, including interest groups 
(Grindle, 2000, 2004; Hassenteufel et al., 2010). They could also be a mix of actors from these 
broad constituencies (Grindle, 2000, 2004). Scholarship within this perspective emphasizes the 
central role of reformers in policy change. Typically, these reformers dominate key aspects of 
the policy process, including developing the actual content of a policy and shaping its very 
outcomes (Haggard & Webb, 1993; Grindle, 2000, 2004; Hassenteufel et al., 2010). Hence, as 
Grindle (2000) argues, focusing on how these reformers "shepherd reforms from definition 
through political turmoil to adoption and implementation" is crucial for the analysis of policy 
change (p. 2).  
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The basis of this approach, according to Haggard and Webb (1993), is to construe 
policy change as "an exercise in coalition-building" (p. 58). This means that reformers’  
"composition and style of work" and their ability to garner sufficient support for their proposed 
reforms and weaken opposition to them can directly shape policy processes and outcomes 
(Grindle, 2004, p. 20). In other words, the analysis of policy change must pay particular 
attention to how the reformers are constituted, who gets to serve on the reform team, what 
responsibilities they are accorded and how they tend to pursue their goals, including 
championing them through political, structural and institutional means. 
A number of empirical studies support this perspective. Focusing on France, Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom, Hassenteufel et al. (2010) introduce the idea of "programmatic 
actors" who are basically drawn from the public service (current or retired), the medical 
profession, the legislature, academia, political parties and the private sector. They define 
programmatic actors as "collective actors who share policy ideas and compete for legitimate 
authority over sectorial policy making" (Hassenteufel et al., 2010, p. 518). What differentiates 
programmatic actors from all other actors in the policy process is the fact that (a) they bear 
similar policy ideas; (b) they possess resources such as institutional position (i.e., either situated 
at or near the locus of power), legitimacy or the strategic capacity to produce change; and 
finally (c) they are ultimately interested in change, not necessarily for material reasons, as the 
quest for professional recognition and personal satisfaction can also motivate them. Depending 
on the institutional makeup of the state, these key actors can take the form of programmatic 
elites, programmatic coalitions or programmatic teams.  
In examining the health insurance process in France since 1981, Hassenteufel et al. 
(2010) show how a small group of senior civil servants collectively championed the idea of 
spending limits, which resulted in the dominance of the state in a health sector hitherto 
dominated by physicians and other non-state actors. In their book, Hassenteufel et al. (2010) 
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made a similar observation about the situation in Spain in the 1980s, when a group of 
physicians introduced a NHS system based on the British NHS model. As for Germany, its 
transition from a system that was wholly managed by the sickness funds to one featuring the 
incorporation of the regulatory state, Hassenteufel et al. (2010) stressed that it was a coalition 
of actors from public service, academia and the legislature that developed the idea and manned 
the entire policy change process. For instance, the 1992 and 2003 reforms were pursued by a 
two party coalition (Social Democratic Party and Christian Democratic Union - Christian 
Social Union ), and the 2007 reform was developed and decided upon by a tripartite 
commission, with membership drawn from parliament, the länder, and the political parties 
forming the ruling coalition at the time. In the case of health care reform in the UK since the 
1980s, a loosely connected group of political advisors, drawn from the academia and the private 
sector, championed the policy development and change process. Their role as advisors 
accorded them direct access to the levers of power, which enabled them to pursue their policy 
goals. Thus, the authors concluded that it was these ideas-bearing and resourceful actors that 
shaped the transition from a corporatist to a regulatory health care system, where the state 
assumes a dominant role in health care management and administration (Hassenteufel et al., 
2010).  
In his pivotal study Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Kingdon (2003) 
introduces the “window of opportunity” framework to explain when and how significant policy 
change may occur through the actions and strategies of policy entrepreneurs, who he refers to 
as “advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time energy, reputation, money – to 
promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or 
solitary benefits” (p. 179). As he develops his arguments, Kingdon identifies three streams that 
make up the policy process: the problem, the policy and the politics streams. The problem 
stream encompasses the issues that may capture the attention of policymakers, the policy 
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stream contains policy solutions and the actors designing them, and the politics stream is about 
political factors such as swings in national mood and electoral results. Kingdon (2003) argues 
that these streams operate independently from one another and are coupled either by chance or 
by the actions of policy entrepreneurs during short windows of opportunity when policy change 
is most likely to occur. Since its development, Kingdon’s window of opportunity framework 
has inspired various studies on policy change across the world. For example, Marchildon 
(2014) used it to explain the establishment of the universal medical care system of Canada in 
the 1960s. Leiber, Greß and Manouguian (2010) also used it to explore the way the 2007 
German health care reform was influenced by the central fund and flat-rate premium models 
of the Netherlands. 
The most interesting aspect of Kingdon’s (2003) framework so far as this study is 
concerned is that it provides a realistic understanding of the agenda setting process, particularly 
when and how issues and policy ideas make their way onto the policy agenda. It also helps to 
better understand how the strategies of policy entrepreneurs, in terms of advocacy and 
brokerage, matter for policy change. In explaining the radical changes in Ghanaian health 
policy, these two areas of the window of opportunity framework will be useful, at least at the 
agenda setting stage.  
The fundamental limitation of the window of opportunity framework that prevents me 
from making it the sole analytical foundation of this study is that it focuses only on the agenda 
setting and alternative specification stages of the policy process, neglecting other aspects of the 
policy process (Howlett, Ramesh & Perl, 2009), particularly implementation and sustainability. 
These stages are crucial sites of policy change in the developing world (Grindle & Thomas, 
1989; Parliament of Ghana, 2003, p. 167). More important for this study, in many developing 
counties, where institutions are generally weak and a majority of the policy changes tend to fail 
beyond the initial stages of the policy process, especially during implementation (Grindle & 
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Thomas, 1989), it is very important to explore the entire policy process. Kingdon’s argument 
that policy entrepreneurs must have their policy initiative ready when windows of opportunity 
open also makes his work less applicable to Ghana, where, as suggested in this study, except 
in the case of the NHIS, such windows rarely open. In other words, the policy entrepreneurs in 
this study seldom waited with initiatives ready to be implemented once policy windows open. 
But even after the window of opportunity has opened and the agenda for change is set, 
policymakers may still have great hurdles to surmount before a significant policy change may 
occur. This is because opposition to policy change tends to occur after the agenda setting stage, 
particularly during adoption and implementation. In order to explain radical changes in 
Ghanaian health policy beyond the agenda setting stage, therefore, Kingdon’s (2003) “window 
of opportunity” framework may have to be complemented with other factors, particularly 
Grindle’s (2004) “dynamic political process” model.  
Focusing on education reforms in Latin America, Grindle (2004) introduces an 
analytical framework that explains policy change as a “dynamic political process that unfold 
over time [and] as complex chains of interactions subject to the interaction of reform advocates 
and opponents in particular institutional contexts that are sometimes subject to alteration” (p. 
15). As part of her framework, Grindle (2000, 2004) points to how “reform mongering” by key 
policy entrepreneurs, such as governments and design teams, among others, plays a 
fundamental role in instituting path-departing policy change, even when there is no window of 
opportunity. In such situations, she argues that the strategic choices of the reformers or policy 
entrepreneurs are crucial to pursue path-departing change. For instance, "reform mongering by 
the president and ministers" or the executive leadership is identified as critically important in 
setting the agenda for change (Grindle, 2004, p. 20). Some of the strategies the governments 
tend to employ at this stage involve capitalizing on their institutionally-vested power of 
appointment to fill important positions of authority with people who support their views 
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(Grindle, 2000, 2004). Thus, they can use appointments to put people who would support 
(rather than impede) change in positions of authority. They may also influence the timing of 
reforms by ensuring that reforms are pursued at the time the environment is conducive for 
change, particularly after all potential opponents have been either eliminated or convinced of 
the policy change. Additionally, they can set the parameters within which public debates, 
expert discussions and political discourses surrounding proposed reforms are pursued, for 
example, by determining the main issues that are being discussed (Grindle, 2004).  
According to Grindle (2004), once issues have made it to the policy agenda, design 
teams are set up to develop proposals for reform. The kind of preferences and choices the teams 
put forward are fundamentally shaped by the teams’ make-up and preferences rather than any 
governmental or interest group influences. The author makes this argument even clearer in the 
earlier (2000) version of the study, which focused on Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina. She 
argues that the content of the policies as hammered out by the design teams “could not be 
clearly linked to the pressures or preferences of either domestic or international interest groups, 
nor directly in the electoral calculations of politicians, [as only a] little mobilization of public 
or international demand for reform [was sought] and the political gains they promised to 
politicians were often ambiguous " (p. 8). Thus, design teams are critical in policy change. 
Despite the above, she notes that the most successful design teams are the ones that 
establish strong networks with the government in power and other domestic and international 
actors relevant to achieving their assigned goals (Grindle, 2004). In addition, to remain 
effective, the design teams should be able to make decisions easily, either through consensus, 
compromise or negotiations. They should also develop strategies to enhance the chances of 
success of their initiatives. For example, they estimate the likely losers and their potential 
reaction against the proposed policy. This is what is called "smoothing" (Grindle, 2000, p. 32). 
The purpose of smoothing is to counter actors opposed to change, and it is generally meant to 
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ease the way to policy change. In doing this, the design team’s level of transparency, the kind 
of actors they decide to involve in the policy process, the issues they decide to consult or 
negotiate on, the atmosphere within which they decide to deliver their policy recommendations 
and the extent to which they are able to solicit support from political authorities matter 
significantly for their success. The stakeholders whose ideas matter the most are usually fully 
incorporated in the policy process, sometimes from the beginning, while those who matter less 
are just consulted after the end of the policy design stage. In fact, sometimes stakeholder 
involvement is completely ignored, especially where it is perceived that their role might 
adversely affect the chances of reform. Other strategies the design teams can employ to counter 
domestic interests and institutions include negotiations and consultation, by which the teams 
actually determine the underlying terms of reform. Grindle (2000), for example, reveals that, 
in Venezuela, the reform team focused on building consensus among the national elites in 
support for change. In the case of the reform in Bolivia, in addition to making an adjustment to 
the original participatory plan of the design team, an agreement was signed with the opponents 
of the policy, assuring them that the policy would be implemented in ways that would not 
undermine their interests. The design team in Bolivia went even further by amending its final 
policy recommendations. Despite these limitations, however, Grindle (2000) observes that the 
consultations and negotiations were generally undertaken merely to "put finishing touches" on 
already made decisions. For instance, in Bolivia, no obvious changes were made to the original 
policy proposal, despite the existence of a signed agreement.  
When reform initiatives are publicised, usually during the legislative or adoption 
process, the above reformers usually lose significant level of control since the arena of policy 
change shifts to the public domain. At this stage, the reformers may alter their strategies. For 
instance, they may have to compromise with opponents rather than to confront them. For 
Grindle (2004), the implementation stage is also shaped by the characteristics of the 
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implementing agency and the relationship between the reformers and the various levels of 
implementation. As for the sustainability stage, during which the implemented policy must be 
sustained over time, it is shaped by the extent to which the reform initiatives have been able to 
generate new supporters, and reformers have the incentive to preserve the policy in the first 
place (Grindle, 2004).  
As suggested in this thesis, Grindle’s (2004) framework is the most systematic and 
convincing analytical framework for understanding the three main health care changes in 
Ghana since independence. This is because, beyond placing policy entrepreneurs at the centre 
of the study of policy change, Grindle (2004) also provides a comprehensive understanding of 
policy change, beginning from agenda setting and ending with implementation and 
sustainability. As stated above, due to the severe financial difficulties and other challenges of 
implementation in developing countries, including Ghana, the politics of policy change usually 
heat up after the agenda-setting and alternative specifications emphasized by Kingdon’s 
window of opportunity framework. Thus, in contrast to Kingdon’s (2003) most useful but most 
limited approach, Grindle’s (2004) policy as political process framework takes a broader look 
at policy change, which puts it in a better position to explain the three episodes of radical policy 
change at the centre of this empirical analysis. It has an additional benefit of providing 
mechanisms by which change may be pursued in the face of strong obstacles. 
Grindle’s (2004) analytical framework is not without limitations, however. First, it does 
not account for how certain contextual factors related to the nature of the economy and political 
transitions may create the impetus for policy change to occur. For instance, as she emphasized, 
“episodes of reform were not systematically associated with particular economic conditions or 
with particular characteristics of party systems, governing coalitions, or electoral cycles. 
Rather, the emergence of reform initiatives is almost universally traced to the interests and 
actions of political executives or those closely associated with them; their concerns to improve 
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education was generally part of broader political and policy agendas they espoused…" 
(Grindle, 2004, p.20). To capture the contrary perspective more clearly in the analytical 
framework of this study, I draw ideas from Kingdon’s (2003) “window of opportunity” 
framework. By so doing, I show how certain conjunctural factors, such as the state of the 
Ghanaian economy, the crisis of the health care system, or changes in government, created 
“policy windows” which were seized upon by policy entrepreneurs to bring about path-
departing policy change. Second, Grindle’s (2004) framework proposes change strategies that 
are largely mechanistic and rationalistic, neglecting a systematic analysis of those strategies 
that involve the use of cognitive and normative ideas and frames (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002; Stone, 2002; Fischer, 2003; Padamsee, 2009; Leiber et al, 2010; 
Starke, 2010; Béland & Cox, 2011; Mehta, 2011; Wincott, 2011) and feature subtle and 
incremental, but cumulatively transformative strategies like layering new policies on the top of 
existing ones (Hacker, 2004; Thelen, 2004; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2010). Finally, 
Grindle’s (2004) analysis is limited in relation to the use of coercive mechanisms to pursue 
change. This study provides additional strategies of policy change, such as the use of brutality, 
media censorship, and the co-optation or banning of oppositional groupings and activities. In 
an attempt to transcend these limitations, the analytical framework used in this study also draws 
selectively on historical institutionalism, frame analysis, and the analysis of repressive political 
strategies. 
 As indicated above, the historical institutionalist approach to radical policy change 
focuses on the mechanisms of change that are usually endogenous, and gradual, but all the 
while “transformative" (Thelen, 2010, p. 45). They include displacement, layering, conversion, 
and policy drift (Thelen, 2010). These four mechanisms, though incremental, could lead to a 
path-departing change over time. In his study on institutional change and globalization, 
Campbell (2004, 2010) introduces additional change mechanisms, such as bricolage and 
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translation. Bricolage "involve[s] the rearrangement or recombination of institutional 
principles and practices in new and creative ways, [while translation points to] ... the blending 
of new elements into already existing institutional arrangements" (Campbell, 2010, pp. 98-99). 
Although not necessarily incremental in nature, these two additional mechanisms complement 
the ones Thelen (2010) discussed and are relevant for an analysis of radical policy change. 
These mechanisms are important because they help to devise a framework that is more dynamic 
than the path-dependency/punctuated equilibrium approach, which is why the tools they 
develop are appropriate for this thesis and its reformer-centred approach.  
Exploring the cognitive and normative mechanisms of policy change, scholars have 
explored the role of framing processes. In particular, how reformers may manipulate the 
cognitive orientation of potential opponents and the public at large to legitimize their programs 
(Campbell, 2004). Two main understandings of framing are available in the literature – 
ideational and psychological. The ideational dimension emphasizes the use of historically 
generated ideas and cultural symbols residing in the foreground of policy debates to legitimize 
reforms (Campbell, 2004). The psychological dimension, on the other hand, emphasizes hard-
wired mental processes that make individuals either support or oppose radical policy change 
(Parsons, 2007; Weyland, 2008). 
 It is argued that through an appropriate framing device, one could help shape public 
perceptions about a particular policy and also turn a potentially “unacceptable” policy into an 
“acceptable” one. Various suggestions have been advanced regarding how to launch an 
effective framing campaign. For instance, focusing on the ideational dimension, Campbell 
(2004) and Béland (2005) suggest a two-dimensional approach to an effective framing 
campaign. In one dimension, the framer should launch a “discursive opposition" (Campbell, 
2004, p. 98) to the status quo by portraying it as both incredible and unacceptable. This is 
supposed to create urgency for change. Thereafter, within the other framing dimension, the 
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framer should orient the public in a particular way to justify their reform proposals (Béland, 
2005). Following a similar approach, Bahtia and Coleman (2003) examine the conditions under 
which framing processes embedded in policy discourse can serve as means to bring about 
policy change, even in the absence of change in political institutions and interests. Using the 
cases of health care reforms in Canada and Germany in the 1980s, they argued that Germany 
was able to pursue an extension of solidarity (from a class-based approach to a universal 
approach) because the opposition party was able to launch a powerful, challenging discourse 
that generated a broad consensus among policy elites about the nature of the status quo, and 
offered a normatively persuasive and convincing cognitive solution to the problem at hand. 
However, in Canada, the opposite discourse (involving a reduction in solidarity) generated by 
the Alberta provincial government was unpersuasive and encountered strong resistance, 
leading to the policy failure of the privatization agenda.  
Focusing on the psychological dimension and drawing on prospect theory and cognitive 
psychology, Weyland (2008) emphasizes the two main domains of interpretation – loss or gain 
– and how they shape policy change. Actors are in a domain of gain when they foresee a 
situation as having positive effects on them and in the domain of loss when they foresee a 
situation as having a detrimental impact on them. Following prospect theory, the psychological 
perspective argues that actors are usually risk averse in the domain of gain and risk accepting 
in the domain of loss. As Weyland (2008) argues, "people who face prospects of losses go to 
great lengths to avoid any costs, even if the chosen remedy holds considerable danger... When 
facing positive prospects, people tend to proceed with caution. They pursue gains with 
prudence and, due to loss aversion, refuse to incur risks for this purpose" (pp. 286-287). Thus, 
framing the status quo in the domain of loss is crucial for a radical policy change to occur.  
Although they focus on economic policy reform, Haggard and Webb (1993) also 
provide additional strategies to complement my analytical framework. In their study, the 
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authors underline that while "policymakers undertaking economic reform rarely have much 
influence over the political structure or fundamental economic situation…they have 
considerable control over the design and tactics of reform” (p. 158). They itemize three main 
tactical and material approaches that design teams usually employ to shape policy change. 
These strategies relate to the tempo (i.e., whether reforms are introduced rapidly or not), 
sequence (whether they are introduced as a bundle or in a piecemeal) and remuneration 
(whether and how potential losers are remunerated). By referring to tempo, these scholars 
emphasize that policy change is usually more effective through a rapid approach, as it is more 
economical and has a tendency to generate more confidence for change relative to the delayed, 
slowed approach. As they point out, "delay has high economic costs and casts doubt on the 
sincerity of the reform effort" (Haggard & Webb, 1993, p. 158). They also note that the rapid 
approach is particularly important for a new government, as political support tends to peak at 
the beginning of every new government. As time goes on, however, the legitimacy of the 
government dwindles, making change difficult. Additionally, implementing reforms as quickly 
as possible allows the policy to more quickly develop a constituency for change. In particular, 
potential opponents may be taken by a surprise and hence unable to effectively organize against 
change. Introducing reforms quickly, therefore, can be a step towards ensuring successful 
reforms. 
Regarding the sequence of reforms, Haggard and Webb (1993) argue that reforms are 
usually more successful when they are introduced in a single package rather than in a 
piecemeal. Different aspects of a reform may generate different outcomes – negative and 
positive – so introducing reforms in a bundle allows reformers to offset potentially “bitter” 
policies with “sweet” ones. If different aspects of a reform are implemented differently, specific 
opponents may emerge to forge a united front, which could cause the reform to backfire 
(Haggard & Webb, 1993). Finally, since they involve reallocation and redistribution of 
52 
 
resources, reforms are likely to create benefits for some stakeholders while making others 
suffer losses, even if not necessarily making them completely worse off. Therefore, to become 
successful, reformers must incorporate appropriate compensation packages for those who 
might suffer as a result of the reform. Compensations to potential losers would calm opposition 
and create a sound atmosphere for policy change (Bonoli, 2000).  
Finally, in the case of Ghana, these strategies are complemented by the use of repression 
or force in some cases to smooth the policy process in its pursuit of path-departing policy 
change. Because Ghana has witnessed a number of military coups and authoritarian regimes 
since independence, studying the potential impact of repression on policy change is especially 
relevant.  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
In the above discussion, I have argued that the functionalist, interest-based, institutionalist, 
globalization and partisan politics approaches to policy change are limited because they 
overemphasize the role of existing health care system, vested interests, veto points, imposition 
by international organizations and partisan effects, respectively. Hence, they cannot adequately 
explain the Ghanaian health policy changes, which depart significantly from the existing health 
care system and were pursued despite opposition from vested interests, ideological conflicts 
and opposition from key international actors.  
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Figure 1 Summary of the theoretical framework of this study 
 
Bringing agency front and centre while explaining the path-departing health care 
changes in Ghana, this study draws ideas from actor-centred institutionalism, particularly the 
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window of opportunity thesis, the policy as political process model and the ideational, as well 
as the incremental but cumulatively transformative strategies explained above. It complements 
these frameworks with the repressive strategies employed by reformers in Ghana, which are 
generally lacking in much of the dynamic institutionalist literature. 
The Figure 2, above, illustrates the analytical framework of this study. In this 
framework, the state of the Ghanaian economy, coupled with the performance of the health 
care system and political transitions created windows of opportunity for change. Policy 
entrepreneurs then seized these opportunities and not only propelled the changes onto the 
agenda, but also saw them through design, approval, implementation and sustenance over time. 
The ability of policy entrepreneurs to go through the entire process successfully often depended 
on their commitment to reform and the strategies they employed, as well as the extent to which 
they were influenced by contextual factors such as institutions and policy legacies. 
By placing policy entrepreneurs at the centre of policy change, however, this 
framework does not suggest that contextual factors have no effect on policy change. Rather, it 
shows that contextual forces such as political transition and ideology may create a window of 
opportunity for change or structure the behaviour of the policy entrepreneurs in their pursuit of 
policy change, respectively14. Thus, this study’s analytical framework acknowledges situations 
whereby path-departing policy change may still occur despite the presence of contextual 
obstacles. 
  
                                                          
14 While it accommodates the window of opportunity thesis and the structuring impacts of contextual actors, the 
analytical framework of this study significantly disagrees with the strict deterministic argument that these 
necessarily determine the outcome of policy change. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction  
In order to arrive at an explanation that fits the reality of health policy change in Ghana, it was 
important to ground this study in a systematic discussion of the available research methods and 
techniques. This chapter, therefore, provides the methodological framework of the study: the 
research design, the methods and procedures of data collection and analysis, the justifications 
for employing those research approaches and methods, as well as the key challenges 
encountered in the research process and how they were surmounted. Before doing this, it is 
important to recognize that a number of research approaches have evolved in the social sciences 
with the goal of helping scholars to better study social phenomena. These approaches can be 
broadly categorized into qualitative, quantitative and mixed-methods. The quantitative 
approach involves the use of experimental design and statistics to establish relationships among 
specific social behaviours and variables. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, focuses 
on strategies that are unquantifiable, such as observations, document reviews and interviews to 
address social phenomena. Mixed-methods blend strategies from both quantitative and 
qualitative sources to understand social behaviour (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  
Patton (1990) argues that whereas all the approaches are relevant, in order to attain the 
main goal of scientific inquiry, social scientists should pay primary attention to the 
"methodological appropriateness" of their study (quoted in Hoepfl, 1997, p. 48). In other words, 
the first and foremost priority should be how well the situation under investigation fits with the 
research approach chosen. For instance, based on the research problem, the purpose of the study 
and the research questions at hand, a particular type of research approach may appear the most 
useful (Patton, 1990; Hoepfl, 1997). Thus, none of the research approaches are universally 
superior to the others.  
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The qualitative approach was chosen for this study. The specific qualitative approaches 
employed involve a case study method, document reviews and semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews. This chapter provides details about each of these specific qualitative approaches 
and how they were employed. First, it discusses qualitative case study research method, 
focusing on its strengths and weaknesses and why it was the most appropriate approach for this 
study. Second, it explains the research design, beginning with a description of the research 
setting, particularly Ghana's health policy process and its geographical, demographic, political 
and economic history. Third, the methods and procedures of data collection and analysis are 
discussed. In the remaining sections, issues pertaining to ethics, the challenges encountered in 
the process of conducting the research and the measures taken to ensure the authenticity of the 
study's findings are also explained.  
 
3.2. Qualitative Case Study Method 
George and Bennett (2005) define a qualitative case study method as a “detailed examination 
of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events” (p. 5). It helps to attain a detailed understanding within the 
framework of the actors involved (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Yin, 2003) and “provides tools for 
researchers to study complex phenomena within their contexts” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 544). 
Kaplan and Maxwell (2003) emphasize that a qualitative case study approach is necessary 
where the causes of a situation are complex and for that matter no single variable can 
completely explain the observed outcome. This way, it "can yield theories and explanations of 
how and why processes, events and outcomes occur" (Kaplan and Maxwell, 2005, p. 33). Yin 
(2003) confirms the above argument, recommending the qualitative case study approach for 
scientific inquiry when the goal of the study is to address “why” and “how” questions, and 
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where contextual factors are critical for understanding the situation under study (see also Joia, 
2002; Baxter & Jack, 2008).  
The qualitative case study method is the most appropriate for this study given that I 
intend to attain a deeper understanding of the path-departing health policy changes in Ghana 
and, particularly, how and why they occurred within such a short period of time and despite 
the presence of factors (e.g. ideological conflicts and vested interests) that should theoretically 
prevent such outcomes. The use of this method in this research aided in uncovering the 
complexity inherent in policy change processes so as to devise a relevant explanation for why 
and how the changes occurred so quickly despite the countervailing factors. 
Qualitative explanations involve exploring or establishing relationships or patterns of 
association in the data available, as well as interrogating why these patterns or relationships 
occur the way they do (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Kaplan and Maxwell (2005) emphasize that, 
"although experimental interventions can demonstrate that causal relationships exist, they are 
less useful in showing how causal processes work" compared to qualitative systems (p. 33). 
Qualitative researchers can formulate explanations using explicit reasons (e.g., participants' 
response to factors that motivate their actions); inferring an underlying logic in the data (by 
juxtaposing or interweaving noted and connectable themes); using a common sense assumption 
(i.e. patterns that are commonly known to exist or make sense); developing powerful analytical 
concepts (such as "social loss", or "normalization"); drawing on commonly known conclusions 
in the empirical literature; or using theoretical frameworks (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 261). In 
this study, the health policy changes in Ghana are explained by combining explicit reasons, 
logical inference, and theoretical frameworks, focusing on the dynamic institutionalist 
approach that was discussed in the preceding chapter. Qualitative description involves 
exploring the meanings and the experiences of people with the goal of obtaining a holistic and 
interconnected understanding (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Thus, in this study the causal 
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explanations and analysis of the health care changes in Ghana are made following a detailed 
description of the contexts in which the reforms took place. 
Despite its relevance, the qualitative case study method is criticized for selection bias 
and lack of objectivity, reliability and validity (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). However, as Ritchie 
and Lewis (2003) emphasize, much of these criticisms are the result of ineffective employment 
of qualitative method, rather than due to a limitation of the method itself. According to them, 
objectivity or validity and reliability “are important features of qualitative research, and 
attainable aspirations” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 20). In order to promote the scientific basis 
of their studies, qualitative scholars must perform “internal checks on the quality of the data 
and its interpretation [as well as provide adequate] information about the research process” 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 272). Also, scholars should be reflexive in their approaches. That 
is, while they are responsible for structuring the direction of the entire research and data 
collection, scholars must ultimately ensure that the content of their studies truly reflect the 
viewpoints of research participants. This could be achieved by encouraging active involvement 
of research participants and ensuring that “participants covers the full range of dimensions, 
constituencies or groups which are of relevance to the research questions” (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003, p. 80).  In analysing their data, scholars must also combine “creativity” with “systematic 
searching” and “inspiration” with “diligent detection” in order to ensure that scientific inquiry 
“is an inherent and ongoing part of … [their] research” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 199).  
 
3.3. Description of the Research Site – Ghana 
The research was undertaken in Ghana, which is situated in West Africa, between latitudes 4° 
and 12°N and longitudes 4°W and 2°E. It shares borders with Togo to the East, Burkina Faso 
to the North, Cote d’Ivoire to the West, and the Gulf of Guinea to the South. The size of Ghana 
is about 238,533 square kilometres. The country is divided into ten main administrative 
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regions, which are further divided into metropolises, municipalities, districts, city, towns and 
villages. The main unit of local governance is the district. Currently, there are 216 districts. 
The capital city is Accra, which also doubles as the capital of the Greater Accra region. The 
latest population and housing census, which took place in 2010, pegs Ghana's population at 
24,658,823. Of those, 48.7% are men and 51.3% are women (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS], 
2012). 
 The country gained independence from Great Britain on the 6th of March, 1957, the 
first country in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to have done so. It started off as a parliamentary 
democracy. The country, however, attained republican status in 1960 and transitioned into a 
presidential system, with Dr. Kwame Nkrumah as the first president. Later, the country went 
through a turbulent period from 1966 to 1992, characterized by an alternating military and 
civilian regimes. In 1992, a stable democratic system of government was finally restored. 
Having gone through six successive, peaceful elections since 1992, Ghana can be described as 
one of the few countries in Africa that has a sustainable democracy (Arthur, 2010). The 
consolidation of Ghana’s democracy has also contributed to shaping the policy making process 
(Carroll & Ohemeng, 2012). For a long time, Ghana’s policymaking process followed the 
bureaucratic model, where politicians and bureaucrats excluded the participation of other 
actors, as in many developing countries (Tsikata, 2001; Ohemeng & Ayee, 2012). With the 
development of a stable system of governance in Ghana, however, this has changed, paving 
way for many other actors, including civil society ones, to participate in the policy process 
(Ohemeng, 2005; Kpessa, 2009; Ohemeng & Ayee, 2012). 
At the time of independence, Ghana’s gross domestic product (GDP) was comparable 
to those of Malaysia and South Korea. Not too long after independence, however, Ghana’s 
GDP fell (Werlin, 1994; Asare & Wong, 1999; Mazrui, 2006). Thus, whereas both Malaysia 
and South Korea have had a sustainable and growing middle-income economy for a very long 
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time (South Korea is now a high income country), Ghana had only moved from a lower income 
country to a lower middle income country in 2010/2011, a status it is struggling to maintain 
(Sakyi, 2011).  
Ghana was chosen for this study because its experience addresses the main challenges 
identified in the existing literature on health care change: a failure to focus on path-departing 
health care change globally and in Low-Income Countries (LICs) in particular. Since Ghana 
pursued path-departing changes within a relatively short time frame, despite the influence of 
factors such as massive opposition from vested interests and the potential of ideological 
conflicts (Herbst, 1993; Coleman, 1997), it also provides useful information with which the 
existing literature on health care change, analyzed in Chapter Two, could be further 
interrogated. 
In addition to being the first country in SSA to have attained independence, Ghana is 
representative of SSA, especially when the sub-region's recent political experiences are taken 
into consideration. For instance, it has experienced almost all the different political regimes 
that broadly characterize post-independence SSA history, including authoritarianism, a one-
party system, a military takeover, and democracy. Focusing on Ghana, therefore, can serve as 
a point of comparison and an example for many countries in SSA and beyond. That said, 
Ghana’s case is unique in a number of ways, including the rapid succession of radical health 
care reforms it witnessed in recent decades. This is partly why this thesis adopts a case study 
approach, which is best suited for the type of in-depth historical and political analysis 
undertaken here to explain policy stability and change over time.  
 
3.4. Data Collection 
As indicated, two main sources of data were gathered for the study. They include document 
reviews and in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Document reviews involve studying existing 
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documents to “understand their substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings which 
may be revealed by their style and coverage” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 35). Document 
reviews are particularly relevant in studies where past events and experiences, communications 
and private and public records can help shed light on specific historical and political 
developments (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). They are also relevant for studying situations where 
direct observations are impossible (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Since the situations under study 
involve particular events and processes that took place between the 1950s and 2000s, quite a 
number of studies had, indeed, been conducted on them. Hence, resorting to document reviews 
was found to be appropriate in providing a detailed and comprehensive understanding of the 
extent to which the literature on health care change explains the changes observed in this case.  
 In order to properly conceptualise the literature, existing studies were categorised into 
two groups. The first group encompassed the theoretical studies on policy change and, 
especially, on health care policy. I sought to familiarize myself with the different theoretical 
studies on health care stability and change so as to map out the key themes that could help 
guide my collection of empirical data on the health care systems and transitions in Ghana. The 
key themes that emerged during the review process of this set of literature were broadly 
discussed in Chapter Two. They include functionalism, interests, institutionalism, partisan 
politics and globalization. 
The second set of documents I reviewed included existing materials on health care 
reforms in SSA in general, and Ghana in particular. They included relevant government 
documents, major Africa and Ghana newspapers, Presidents’ speeches and press releases, 
parliamentary records, NGOs’ reports, political party documents (manifestos and 
constitutions), reports of international organizations (World Bank, IMF, WHO, ILO), as well 
as relevant scholarly books and journal articles on the health policy process in Ghana. In 
reviewing these documents, my goal was to obtain a detailed understanding of the pattern and 
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politics of health policy change in Ghana, especially related to the three regimes of health care 
change in this study.  
I reviewed this literature through the lenses of the broad perspectives identified in the 
theoretical literature and so was able to conceptualize the Ghanaian situation in relation to that 
theoretical literature. In turn, these conceptualizations helped in developing specific ideas to 
describe the Ghanaian situation. Some of these ideas are the imposition thesis, which 
emphasizes the disproportionate impact of global forces on health care change; the strong 
influence of institutions on policy change, including related to the colonial legacy; and the 
weak role of medical interests, particularly the medical association, in policy change. Other 
themes, such as economic crisis, political transition and political parties, were also identified. 
These ideas helped me formulate the research questions underlying this study, as well as the 
questions I explored during my fieldwork in Ghana. A review of the empirical literature also 
helped me uncover some of the key participants and stakeholders in the health care reforms 
under study. These actors were subsequently contacted during the fieldwork for face to face 
interviews. 
Ofori-Birikorang (2009) stresses that relying solely on document reviews “might lead 
to a degree of subjectivity on the part of the researcher” (p. 98). It may also lead to ambiguous 
results (Kpessa, 2009). To limit these biases, the document reviews were coupled with in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) define a semi-structured interview as a 
conversation between the researcher and the relevant stakeholders, whereby the former actively 
participates in the process with the aim of probing the latter for detailed information. Rightly 
so, this type of interview is sometimes referred to as a "conversation with a purpose" (Ritchie 
& Lewis, 2003, p. 138). Ofori-Birikorang (2009) declares that an interview is a “very rich 
source of data because the information provided is first hand, presumably accurate, and reveals 
the world of the participants, their emotions, and thoughts about the world around them” (p. 
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100). Interviews also provide an atmosphere that encourages social actors to tell their own 
stories regarding issues that affect them without interference. Thus, the semi-structured, in-
depth interviews allowed me to unravel detailed information from the viewpoint of the relevant 
stakeholders I identified through the document reviews. It also allowed for flexibility, which, 
in turn, allowed me to seek further clarification from the research participants both prior to and 
after the interview process. By adding in-depth interviews to my research, I could also "explore 
all the factors that underpinned the participants' answers: reasons, opinion, and beliefs", thereby 
feeding the explanatory logic that underlies this study (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 141).  
In all, I interviewed 35 participants for the study. These participants were recruited 
based on a stratified purposive sampling method. A stratified purposive sampling method 
involves selecting participants across relevant groups dealing with the same phenomenon; each 
group must be homogenous enough so that cross-group comparisons can be made (Ritchie & 
Lewis, 2003). In this regard, the sample was drawn from the main groups of stakeholders I 
identified through the document reviews as having been influential in the policy processes 
under investigation. These stakeholders include the media; cabinet ministers; officials in the 
Ministries of Health, Social Welfare and Finance; experts from the Ghana Health Service and 
the National Health Insurance Authority; parliamentarians and parliamentary staffers; 
members from civil society (the Trade Union Congress, the Ghana Medical Association, Help-
Age and the Christian Health Association of Ghana); and foreign experts from the World Bank, 
Danish Development Assistance Programmes (DANIDA), International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and World Health Organization 
(WHO)15 (Zwi & Mills, 1995; Batley, 2004; Agyepong & Adjei, 2008).  
                                                          
15 The sample was distributed as follows: two media personnel; three cabinet ministers; seven officers from the 
Ministries of Health, Finance and Social Welfare; eight officers from the Ghana Health Service and National 
Health Insurance Authority; four parliamentarians and parliamentary staffers; nine people from the civil society 
sector; and five foreign experts. Three individuals belonged to two of the above classifications. 
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Ritchie and Lewis (2003) argue that once the relevant participants have been identified, 
the next step should be to develop a sample frame from which those people would be selected. 
The sample frame should be relevant to the research questions and allow the researcher to 
identify and make contact with relevant participants. The main sample frame for this study was 
organizational. The organizational sample frame involves recruiting participants for a study 
through the help of specific stakeholders or organizations that work with them (Ritchie & 
Lewis, 2003, p. 93). It is particularly useful for "generating a sample frame for a group which 
cannot be identified through official statistics or administrative records, and which are too 
scattered or small to be identified easily through a household screen" (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, 
p. 93).  
To identify the particular individuals that shaped the changes copies of the letters of 
recruitment, which had been approved by the Ethics Board of the University of Saskatchewan, 
were emailed to the relevant stakeholders at least two weeks to my travel to Ghana on the 3rd 
of March, 2013. In addition to making a formal request for participation in the study, the letters 
detailed the purpose and significance of the study, as well as the ethical measures underpinning 
it. Out of the over 20 letters submitted to various stakeholders through email, only three 
responses (from UNDP, DANIDA, and the African Women Leaders Network) were obtained 
prior to my travel to Ghana. Hence, after my arrival in Ghana, I visited the offices of these 
stakeholders to personally request their support in identifying individual participants for the 
study. This approach proved to be a more effective way of recruiting the participants compared 
to the email approach, especially since it allowed me to familiarize myself with some of the 
personnel of these organized stakeholders. Among all the stakeholder organizations that I 
visited during the participant recruitment process, the MoH was the most helpful; in addition 
to furnishing me with the list of potential participants, it also provided additional information 
related to other stakeholder organizations that participated in the reforms but were not 
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mentioned in the existing documents. These included the Department of Social Welfare within 
the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare and the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT). 
A snowball method was added to the organizational sample frame to identify additional 
participants. A snowball method involves "finding research subjects, as one subject 
recommends another subject, who in turn refers another subject and so on" (Baidoo, 2009, p. 
87). It is especially significant where participants involve a small population, are dispersed, 
and require a certain level of trust to participate. I added snowballing because the participants 
are largely elite, and many are in positions of power or even retired. Those in positions of 
power are usually busy and one generally requires protocols to be able to see them.  
For participants in the 1980s reform, for instance, current officials were asked to refer 
people who were still alive and participated in the reforms. Unfortunately, none of those who 
had participated directly in the transition to the NHS system of the 1950s/1960s were alive to 
inform the study. However, some of the participants of the user fee and NHIS reforms provided 
useful information about the NHS that helped to complement the information obtained through 
the documents reviewed. A snowball method, however, may be challenged by the likelihood 
of participants recommending only like-minded people, such as friends, which could 
significantly skew the data (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). In preventing this potential challenge, as 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) suggest, I gave detailed information about the characteristics of the 
additional participants to the referrers. The referrers were then asked to indicate not only people 
who shared their ideas and preferences, but also those that opposed them during the reforms. 
That strategy allowed me to enlist divergent perspectives on the reforms, which also aided in 
limiting potential biases in the interview data.  
All the interviews were conducted individually and in person. Individual participants 
were contacted directly by phone or through email, depending on the type of contact 
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information available. On my first contact with the participants, I introduced myself and 
explained the research agenda before requesting their participation in the study. This helped in 
creating a comfortable atmosphere and rapport during the interviews. When participants agreed 
to be interviewed, these were scheduled based on times and locations determined by the 
participants.  
All the interviews were conducted in English, which is the official language of Ghana. 
English was chosen because all the participants understood and spoke it perfectly. Before 
starting each interview, the purpose and ethical procedures underlying the study were 
reiterated16. This allowed me to reassure the participants about ethical and confidentiality issues 
while focusing their attention on the topic of this study. Except for five longer interviews 
(between 1 and 3 hours), all the interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, which is in line 
with the timeframe generally regarded as conducive for a lively interview (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003).  
The five interviews that lasted longer than an hour did so because, based on the 
document reviews and stakeholder interactions, the participants were widely noted to have 
played extensive roles in the reforms under study. Hence, engaging them in a much more 
detailed discussion was critical to enrich the study. To allow these participants to prepare for 
the detailed discussion, however, both written and verbal permissions to that effect were sought 
during my initial contact with them. Fortunately, they all agreed to their interviews at least two 
weeks ahead of time, giving them the opportunity to adequately prepare. Coincidentally, all 
these interviews occurred on the weekends, when the participants were relatively free from 
official duties that could distract them. I took advantage of these opportunities to question these 
interviewees as much as I deemed relevant for the study.   
                                                          
16 Because the participants were all elites, they were also given hardcopies of the recruitment forms, which 
contain the purpose and ethical procedures of the study. They read and signed those forms before the interviews.  
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3.5. Research Instrument 
For the purpose of the in-depth interview process, I developed a semi-structured in-depth 
interview guide. The interview guide was prepared based on the relevant themes and issues 
identified through the document review. Some of the key themes explored during the 
interviews involved how the participants were connected to the health care reforms under 
study; their perceptions about how the ideas for change evolved and their role in the process; 
how the agenda for change was set, formulated, adopted, implemented and sustained; who were 
the key actors involved in the process of policy change and their positions on the reforms. I 
also interrogated how external actors, interests groups, partisanship, the state of the economy, 
public opinion and political transition shaped the reforms. Despite having these pre-set 
questions, I sought to remain flexible throughout the interview process. For instance, the 
original content of the interview guide was modified during the course of the interview process 
to make way for new information and additional insights. For instance, I incorporated the idea 
of strategic choice in the interview guide only after realizing their re-emergence in the 
responses of the first five interviewees. Also, while the questions on the interview guide were 
framed in general terms, I adapted them to suit the specific roles each participant played during 
the reforms under study. For example, the interviews for cabinet ministers and ministry 
officials focused to a large extent on how the idea for policy change emerged and what the 
process of formulating the reforms was like. The questions directed at front line bureaucrats, 
on the other hand, focused largely on implementation. Since the participants were very 
knowledgeable on a broad range of issues concerning the reforms, the interview guide 
protected me from straying from the substantive issues underlying the study.  
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For a number of reasons, including ethics and rapport17, I sought verbal and written 
permissions from the interviewees before each interview began. I used a tape recorder and a 
note pad to record the interviews. The note pad proved particularly useful in circumstances 
where the participants refused to be taped. Only three respondents refused to be recorded, 
indicating personal reasons. In these cases, I took detailed notes. Some of the interviews were 
transcribed into Microsoft Word documents immediately after they were conducted, but most 
of them were transcribed after the researcher had completed the entire interview process and 
returned to Canada. In all, the interview process ended in July 2013. 
 
3.6. Data Analysis 
The data was analysed through content analysis and process-tracing techniques. Content 
analysis involves reviewing documents in order to understand and ascertain both their content 
and context. It involves identifying important themes in the documents, how the themes are 
being portrayed, and the number of times they appear (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). As for process-
tracing, it involves “trac[ing] the links between possible causes and observed outcomes” 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 6). Process tracing enables the researcher to examine documents 
or archives, interview transcripts and other data sources “to see whether the causal process a 
theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the 
intervening variables in that case” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 6). Process-tracing is being 
used by a growing number of policy scholars. Campbell (2004) notes that ideational scholars 
can use process-tracing to study the impact of ideas on policy outcomes and to generate 
                                                          
17 Additional ways by which I built rapport with participants involved choosing appropriate dressing codes and 
communication skills. For example, since the research participants were mostly elite, I made sure that I put on a 
formal wear when going to conduct the interviews. I also used respectful language when addressing the 
interviewees. While it was enforced across the gender divide, use of respectful languages (such as “please,” 
“madam” or “sister”) was a special requirement when interviewing women, as Ghanaian women must, 
traditionally, be accorded much more respect than men.  
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hypotheses for future studies. Also, by using process-tracing, ideational scholars “can tell 
plausible stories about how, for instance, programs must fit into existing cognitive and 
normative constraints, and that if they don’t, then they are not likely to be effective” (Campbell, 
2004, p. 119). In this study, the process-tracing approach allowed me to explore the sequence 
of events leading to the health care transitions under study. It also helped me assess the 
relevance of the various causal factors and how they interacted to shape the patterns of health 
care policy change in Ghana.  
The computer program NVivo was used to analyse the interview data. Developed in 
1999, NVivo has become a useful tool for qualitative research analysis (Bazeley & Jackson, 
2013). It is able to organize and establish relationships in non-numerical or unstructured data. 
It can also perform coding and graphing, as well as store a significant amount of information, 
including pictures (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). Thus, after transcribing the interview tapes into 
Microsoft word documents, I uploaded the transcribed data into the NVivo software. 
Thereafter, I coded the uploaded data into common themes that emerged from responses given 
by the interviewees and subsequently, along the broad perspectives identified through the 
document reviews. By organising these themes along the broad perspectives identified through 
the document reviews, I was able to conceptualize the Ghanaian situation in relation to the 
existing literature. This conceptualization shaped my analysis in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 as well 
as the choice of the conceptual framework underlying this study.  
 
3.7. Validity/Trustworthy Concerns 
Measurements of integrity involve the researcher checking to see that the study is authentic. 
To enforce and protect the authenticity of the study's findings, therefore, I employed data 
triangulation and process and peer auditing, as well as asking the participants to review 
transcripts of their interviews. Triangulation is defined as “the use of different methods and 
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sources to check the integrity of, or extend, inferences drawn from the data” (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003, p. 43). By combining both document reviews and in-depth semi-structured interviews, I 
was able to juxtapose and compare the findings from each method. For example, the document 
reviews suggested that the user fee policy was externally imposed on Ghana. The information 
obtained through the interviews helped in understanding how that occurred. It indicated that 
although some direct external forces were involved, the reform process was largely driven 
locally. Juxtaposing these findings helped me to gain a more nuanced understanding of the 
factors that shaped policy change. To improve the validity of the study, the transcripts of the 
interviews were emailed to participants for verification. Participants were able to check their 
answers and correct any misconceptions that might have arisen during the interview and 
transcription process. Short phone conversations with some of the participants after the 
interviews (while in Ghana and after returning to Canada) also helped the researcher to seek 
clarification on complex issues as and when they emerged.  
 
3.8. Ethical Concerns  
To address the ethical implication of the study, a copy of the research proposal, including the 
interview guide was, first, sent to the ethics committee of the University of Saskatchewan for 
approval. Having received ethics approval, I ensured that all ethical procedures were followed. 
These include protecting participants' confidentiality, anonymity and rights and freedoms. For 
instance, as indicated, interview dates and times were booked with participants ahead of time 
to accord them enough opportunity to prepare for, or decline, the interviews if necessary. 
Whatever information they provided was kept confidential except when the participants 
indicated otherwise. For this reason, the actual names of the participants, except those that 
indicated otherwise, were eliminated from this dissertation. In place of their actual names, 
pseudonyms are employed. I also made sure that participants were aware of their rights. At the 
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start of each interview, the participants were provided with and read copies of the ethical 
procedures underlying the study. The participants were also informed about their right to stop 
the interview if/when they deemed necessary.  
 
3.9. Challenges and Solutions 
Most of the challenges I encountered during the data collection process related to the interview. 
For instance, though, the letters of recruitment were emailed to the relevant stakeholders about 
two weeks ahead of my travel to Ghana, responses to those emails were not forthcoming. As 
such, the participant recruitment process essentially began after I had arrived in Ghana. 
Additionally, although the participants were free to determine the date, venue and time they 
wished to be interviewed, some of them failed to show up as scheduled. Although the 
researcher managed to reschedule the meetings, this nevertheless led to a delay in the interview 
process. One of the relevant persons believed to have played a significant role in the transition 
to the health insurance process also refused to participate because he was too busy. However, 
he managed to direct me to a useful report he had compiled on the policy process. Additionally, 
as I mentioned above, none of the individuals who had participated in the NHS-type system 
directly were still alive. This was not unexpected given that the policy change had taken place 
about four decades ago. Also, some of the people who participated in the transition to the user 
fee policy directly were retired from the public sector, working in the private sector, or living 
abroad, making it difficult to identify them through the organizational sampling frame. 
However, I was able to identify and interview a significant number of them using the 
snowballing approach. To complement the information obtained from the direct participants in 
the reforms (and to ensure that enough relevant information was obtained for all the policy 
changes covered in this study), the definition of the relevant stakeholders was modified to 
include people who might not have played a direct role in the reforms, but were generally 
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referred by their organizations to have adequate knowledge on, and expertise in, the subject 
area. Interviewing those people proved useful as some of them had already done some work on 
the issues and eventually emerged as their organizations’ mouthpiece on such matters.  
 
3.10. Conclusion 
Given the complex nature of the topic of this study and its theoretical and explanatory intent, 
the qualitative case-study paradigm was identified as the most suitable for this research project. 
The qualitative case-study approach afforded me the opportunity to obtain a detailed 
understanding of how and why the changes occurred from the perspective of the relevant 
stakeholders and existing documents. The stakeholders include individuals and organizations 
that participated in the reforms directly and those that were not directly involved but believed 
to possess adequate information on, and expertise in, the issue area. By focusing on 
perspectives from both sources, I was able to establish triangulation, which helped to improve 
the validity of the study.  
The next three chapters explore the main health care regimes in Ghana since 
independence. Beyond assessing the scope of these changes, the chapters also provide an 
understanding of the various points of continuity, suggesting that the path-dependence thesis 
might not be debunked even in the context of radical policy changes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE IN GHANA 
4.1. Introduction 
Upon attaining political independence on March 6, 1957, Ghanaians were imbued with hope 
of a prosperous and buoyant future. As a popular saying by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the first 
president of Ghana, suggests, (“seek ye first the political kingdom and liberty and all other 
things shall be added unto it” [Timothy, 1963, p. 130]), people expected independence to put 
an end to the challenges associated with colonialism in Ghana. In the health sector, those 
challenges included a health care system that was exorbitantly expensive for patients, 
discriminatory against natives, urban-biased, significantly underdeveloped and woefully 
inadequate (Twumasi, 1981). To improve health care for all Ghanaians, the government 
decided to introduce far-reaching policies such as abolishing health care user fees and 
establishing more health care facilities (Senah, 2001). Consequently, by 1962, Ghana’s health 
system had become very much like the British NHS that offered universal health care to all 
residents. 
This chapter examines the process of transitioning from the minimalist approach to 
health care provided under the colonial system to the universal NHS-style health system after 
independence. Considering the political and the technocratic factors that influenced the change, 
it is clear that various factors interacted in both complex and dynamic ways to bring about 
comprehensive change to NHS. These factors include: (a) the poor and discriminatory state of 
the Ghana’s health system at the time; (b) the transition towards self-government; (c) the 
election of a socialist and nationalist leader, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, whose ideological affinity 
with the policy change was crucial; (d) the economic and human resource vibrancy of Ghana, 
which meant that that the necessary resources for pursuing the change were available; (e) the 
global trend towards big government, including the diffusion of the idea of the British NHS; 
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(f) the concentrated institutional configuration of Ghana’s legislature that, in turn, limited the 
veto points for potential sabotage by interests; and (g) policy entrepreneurship by the Maude 
Commission, which pushed the policy change onto the agenda, President Nkrumah, who led 
the entire reform process and Dr. Brachott’s design team and other actors, who supervised the 
adoption, implementation and sustenance of the policy change overtime. 
For the sake of simplicity, the above factors are classified into three categories: 
conjunctural factors or windows of opportunity, policy entrepreneurship and institutions. For 
instance, conjunctural factors such as the deplorable state of the health care system, the 
transition towards self-government, the election of a socialist leader, the international drive 
towards welfare state expansion and the growing Ghanaian economy created windows of 
opportunity for change. Various policy entrepreneurs then seized the opportunities to bring 
about policy change within Ghana’s favourable institutional context. For example, the new 
government (led by Nkrumah) set up the Maude Commission to study the health care situation 
in the country and make recommendations for policy change. Based on its findings, the 
Commission then put the NHS-type system on the agenda, a system that was ultimately 
designed by Dr. Brachott. In turn, the adoption process was facilitated by the socialist and 
nationalist orientations of the government, as well as, the commitment and strategies of the 
Nkrumah government, while the implementation process was facilitated by the quality of 
Ghana’s bureaucracy and the political strategies of President Nkrumah. Sustaining the policy 
change over time was also largely the result of the high political commitment and strategies of 
the government, including President Nkrumah, as well as, the policy’s ability to generate a 
large constituency, which guarded against its reversal even after the overthrow of the president. 
Finally, the policy change was facilitated by the institutional configuration of Ghana, which 
was made up of a unitary system and an executive-centered legislative assembly that was 
dominated by the members of the ruling party.   
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In the sections that follow, the transition to the NHS-type system is explored. The first 
section focuses on the evolution of health care change in post-independence Ghana, accounting 
for its main components, content, actors and timing. The second examines the magnitude of 
the change. The third section explores why and how the transition occurred, using analysed 
data mostly from the document reviews,18 while the fourth explores the interactive mechanisms 
at work and shows how various causal factors interlaced over time. The next section analyses 
the findings based on the theory of dynamic or actor-centred institutionalism, while the final 
section provides a concluding remark for the chapter. 
 
4.2. The Evolution of NHS in Ghana 
In the early part of the colonial period, modern health care, though important, was not a topical 
issue on the policy agenda (Brenya & Adu-Gyamfi, 2014). The fundamental reason, as Senah 
(2001) indicated, was that a majority of the population were not in tune with the modern or 
allopathic health system. They believed that it had been brought along by the Europeans who 
came to trade and eventually settled in the country. Ordinary Ghanaians were used to their 
indigenous health system because it was the only system familiar to them. Beyond that, it was 
(and still is) rooted in their culture and applies principles of healing that resonate well with 
their understanding of health care (Twumasi, 1981). As such, they held a strong belief that 
indigenous health care was a precious inheritance from their ancestors that must be protected 
and upheld (Twumasi, 1981). In contrast, the allopathic health system applied healing 
principles to which people could hardly relate. The fact that, when it was first introduced, 
modern health care was concentrated in the colonial posts such as castles and forts that mainly 
                                                          
18 The analysis in this chapter is based mainly on document review because, as suggested, the potential 
respondents were not alive to inform the study through semi-structured, in-depth interviews.  
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benefited Europeans rather than the entire population of Ghana likely convinced few of the 
benefits of modern health care (Arhinful, 2003). 
 However, due to the Europeans’ extensive communication and interaction with the 
natives in the 19th century, largely as a result of extensive European missionary activities and 
businesses in the hinterlands, the colonial administration decided to extend some modern health 
care to Ghanaians. The initial attempt included Ghanaians who were working in the colonial 
civil service, the military, and the mining sector (Baidoo, 2009). The inclusion project led to a 
concentration of most health care facilities in the colony and urban areas where most Europeans 
and civil servants lived, and so also contributed to the neglect of the hinterlands (Twumasi, 
1981). For instance, out of the 39 hospitals reported in colonial Ghana in 1927/28, about 72% 
were stationed in the colony, while the rest were shared by those in the hinterland - the Ashanti 
(15%) and the Northern (13%) regions (Patterson, 1981). This situation, among others19, 
directly contributed to the poor health conditions in the hinterlands, where a majority of the 
Ghanaian population lived (Baidoo, 2009). Thus, it was not surprising that only about 10% of 
the population could access medical care during the colonial era (Senah, 2001). Indeed, the 
figure might have been even lower; many of the natives (mostly official workers) who visited 
the health centres in the colonial era may have done so for the associated benefits (e.g., work 
leave, etc.) rather than to seek medical treatment (Twumasi, 1981; Senah, 2001). 
In 1852, the colonial authorities, with the consent of some colonial chiefs, introduced a 
Poll Tax in an attempt to increase natives’ enrolment in the health system (Arhinful, 2003). 
The philosophy behind its introduction was that “if the Gold Coasters [Ghanaians] needed 
health care they would have to pay for it” through a head tax (Arhinful, 2003, p. 33). The tax 
was supposed to generate additional revenues to support the national economy, but it was also 
                                                          
19 Also, “trypanosomiasis found in Ashanti and Northern region were not viewed as a threat to the colony; 
therefore, the colonial authorities and medical practitioners diverted their focus away from containing the 
disease and even suspended tsetse investigation between 1918 and 1923” (Baidoo, 2009, p. 34). 
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meant to make medical care free of charge (Arhinful, 2003). However, the policy failed, leading 
to the institution of user fees (Arhinful, 2003). Thus, whereas Europeans and Africans who 
worked for either the colonial government or businesses owned by Europeans, particularly the 
mines, were provided free medical care services, ordinary Ghanaians were paying for those 
services. Although they seemed small, the user fees proved expensive enough to discourage 
natives from accessing medical care (Baidoo, 2009). This was particularly true because, as 
Arhinful (2003) notes, fees were computed on the basis of the actual cost of service, plus 15% 
in additional charges to cover overhead costs. In this context, as Baidoo (2009) described, 
“native accessibility to the...health system became a sign of affluence to which many citizens 
aspired” (p. 33). 
By 1951, when the longstanding struggle for internal self-rule intensified, a majority of 
Ghanaians had grown receptive to modern health care for reasons that included its earlier 
success in treating contagious diseases such as yaws and small pox (Arhinful, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the health sector still faced deep challenges. It was, for example, largely focused 
on curative care, neglecting preventive services (Baidoo, 2009). According to Arhinful (2003), 
while there were three rural health centres by the time Ghana attained internal self-rule in 1951, 
there was still no preventive health care in Ghana.  
When Kwame Nkrumah assumed office as prime minister in 1951, he decided to pay 
particular attention to the health sector. First, he converted the colonial Health Department into 
a MoH, which was to be headed by an African. Second, he set up teams of experts whose aim 
was to study the health care situation in the country and make recommendation for change. The 
government also established the University of Ghana medical school with the goal of providing 
free medical training to Ghanaians. It also enlarged and improved the Korle Bu Teaching 
Hospital, originally set up by the colonial governor, F. G. Guggisberg, in the 1920s (Senah, 
2001). The government also sought to address the problem of unequal distribution of health 
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service in the country (Akazili, 2010). Hence, several health care centres were established 
across the country (Senah, 2001; Wireko & Béland, 2013). Furthermore, the government 
allocated significant funding for the health sector. For example, about 31% of the total 
budgeted expenditure (amounting to 144 million pounds) in the 1963/1964 fiscal year was 
voted for the development of social services, including health care (Senah, 2001). Surprisingly, 
this occurred at a time when the price of cocoa, the country’s major foreign exchange earner, 
was falling in the international market (Senah, 2001).  
 From 1964 onwards, these changes began to have a significant impact on the Ghanaian 
economy. Particularly, the revenue capacity of the state had plummeted significantly (Senah, 
2001). While the government introduced some measures to address the situation, including 
foreign exchange and import restrictions, they failed to save the health sector. Rather, those 
measures adversely affected the importation of capital intensive equipment, drugs and supplies 
for the health sector (Arhinful, 2003). This situation upset personnel in the health sector and 
made them critical of the government and its policies (Arhinful, 2003). It also generated 
opposition from political activists. For instance, in view of the deteriorating socio-economic 
situation, a group of military personnel, referring to themselves as the National Liberation 
Council (NLC), overthrew the government in 1969.  
 
4.3. Examining the Change 
As suggested in Chapter One, the magnitude of change in health policy is examined based on 
both spending (quantitative) and institutional (qualitative) changes in the health care system 
resulting from the establishment of NHS in Ghana. Using the above criteria, significant changes 
were observed in both public spending on and the institutionalization of health care after the 
introduction of the NHS system. The policy change led to both a rise in the amount of 
government spending on health care and an expansion in the structure of that spending. For 
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instance, it created a shift from private to public provisioning of health care; from a health 
system with fee payment as the main criterion of access to one that focused on citizenship; 
from a system that capped benefits to one that emphasized comprehensive benefits; and from 
one that targeted Europeans to one that emphasized universal access to health care for all 
residents.  
 
4.3.1. Spending Change 
Government spending on health care improved significantly after the introduction of NHS 
(Arhinful, 2003; NDPC, 2005; WHO, 2006)20. For instance, as Grischow (2011) noted, the 
government spent not less than 63% of the total budget on social services and infrastructure, 
including health care, between 1957 and 1966. Between 1960 and 1961 government 
expenditure on health care doubled from that of the 1957-1960 period and tripled for the period 
of 1961-1962 (Addae, 1996). As well, the government allocated about 53 million pounds 
sterling over ten years to its development agenda, which included the NHS (Addae, 1996). 
According to Baidoo (2009), total government expenditure in the health sector increased from 
6.4% to 8.5% between 1965 and 1969; generally, “the government spent more on health care 
and human resource development compared to other departments” (p. 41).  
Beyond the increase in government expenditure, the introduction of NHS also resulted 
in changes to the structure of government spending on health care. For instance, the 
government focused much of its health care expenditure on a radical expansion of the number 
of health care facilities in the country (Twumasi, 1981). For example, the number of health 
centres rose from 10 to 41 between 1957 and 1963 (Senah, 2001). In the end, because it 
outlawed the colonial fee-paying system that required ordinary Ghanaians to pay at the point 
                                                          
20 While these studies acknowledge the increase in public spending after the introduction of the NHS system, no
ne of them provide information about the quantum of increase 
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of service use, under NHS, the government became the only payer of medical care in the 
country through general revenues. 
 
4.3.2. Institutional Change 
Policy change also led to a shift from a health care system that targeted colonial Europeans to 
one that provided universal access to health care for all residents of Ghana, including 
foreigners. Health care services were provided free of charge at the point of use. The free 
provision of medical care made access to care a fundamental human right, thereby eliminating 
the need for individuals to resort to the market for those services. For a number of reasons, 
which are explained below, the government also emerged as the sole provider of medical care 
in the country. Hence, it could be argued that the creation of the NHS system also resulted in a 
transfer of medical power from the market to the state.  
Arhinful (2003) notes that under the colonial health system, “higher income workers 
were expected to pay when they exceeded their limit within which free care was provided” (p. 
36). For example, government workers who exceeded their limit for free services were required 
to pay between 3 shillings 6 pence per day (if their earnings exceeded 250 pounds) and 6 pence 
(if their income was below 50 pounds) to cover themselves, their wives and their children 
(Arhinful, 2003). The NHS abandoned the cap system and replaced it with comprehensive 
medical coverage, which encompassed outpatient and in-patient care, dentistry and medication, 
as well as all diseases (Arhinful, 2003).  
In part because it was free, the NHS also created a higher level of access to health care 
compared to the colonial health system (Baidoo, 2009). For example, the rise in the number of 
available health care posts recorded a tremendous increase in use under the NHS system 
(Arhinful, 2003). Public confidence in modern health care had also drastically improved by the 
81 
 
time of independence (Arhinful, 2003), which could also have helped create a higher demand 
for health care under the NHS system.  
A recent comment by Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso, an adherent of Dr. Nkrumah and 
Senior Research Fellow at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy 
(LECIAD) that “one of the best interventions we have as a country is pregnant women going 
to hospital for free, the poor also getting medical care for free,” (TV3 Weekend News, March 
1, 201321) confirms the extent to which the NHS system guaranteed the social rights and 
freedom of the individual. For the reasons mentioned above, this study argues that the 
establishment of NHS led to a significant change in health care policy in Ghana. There were 
some important areas of continuity, however. For example, although the NHS system led to an 
increased medical care infrastructure, the majority of the infrastructure were located in the 
urban areas. This situation perpetuated the rural-urban inequity in access to medical care, which 
was a key feature of the colonial health care system. Despite the continuity in this feature, the 
changes that were introduced by the new system were significant. In the following section, I 
explain how and why the NHS system was achieved.  
 
4. 4. Why and How the NHS was Pursued 
This section explains the transition to NHS, from agenda setting to policy formulation or 
design, adoption, implementation and sustainability, accounting for both the political and the 
technocratic dimensions of health care system change in the process. 
 
                                                          
21 Retrieved from http://tv3network.com/all-news/politics/local/best-social-interventions-in-ghana-have-been-
under-nkrumah-and-kufuor-antwi-danso.html 
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4.4.1. Problem Definition and Agenda setting 
The high costs of medical care for the public and the health system’s overall discrimination 
against Ghanaians became a great cause of concern to most stakeholders in colonial society, 
including colonial and African elites. Akosa22 (2013) described the nature of the colonial 
system in his interview. He noted, “it was a system that served the British and London as a 
metropolis. It was a system that did not serve the Ghanaian people, the only hospital that was 
built for Ghanaians was Korle-bu hospital at that time, so throughout the whole land there was 
virtually no health facility that indigenes could go to”. He emphasized that, “if you were an 
indigene and you went there, you paid through your nose because the whole essence was not 
to make you come [or seek medical care]. So as indigenes, really, there was no health facility 
at all and people of course resorted to what you will say is an indigenous health system, that is 
herbal and traditional medicine”.  
Situations like this created a need for reform, particularly the removal of user fees. The 
first time such a policy idea came on the agenda was in the 1850s, when Governor Stephen J. 
Hill (1851-1853), in consultation with some Fanti chiefs, introduced a one shilling Poll Tax for 
all residents in the colony. As indicated, the tax was supposed to grant all people in the colony 
free access to basic health care services. However, it was withdrawn in response to public 
resistance, leading to the concurrent withdrawal of the free medical system in just a few years 
(Arhinful, 2003). After that, the idea of universal medical care vanished from the policy agenda. 
Its disappearance, however, was not much of a surprise because most of the population had not 
become accustomed to the modern health care system (Arhinful, 2003). Also, as indicated, the 
few available hospitals were concentrated in the colony and a few others places, where only 
Europeans and colonial officers lived (Twumasi, 1981; Senah, 2001).  
                                                          
22 Akosa is a former Director General of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) and the president of the Ghana 
Medical Association (1999-2001). He is currently, the spokesperson on health for the CPP, the party of the first 
president of Ghana (Nkrumah). 
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However, by the 1950s, the colonial-based medical care system had gained a marked 
popularity among the natives, even though it was still discriminatory and expensive (Arhinful, 
2003). That situation, among others, intensified the longstanding struggle for self-government 
by the natives. In 1951, the British finally agreed to grant self-government to the Ghanaians. 
They first organized an election for internal self-government, which was contested by the two 
main political groupings in the country at the time – the United Gold Coast Convention 
(UGCC), led by Dr. J. B. Danquah, and the Convention People Party (CPP), led by Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah (Biney, 2011). These political parties were divided on ideological and class lines. 
The former was largely comprised of Ghanaian elites, such as lawyers and businessmen, who 
subscribed to rightist ideological orientation, while the latter was mainly made up of ordinary 
people on the street, workers, and students etc., who were on the left of the political spectrum. 
The two groups were also divided on perceptions about independence, as their mottos, 
"Independence in the shortest possible time” and "Independence Now”, respectively, indicate. 
The UGCC also appeared less aggressive in its quest for self-government compared to the CPP, 
which was extremely radical. In the end, the CPP won the 1951 election with 34 out of 38 seats 
in the legislative assembly and 82% of the popular vote, automatically making the party’s 
leader, Nkrumah, who was then in prison, the Prime Minister of the country (Okoth, 2006).  
Given that he had won the election with such an overwhelming majority and was the 
first African Prime Minister of the country, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah saw the period as a window 
of opportunity to pursue change. Akosa (2013) explains this more. 
Of course you had Kwame Nkrumah leading the independence movement. His own 
ethos was to decolonize Ghana. Therefore, everything that was to the colonial 
advantage had to be reversed and, in 1951, when he became leader of government 
business, the first thing he did was to advocate for free health, free education. It was 
the goal of these two major social interventions to ensure that everybody born to this 
country would have good health or at least access to good health and good education. 
And therefore, you could imagine that infrastructure had to be built because there was 
none, for over hundred years I said there was only one hospital built in Accra every 
hospital that was available was a European hospital. 
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The 1951 election was a crucial moment for policy change because, until that period, 
Ghana had been ruled by the British through a governor who acted as the official representative 
of the Queen of England. Nkrumah used the opportunity to explore making changes to the NHS 
system. He set up a commission of inquiry, led by Sir John Maude, a former permanent 
secretary of the MoH in the UK, to review the health system and make recommendations for 
policy change. Named after its leader, the commission was simply referred to as the Maude 
Commission. According to Arhinful (2003), the mandate of the commission was:  
To review the measures taken and projected in the Gold Coast, either by government 
or by enterprise; for the development of preventive and social medicine, including 
health education; for the development of curative medicine, including the provisions 
for hospitals, health centres and dressing stations and for the training of personnel; for 
medical research; to examine the adequacy of the administrative structure and 
organisation of the Medical Department in relation to such development; and to make 
recommendations (p. 45). 
From the above quote, it is clear that establishing the NHS was not directly touched upon in 
the commission’s mandate, though it featured prominently in its report. As Arhinful (2003) 
noted, the commission recommended, among other things: (a) the abolition of hospital fees and 
all charges; (b) the establishment of additional health care facilities, mostly health centres and 
dressing stations; (c) the division of health care management between the central government 
and local government units, whereby the former would take over hospitals and health centres, 
while the latter would take control of dressing stations and maternity homes; (d) the need to let 
large municipalities recruit their own MoH staff and operate health services in schools; and (e) 
the need to place rural and urban sanitation in the hands of urban and district councils (Arhinful, 
2003). By suggesting free medical care and an expansion of medical care facilities in the 
country, the Maude Commission could be regarded as the first to have put NHS on the agenda 
of post-independent Ghana.  
After self-government was achieved, the agenda for change to the NHS can also be 
understood in the context of domestic need, the nature of the economy at the time and the 
diffusion of the British NHS. Addae (1996) argues that in fulfilling their responsibilities, the 
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members of the Maude Commission travelled across the country to solicit views on the health 
problems the people faced and possible solutions. It also advertised the process in the media 
and solicited suggestions, memoranda and letters from various stakeholders. As Addae (1996) 
notes, “the enquiry was the most exhaustive study on medical matters ever undertaken in the 
colony’s history” (p. 84). Since they emerged from this general inquiry, the Commission’s 
recommendations can be interpreted as being the popular opinion of the people.  
  Ghana’s economy was growing rapidly at the time (Senah, 2001), which also influenced 
the agenda for change. As Addae (1996) emphasized, “in view of the financial circumstance of 
the country to which their attention was drawn right at the onset of their enquiries, the 
commission recommended that the urgent medical needs of Ghana could be met by the 
expansion of the Medical Field Units, improvement of hospital facilities, the setting of health 
centres” (pp. 84-85). Thus, the importance of the vibrancy of the Ghanaian economy to the 
agenda of establishing NHS cannot be overemphasized.  
Another important factor in these developments is the creation of the NHS in the UK 
in 1948, just three years before the 1951 elections in Ghana. Maude and two other members of 
the Ghanaian commission, Dr. Albert Lorenzen and Dr. George Albert Clarke, were British 
(Addae, 1996) and quite familiar with the NHS reform in the UK. It should also be expected 
that their knowledge of the popular British NHS system would influence the Commission’s 
recommendations. One of the key features of the British model that relate to the Commission’s 
recommendation is its focus on providing free care to all residents (Arhinful, 2003). According 
to Arhinful (2003), Nkrumah approved the Commission’s recommendations as the basis for 
broad reforms to be pursued after 1957, when independence was officially granted. 
The NHS system got onto the policy agenda, therefore, as a result of the interaction 
between a window of opportunity (created by five main conjunctural factors) and the role of 
policy entrepreneurs such as Dr. Nkrumah and members of the Maude Commission. The 
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conjunctural factors involved the discriminatory and expensive nature of the health care system 
prior to independence; the political transition away from British rule, which began with internal 
self-government in 1951; the election of a socialist and nationalist government led by Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah; the vibrant economic position of the country in the 1950s; and international 
influences with respect to the turn to welfare state expansion and, particularly, the diffusion of 
the idea of the British NHS across the world at the time. The above factors created a window 
of opportunity, which the policy entrepreneurs mentioned above seized. While all the above 
factors contributed to shape the policy agenda, the most central factor was the report of the 
Maude Commission. In this respect, how the commission managed to make its proposal 
appealing to the government (including using public inquiry) was critical to the push to 
establish a NHS in Ghana. 
 
4.4.2. Formulation/Design 
One of the important things Nkrumah did upon winning the 1957 election was to pursue the 
agenda the Maude Commission had set (Coleman, 2011). In order to develop a policy 
framework to guide the process, he recruited Dr. David Brachott, who was a member of the 
medical assistance group that had been sent from Israel to Ghana at the time. His main task 
was to help reinvent Ghana’s health sector and to develop a ten-year medical policy for the 
country. As Coleman noted (2011), 
The ten-year health service development program sought to deal with three major 
aspects of providing health care: a rural health service integrated into the system of 
hospitals, health centers, and other medical units; a country wide hospital plan based 
on the health care needs of the population and on sound medical and economic 
consideration; and a training program for medical and paramedical personnel capable 
of achieving the ten-year health program goals (pp. 10-11). 
The ten-year medical plan was incorporated into the nation’s ten-year development plan. As 
indicated above, it sought to increase the number of health facilities in the country and make 
services in those facilities free. In addition to the above, it banned private practices and 
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prohibited government doctors, dentists and specialists from charging fees. Finally, outpatient 
care was made entirely free for all residents, while a small charge was instituted for in-patient 
care with respect to civil servants and the military (Coleman, 2011; Arhinful, 2003).  
Like the Maude Commission’s report, the country’s medical policy should be viewed 
in light of both domestic and international influences. For instance, Dr. Brachott, who was 
basically a “one-man team,” decided to travel around the country in order to incorporate local 
ideas into the new policy (Addae, 1996, p. 91). It is also possible to see the influences of the 
recommendations of the Maude Commission in the new medical policy. For example, like the 
Maude Commission's report, the design also placed a ban on user fees and the privatization of 
medical care. Given the source of its mandate, it is normal to expect that the design would be 
influenced by the socialist orientation of the government at the time. As a high level bureaucrat 
and professor of public health (Addae, 1996), Dr. Brachott was also abreast of global social 
policy trends, and the idea of the NHS system. Thus, in designing the Ghanaian NHS system, 
he must have also drawn lessons from abroad, particularly, from the design of the British NHS 
system.  
 
4.4.3. Adoption of the Policy 
The adoption of the NHS was shaped by the policy entrepreneurship of Nkrumah and other 
political and economic considerations. First, Nkrumah’s Convention Peoples Party (CPP) had 
the majority of seats in the party-disciplined Legislative Assembly, which facilitated the 
adoption of the policy (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005; Biney, 2011). Besides the legislative influence, 
the NHS was aligned with the ideology and philosophy of President Nkrumah and the CPP. 
These beliefs and ideology are laid out by Nkrumah in his Autobiography. As he explains, 
The ideology of my Party may be formulated as follows: no race, no people, no nation 
can exist freely and be respected at home and abroad without political freedom. Once 
this freedom is gained, a greater task comes into view. All dependent territories are 
backward in education, in agriculture and industry. The economic independence that 
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should follow and maintain political independence demands every effort from the 
people, a total mobilisation of brain and manpower resources. What other countries 
have taken three hundred years or more to achieve, a once dependent territory must try 
to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive. Unless it is, as it were, ‘jet- propelled’, 
it will lag behind and thus risk everything for which it has fought. Capitalism is too 
complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialistic 
society (Nkrumah, 1957, p. x; also quoted in Biney, 2011, p. 106). 
Nkrumah’s beliefs and ideology can be described in three ways, which are all aligned with the 
principles of the NHS system. They are anti-colonialism, independence, and socialism. As 
Botwe-Asamoah (2005) notes, Nkrumah was not just sympathetic to socialism, but also a 
strong advocate. For Nkrumah, as one interviewee noted, “to compromise on ideology is 
abandoning it” (Akosa, 2013); socialism was seen as the most effective way for the newly 
independent country to tackle the remnants of colonialism, which were typically capitalistic 
(Afari-Gyan, 1991, p. 167). However, Nkrumah “cautioned against an uncritical adoption of 
socialism pursued elsewhere” rather than an “African [or scientific] socialism”, which is based 
on the specific circumstances and conditions within which a country finds itself (Afari-Gyan, 
1991, p. 169). Nkrumah’s second reason for adopting socialism was that it was the only known 
alternative to capitalism. According to President Nkrumah, capitalism was too complicated for 
a newly independent country like Ghana to adopt (Nkrumah, 1957). The complications of 
capitalism revolved around its overwhelming emphasis on growth, and the subsequent neglect 
of equity. Finally, unlike capitalism, he believed that socialism promoted equity and solidarity, 
which are fundamental to African society and development (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005).  
Thus, Nkrumah had no problem approving the design of the NHS system because it 
fitted perfectly with all the three dimensions of his beliefs and ideology. It also symbolized a 
break with the colonial market-based past and reinforced the African culture of redistribution 
and solidarity. As a newly independent state, the NHS also measured up to the expectations of 
the general populace that the independence would result in a better life generally and, by 
extension, an improved access to health care for all Ghanaians (Coleman, 2011).  
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In part because of the expectations it raised, the adoption of the NHS system met severe 
challenges. In other words, as Adibo (2013)23 stressed during the interview, “it was tough”. For 
instance, it met a “stiff opposition from health care providers” (Coleman, 1997, par. 12). 
Indeed, a reaction of that nature should be expected in view of the fact that until then health 
care was a huge source of revenue for both public and private health care operators in the 
country. As Arhinful (2003) indicated, “private patients seeking treatment in a government 
hospital was liable to pay: a private professional fees, a statutory dispensary fees and the cost 
of any medication prescribed” (p. 46). The colonial government also allowed specialists to 
privatize their services so that even in government health facilities, ordinary or nonofficial 
Ghanaians paid them for their services (Arhinful, 2003). As  Arhinful (2003) noted, “some of 
the professional fees paid ranged between 2 shillings and 5 shillings for brief outpatient visit 
to medical officers, while outpatient visits to a physicians or surgical specialist cost two pounds 
two shillings” (p. 44). Since all those charges were going to be forfeited as a result of the 
introduction of NHS, it is not unexpected that provider doctors would oppose the policy.  
Mission or religious-based providers (RBP) were also to be affected by the introduction 
of the NHS system. Mission hospitals began in Ghana in the 1930s with the establishment of 
the Agogo hospital in the Ashanti Akim district of the Ashanti Region and developed into the 
second largest providers of health care in the country. According to Arhinful (2003) between 
1951 and 1960, the number of mission hospitals grew nine fold, from 3 to 27. These hospitals 
held significant political power when the NHS system was introduced because they mostly 
operated in the hinterland where the colonial health system was largely deserted, although the 
majority of the Ghanaian population lived in these areas. Their mode of operation and 
                                                          
23 Adibo is a public health specialist. He was the head of the Planning and Policy Unit of the Ministry of Health 
in the 1970s and early 1980s before appointed the Director of Medical Services in 1986 and subsequently, the 
Deputy Minister of Health. He was a key architect of the Ghana user fee model and many other health sector 
reforms such as the Ghana National TB Control Program in the 1960s.  
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financing, as Arhinful (2003) indicates in the passage below, also suggested that they would 
be a critical force to consider in instituting the NHS-type system. For instance, as he notes, 
One remarkable aspect about the mission facilities, as far as health financing is 
concerned, has been that the collection of user fees had always been part of their 
operations. No common fee schedule exists as such, and user prices might vary from 
mission to mission and from Church denomination to denomination; but some 
mechanism exists by which fees are matched with the costs of the services provided. 
Such charges usually covered recurrent expenditures; the full cost of drugs was passed 
on to users (Arhinful, 2003, p.48). 
Given their huge size and strategic areas of operation, coupled with the fact that user fees were 
a huge part of their operations, as suggested in the above passage, the mission hospitals were 
undoubtedly important political forces to reckon with in the introduction of the NHS system.  
In order to obtain the support of the medical doctors and the mission hospitals, the 
government decided to compensate them for their work. For example, as Adibo (2013) noted 
during the interview, the “mission hospitals that were charging fees for their services were 
reimbursed for the services they provided to the various categories of people”, while “doctors 
[were given] allowances in lieu of private practice”. In this respect, the annual allowances and 
reimbursements were utilized as strategies by the government to secure the support of the 
provider doctors and mission facilities, respectively, in the adoption of the NHS system of 
Ghana in the 1960s.  
 
4.4.4. Implementation 
The implementation of the NHS benefited immensely from Ghana’s economic prosperity and 
competent bureaucracy at the time of independence, as well as the government’s strategy of 
sidelining all potential opponents of the policy. With a per capita income comparable to 
countries such as South Korea and Singapore, Ghana was the most prosperous country in the 
Sub-Sahara Africa region at independence (Werlin, 1994; Asare & Wong, 1999; Mazrui, 
2006). Much of its prosperity can be attributed to the huge reserves it inherited from its colonial 
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master, Britain, and the high prices of gold and cocoa, which had been the backbone of the 
nation’s economy (Saleh, 2013, p. 21). For instance, according to Biney (2011), Ghana’s 
reserve was about £200 million sterling at the time of independence. With its GDP growing at 
about 6% per annum between 1957 and 1960, Ghana was one of the countries with the highest 
level of growth in the world immediately after gaining independence (Coleman, 2011; 
Grischow, 2011). Cocoa exports grew exponentially and constituted the largest portion of the 
country’s GDP during the 1950s and 1960s (Mensah, Oppong, Bobi-Barimah, Frempong & 
Sabi, 2010). In this regard, Ghana became not only prosperous, but also the country with the 
“highest per capita income in West Africa” (Mensah et al., 2010, p. 10). Confirming the above, 
Agyepong (2013) emphasized during the interview that, “at independence, Ghana had a budget 
surplus. Because it was after the Second World War, cocoa prices had been high, there hadn’t 
been so much investment in social infrastructure so Ghana had a budget surplus that is why 
Kwame Nkrumah was able to do so much”. Coleman (2011) indicated similarly that “the 
favourable economic conditions made Nkrumah to implement his socialist’s ideology” (p. 11), 
including the establishment of the NHS. Akosa (2013) explained that, 
From 1951, hospitals had to be built, so you had Kumasi “G” [General] hospital built, 
you had Afia Nkwanta built, you had Cape Coast municipal hospital built, you had Ho 
municipal hospital built. All these [hospitals] were built in response to the goal of the 
government in making sure that every region had a hospital. It then proceeded to the 
larger districts, so there was the Bekwai [hospital], there were hospitals in other bigger 
districts. [All those hospitals] were all built to provide infrastructure. In addition to that 
the Ministry of Health created a system that was to support nutrition, sexual and 
reproductive health, and public health. The Medical Field Unit was also established, 
with headquarters in Kintampo, to oversee sanitation and other aspects of health care 
delivery.  
Beyond infrastructural development, outpatient care was made completely free for all residents, 
including non-Ghanaians, in all public health care facilities in May 1962 (Arhinful, 2003).  
The quality and subsequent politicization of Ghana’s bureaucracy also enhanced 
implementation of the NHS. Twumasi (1981) stresses that “the Nkrumah government inherited 
a good civil service administration, [and] manpower ... [and] decided to increase training for 
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health workers” (p. 149). Also, as Biney (2011) emphasizes, the government also had the 
opportunity after independence to Africanise the public service, a situation that eventually 
resulted in generating “patron-client relationships” in the public service. The “patron-client 
relationships” led to a significant number of people, mostly party supporters, getting employed 
in the public sector (pp. 110-111). For example, K. A. Gbedemah, an Nkrumah’s loyalist, was 
appointed to head the metamorphosed MoH (Coleman, 2011, p. 10). Dr. Eustace Akwei was 
also entrusted with the administrative functions of the ministry. Those appointments vested the 
implementation process with the requisite political leadership and expertise and eliminated the 
possibility that administrators from the previous regime would sabotage the implementation of 
the NHS system. 
Another factor that enhanced the implementation of the NHS was the incremental 
approach the government adopted. For example, instead of implementing the basic content of 
the policy all at once, the reformers did so in phases. As suggested above, the expansionist 
program in relation to medical care infrastructure was the first to be carried out in the 1950s 
(Twumasi, 1981; Coleman, 2011) before banning private health care and the collection of user 
fees in medical facilities in 1961, as well as making medical care free for all residents, include 
foreigners in 1962 (Arhinful, 2003; Coleman, 2011). The incremental approach is believed to 
have allowed the government enough time to think through the reform efficiently and address 
grievances satisfactorily (Akosa, 2013).  
 
4.4.5. Sustaining the Policy 
Due to instability in Ghanaian economy and politics after independence, sustaining the NHS 
system was problematic. Grischow (2011) notes that beginning in the mid-1960s, the Ghanaian 
economy suffered significant slowdowns. For example, as Agyepong (2013), a former Director 
of Health in the GHS, noted during the interviews, “we found out that we were not generating 
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enough taxes, our economy couldn’t support it”. Also, the performance of the existing State-
owned Enterprises (SOEs) reduced drastically (Arhinful, 2003; Mensah et al, 2010). According 
to Mensah et al (2010), the “poor performance of the SOEs caused further economic 
deterioration and annual inflation jumped from about 6% during 1965-73 to 50% during the 
following decade” (p. 11). Biney (2011) notes that the international value of cocoa, which was 
the country’s main export, also declined, creating major financial difficulties for the 
government after 1960. For example, the price of cocoa, which was anticipated at 400 cedi 
(Ghana’s currency) per ton turned out to be only 356 cedi in 1964, falling even further to 276 
cedi in the following year. Biney (2011) reports that, as early as 1963, Ghana’s per annum 
deficit hovered around £50 million pound sterling, which was equivalent to 33% of its total 
government expenditure. In the midst of this crisis, the average growth rate fell to about 2.8% 
in part because of an overvalued exchange rate. This, in turn, increased the price of goods 
produced in the country (Coleman, 2011, p. 11). According to Carbone (2011), the 
deterioration of Ghana’s economy had a corresponding impact on the survival of the NHS 
system. As he notes, “the country’s economic conditions were gradually worsening, as were 
the functioning and quality of free public health care” (Carbone, 2011, p. 388).As Agyepong 
(2013)24 added during the interview, “it wasn’t that anybody thought the tax funded system 
was bad – it was a great idea – but our circumstances did not make that great idea work for us”.  
The Nkrumah’s government introduced foreign exchange and import restrictions to 
deal with the crisis (Arhinful, 2003). Although these restrictions were expected to generate 
more revenues, they did not prove fiscally sustainable (Arhinful, 2003). Hence, Nkrumah 
adopted other techniques to address the crisis and to protect his entire administration; these are 
also believed to have indirectly helped to sustain the NHS system over time (Coleman, 2011). 
                                                          
24 Agyepong is a public heath physician, a researcher, and a member of the design team of the Ghana’s National 
Health Insurance Scheme.  She was also the Greater Accra Regional Director of Health Services in Ghana. 
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For instance, Nkrumah tried to eliminate all political opponents in order to concentrate the 
power of the CPP. He did so by banning all political demonstrations and actions, particularly 
those organized along ethnic and religious lines. In 1958 he also introduced the Preventive 
Detention Act, which legitimized arresting and detaining opponents of the CPP without trial 
(Grischow, 2011). According to Coleman (2011), “in 1965, instead of holding scheduled 
elections, Nkrumah announced on the radio the names of persons he had chosen to go to the 
new parliament” (p. 11). 
Additionally, the CPP “co-opted and absorbed” labour unions, which had frequently 
been obstacles to policy change (Grischow, 2011). In order to reduce the influence of the 
unions, the government introduced the 1958 Industrial Relations Act, which limited the 
membership of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) to only 24 official unions. The party also 
absorbed the Farmers’ Council and other organizations, including those involving women and 
youth. As Grischow (2011) noted, in the end “membership of … [the above] organizations 
became simply membership in the CPP [and]… parliament became the sole instrument of the 
CPP” (p. 183). Finally, in order to end all oppositions to its development programs, including 
the NHS, the CPP outlawed strike actions (Grischow, 2011).  
 Furthermore, the CPP co-opted the media, making it a key proponent of the 
government’s development agenda, including the NHS system. The process began with the 
1957 creation of the Ghana News Agency (GNA); the GNA was charged with collecting and 
disseminating information, as well as promoting the broad programs of the government (Biney, 
2011). Aware of high levels of illiteracy in the country, the government made the radio to 
broadcast in the local dialects so as to enable it to reach more Ghanaians. In 1959, the Ghana 
Institute of Journalism (GIJ) was also established with a mandate of training journalists who 
would promote the government’s development agenda. For example at a journalists’ 
conference in Accra in 1963, Nkrumah reportedly spelled out the role of the African journalist: 
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“to the true African journalist, his newspaper is a collective organiser, a collective instrument 
of mobilization and a collective educator—a weapon, first and foremost, to overthrow 
colonialism and imperialism and to assist total African independence and unity” (Biney, 2011, 
p. 114). Speaking to the same situation, Biney (2011) also emphasized, 
In Nkrumah’s opinion, journalists had to be fully committed to the principles of the 
CPP. … the press, radio, and television were not simply arenas of public discourse on 
national issues ‘but a closely guarded and tightly controlled propaganda machine for 
achieving the major objective of political education, the promotion of socialist ideals, 
national unity at home, the projection of Ghana’s image and foreign policy and for the 
liberation and unification of Africa’. When he inaugurated Ghana’s television service 
in July 1965, he made it clear that it was to be used as an ideological tool to assist in 
the socialist transformation of Ghana (p. 114). 
 As part of the coercive strategies to sustain his policies and government, Nkrumah harassed 
and even banned media outlets that opposed his administration. All opposition media outlets 
have been closed down by the time of Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966. For example, the 
Ashanti Pioneer, the main opposition newspaper, was banned in October 1962 (Biney, 2011). 
Thus, besides usurping the Ghanaian media to promote its policies, which included the NHS 
system, the government worked relentlessly to stifle all opponents of his regime. 
In addition, Nkrumah used the political acumen he possessed to his advantage, 
including his outstanding gifts of oratory and “charismatic” or “charming” personality (Iijima, 
1998; Biney, 2011, p. 108). Apter (1972) notes that one of Nkrumah’s key strengths, which 
contributed significantly to his political successes, was that he managed to establish himself as 
a charismatic leader. Two main factors accounted for Nkrumah’s emergence as a charismatic 
leader. First, having led the people of Ghana to independence, he was naturally expected to 
provide all that the people had failed to enjoy under colonialism, including quality health care. 
Second, through the use of religious and traditional symbols and slogans, he managed to 
effectively project himself and his ideas to maximize public attention. Indeed, the use of those 
symbols in the political arena ran through the entire fabric of his administration. For example, 
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the creed of his “Verandah Boys” 25 described the CPP as “the opportune Saviour of Ghana”’ 
and Nkrumah as the liberator, among other things (Timothy, 1955, p. 81 quoted in Iijima, 1998, 
p. 184). Nkrumah could also connect very well with ordinary people, which made him even 
more popular.  
However, as Coleman (2011) notes, “as Nkrumah became more and more dictatorial, 
opposition to him increased” (p. 11). Not only did that lead to his overthrow in February 1966, 
but it also made it even more difficult to sustain the NHS system. For example, the opposition 
party (UGCC) and subsequent governments, mostly those with ideological orientations 
opposed to socialism26 and with the aim of reducing public sector costs, attempted to dismantle 
the NHS system. Nonetheless, they all failed in the face of massive public resistance (Arhinful, 
2003). As Apoya and Marriott (2011) note, “the large-scale popular support for free health care 
deterred any serious attempts to introduce user fees up until the mid-1980s” (p. 17).  
In this context, besides the Nkrumah government’s deep commitment to it, and the 
ideational and repressive strategies it employed, a critical factor in the sustenance of the NHS 
system was the large-scale constituency the policy was able to generate over time. This 
suggests that, to sustain a policy change, the commitment and strategies of the reformers may 
need to be buttressed with the ability of the new policy to establish constituencies outside the 
reformers to defend it even in their absence.  
                                                          
25 The “Verandah Boy’s” concept was coined to represent the rank and files of the United Gold Coast Convention 
(UGCC), which was the biggest movement during the initial stages of the independence struggle of Ghana. It is 
believed that the rank and file usually had their lunch on the verandah of the main dining room, while the leaders 
had theirs in the room whenever the movement had a meeting or campaign trip. After being fired as General 
Secretary, Nkrumah is believed to have tapped into the rank and file, or “Verandah Boys,” to form the CPP. As 
part of the underlying principles of the CPP, Nkrumah introduced the “Verandah Boy’s” creed, which was 
purported to make him supreme, as it read: “I believe in the Convention People’s Party, The opportune Saviour 
of Ghana and in Kwame Nkrumah its founder and leader, who is endowed with the Ghana Spirit, Born a true 
Ghanaian for Ghana suffering under victimisations was vilified, threatened with deportation” (Timothy, 1955, p. 
81 quoted in Iijima, 1998, p. 184). 
 
26 They include the National Liberation Council (NLC), which ruled Ghana from 1966 to 1969, and the Progress 
Party (PP), which took over from the NLC from 1969 to 1972. 
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4.5. Causal Interactions 
In this section, I will show how various causal factors interacted over time to ensure the 
transition to the NHS system in the 1960s. Before NHS came on the agenda, for instance, the 
health system was largely expensive for, and discriminatory against, non-Europeans. In other 
words, it needed significant overhaul. However, that expectation did not gain significant 
governmental attention until after the transition to self-government in 1951, with a Ghanaian 
as prime minister. The 1951 political transition offered an opportunity for the country to look 
after the welfare of the African population for the first time. The first African prime minister 
seized this opportunity and created a commission to investigate the state of the domestic health 
care system and to make recommendations for policy change. Expertise was the main criteria 
in forming this commission, and since many of the high quality health care experts at the time 
were foreigners, most of the commission’s members were foreigners, particularly British. 
Among other things, the commission recommended the elimination of user fees, the 
construction of more health facilities in the country, and vesting ownership of major health 
care facilities in the state, a recommendation that closely aligned with the recently created NHS 
system of Britain, Ghana’s former colonial masters. While it might have been influenced by 
that system, the commission’s recommendations also appeared to have been shaped by the 
information it gathered through the domestic enquiry and the economic boom of the 1950s and 
1960s, as well as the global trend towards big government. 
Although he approved of the recommendations of the commission in principle, 
Nkrumah only followed through on them after 1957 and, most importantly, after 1960, when 
Ghana had attained complete constitutional autonomy, or republican status, from the UK. 
Complete autonomy gave Nkrumah much more power and a wider window of opportunity to 
pursue path-departing policy change that would serve the interests of native Ghanaians. Also 
important was the fact that, by 1960, there had also been a significant rise in mortality and 
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morbidity rates, as well as overcrowding in the health care system, as a result of both population 
and economic growth (Addae, 1996).  
The government appointed Dr. D. Brachott to design a ten-year medical plan for the 
country. Brachott was then a high level health care bureaucrat and professor of public health 
in Jerusalem, Israel at the time. The design of that policy was very much akin to the British 
NHS-system and the recommendations of the Maude Commission of enquiry. In fact, Brachott 
had come to Ghana as part of a high-powered medical and technical assistant delegation from 
Israel. His expertise in health service development was a compelling reason for his 
appointment. In designing Ghana’s NHS system, Brachott, like the Maude Commission 
members before him, travelled across the country to solicit ideas about pressing health issues 
that needed to be addressed. However, the policy’s affinity with the British NHS system and 
the Maude Commission’s report demonstrates the extent to which Brachott’s ideas were also 
shaped by existing policy legacies, as Ghanaians actors drew lessons from policies 
implemented elsewhere around the world, including the UK, where the NHS model had 
emerged in 1948. 
The new policy was then sent for adoption. This process was shaped by the state’s 
institutional configuration, the role of vested interests and the strategies of the reformers. While 
the state’s concentrated institutional configuration facilitated the adoption process, vested 
interests within the existing, privately-operated system were strongly opposed to the NHS. 
Medical officers and facilities in particular opposed the policy because they thought that the 
change would result in a loss of autonomy and their ability to generate income through user 
fees. In order to neutralize opposition, the government compensated the medical officers with 
annual allowances and the mission hospitals with grants-in-aid.  
The implementation phase was, however, supported by the economic boom in the 
country at the time, high levels of governmental commitment to the policy and the strategies 
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of the reformers. The economic boom made enough money available for the country, while the 
government’s commitment to the policy helped in ensuring that those monies were utilized to 
support policy’s implementation over time. However, to win time to deal with opponents and 
hopefully secure their support, the government implemented the policy change in phases and 
gradually.  
Sustaining the policy change also involved a number of factors, including the political 
commitment and strategies of the government and the new stakeholders the policy developed 
in that time. For instance, regarding the key role of political commitment, the government 
basically ignored all criticisms and recommendations meant to dismantle the policy in the face 
of the crisis. In particular, instead of addressing the revenue problem by introducing cuts in the 
health care sector, the government introduced economic measures such as import licenses and 
tariffs and left the NHS system intact. In the face of increasing opposition to its rule, the 
Nkrumah government resorted to repressive strategies involving media censorship and the 
banning of political parties and other oppositional groupings. While they protected the NHS 
from collapse, those strategies fed underground opposition and armed mobilization, which led 
to the overthrow of the regime in 1966. The policy, however, continued after Nkrumah's 
overthrow. This was due in large part to the new stakeholders’ opposition to change, coupled 
with the fact that some of the regimes that came after Nkrumah subscribed to ideological 
orientations that aligned with the existing NHS system.  
 
4.6. Theoretical Implication of the Change to an NHS-type System 
The above discussion is consistent with the theory of dynamic or actor-centred institutionalism, 
particularly as posited by the theoretical framework underlying this study. As indicated, this 
theoretical framework combines Kingdon’s (2003) “window of opportunity” approach and 
Grindle’s (2004) “dynamic political process” framework, among others. In particular, it shows 
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how policy change is mediated by interactions among politico-economic factors and actors 
across five policy stages - problem definition and agenda setting, formulation, adoption, 
implementation and sustainability. While they appear independent of each other, in reality 
these stages operate interdependently. That is, developments at one stage of the policy process 
tend to shape developments at subsequent stages. For example, the compensation offered to 
medical doctors at the adoption stage locked-in policymakers; they had to continue to pay 
doctors even when the economy had deteriorated. Similarly, the use of repression at the 
implementation stage contributed to the overthrow of Nkrumah and the challenges of 
continuing the NHS system afterwards.  
The study also revealed dyads of actors and how they tended to shape the process of 
policy change differently. These actors include domestic, international, proponents and 
opponents. The domestic actors include the government of Ghana, the medical doctors and the 
mission hospitals in Ghana at the time. Also, both the Maude Commission of enquiry and the 
Dr. Brachott design team were constituted by the government of Ghana. Their members, 
however, were largely foreigners. Their knowledge of the British NHS partly shaped policy in 
Ghana. Members of the Maude Commission, Dr. Brachott, and the government were key 
proponents of the policy, while the medical doctors and facilities were its key opponents. While 
both sets of actors attained some successes, the proponents appeared to have made the most 
success in shaping the direction of the change. For example, although medical doctors and 
mission facilities both managed to secure some compensation and shaped the implementation 
process significantly, they were not successful in their overall quest to overturn the NHS 
system. Also, different proponents had a larger impact on shaping the policy change at different 
stages of the process. For example, while they were influential in shaping the agenda and 
content of the policy, respectively, the Maude Commission and Dr. Brachott did not strongly 
impact the implementation process, which was shaped by service providers and special 
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appointees of the government in power. In fact, as British and Israeli citizens, most of the above 
actors returned to their countries soon after the policy was adopted. Dr. Brachott, for example, 
stayed in Ghana for just two years (Addae, 1996). The adoption stage was also shaped by 
Nkrumah's ability to capitalise on the principle of party discipline in the legislative assembly. 
As indicated, sustaining the change was also shaped by commitment and strategies of the 
government and the vested interests the policy built overtime. 
 Combining ideas from both Kingdon (2003) and Grindle (2004), the author observes 
that contextual factors created a window of opportunity for policy change and also shaped the 
strategic choices of the reformers. In relation to Kingdon’s (2003) framework, the study 
showed how the process of transitioning to political independence; the election of Nkrumah as 
both a socialist and a nationalist leader; and the discriminatory, expensive and poor nature of 
the Ghana’s health system at the time; the economic boom of the 1960s; and the global shift 
towards big-government, including the NHS system, converged to create a window of 
opportunity for change. The opportunity was then seized by the government, which, as 
Grindle’s (2004) framework suggests, demonstrated a high commitment to the policy and put 
together teams of experts to study the health care situation and make recommendations for 
action. The design of the policy and subsequent stages of the policy process, as indicated above, 
were also shaped by reformers’ politics and ideology, research and evidence, existing policy 
legacies, the diffusion of ideas from the British NHS system and political strategies, which 
enabled the reformers to stave off opponents of policy change. These remarks are consistent 
with the analytical framework of this study, especially, the emphasis on reformers or policy 
entrepreneurs and their strategies. 
This study, therefore, contributes to both the window of opportunity approach 
(Kingdon, 2003) and the policy as political process model (Grindle, 2004) by showing how 
their combined insights can enrich our understanding of policy change. For instance, while 
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Kingdon’s (2003) concept of windows of opportunity enables us to understand the factors that 
drive change, on its own, it falls short of explaining how the window of opportunity was seized 
by reformers, beyond the agenda setting stage. By emphasizing the role of political 
commitment, design teams and reformers’ strategic choices in driving the change across the 
entire policy process, from agenda setting to sustainability, Grindle’s (2004) dynamic political 
process framework provides additional insight on how policy change occurs. Yet, on its own, 
this framework does not account for how certain contextual factors may trigger policy change 
in the first place, something the work of Kingdon (2003) points us to. A combination of these 
two approaches, therefore, provides a richer framework for understanding the transition to NHS 
in Ghana. In addition, the topic confirms the relevance of elements of the integrated framework 
derived from various institutionalist perspectives, particularly the role of material factors such 
as compensations, tactics such as incremental implementation and ideational strategies such as 
framing processes. It also reveals additional strategies policy entrepreneurs in Ghana 
employed, namely the use of repression, such as ban of political parties, co-optation of labour, 
media censorship and controls, these are largely ignored in the existing literature on health 
policy change.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the development of the NHS in Ghana and why and how it was 
achieved despite the marked opposition from vested interests, such as medical care providers. 
The analysis, as summarized in Table 2, below, shows that a combination of factors led to the 
radical heath care change in post-independence Ghana.  
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Table 2. Summary of factors leading to the introduction of the NHS system 
Factors Specifics Contributions 
 
 
Conjunctures 
 Discriminatory and 
expensive health system;  
 Attainment of self-
government;  
 Booming economy; 
 Global trend towards big-
government  
 They created windows of opportunity for 
change rather than determined the specific 
policy change to pursue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy entrepreneurship 
 
 The Nkrumah government 
 The Maude Commission 
 The Brachott design team 
 Cabinet and 
parliamentarians  
 Ghana’s quality 
bureaucracy  
 The vested interests or new 
stakeholders the policy 
developed over time 
 
 They seized the open windows to propose 
the NHS system onto the agenda.  
 They subsequently saw policy change 
through the remaining stages of the policy 
process (design, adoption, implementation 
and sustainability). 
 Different policy entrepreneurs playing 
different entrepreneurial roles were 
identified across various stages of the policy 
process.  
 Their leadership, strategies and 
commitment to change made them unique 
and relevant for the changes. 
 
 
Institutions 
 A party-disciplined 
democratic parliament 
with government holding 
majority of the seats  
 After 1964, the regime 
transitioned to a one-party 
state 
 These concentrated institutions minimized 
veto points for interests to overturn the 
policies.  
 They also eased the ability of the policy 
entrepreneurs to adopt the new policies. 
 
These factors involved the role of windows of opportunity created by the transition to self-
government in the 1950s and early 1960s, the lack of accessibility to health care due to 
discrimination and financial barriers, the election of a socialist and nationalist leader at the time 
of independence, the booming economy and the global trend towards broad welfare state 
regimes at the time. The above windows of opportunity were seized by the government, which 
set up a team of experts (the Maude Commission) to study the health care situation in Ghana 
in order to make recommendations for policy change. After the recommendation, Dr. Brachott 
was charged to design the policy, which was subsequently adopted, implemented and sustained 
up to the 1980s. While contextual factors shaped the change, the policy entrepreneurship or the 
leadership, commitment and strategies of the above actors in seizing the existing opportunities 
and countering subsequent challenges were the most critical factors. For example, using 
different political tactics, including the incremental approach to policy implementation, 
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framing and compensation, policy entrepreneurs managed to shift Ghana’s health care system 
from the regime of a colonially-centred user fee model to a universal NHS-state model, despite 
the resistance posed by health care providers and the economic challenges it faced after 1964. 
These findings suggest the need for scholars to pay attention to how the ingenuity of reformers 
may work in tandem with other factors to surmount forces of path-dependency and institute 
and sustain path-departing policy change. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A USER FEE SYSTEM 
5.1. Introduction 
In the early 1980s, Ghana moved significantly beyond its NHS system by introducing a cost 
recovery or a user fee model that required health care users to make out-of-pocket payments 
before services would be delivered to them. The main goal of the new policy was to generate 
additional revenue, which would account for only 15% of the total operating costs of public 
health care. However, as I will explain in the next section, the policy change led to in a 
remarkable transition in the mode of financing, delivery and access to health care in the 
country. This chapter examines the process of establishing the user fee model with the goal of 
understanding why and how the policy change occurred within the timeframe in which it did, 
despite certain countervailing factors. For example, whereas some modes of cost-sharing had 
been enacted in Ghana in the past, almost all of them had failed to  reach the level of 
implementation, making user fees one of the most critical paths to policy change in the history 
of the country (Arhinful, 2003; Coleman, 2011).  
Having initially portrayed itself as leftist and populist and as embracing a neo-Marxist 
brand of socialism (Hutchful, 2002), most people expected the government at the time (PNDC) 
to maintain the status quo, rather than embrace a far-reaching policy like user fees. This is the 
case for a few reasons. First, as a leftist regime, the PNDC was expected to first and foremost 
protect the vulnerable and the working class by improving the existing NHS system, rather than 
committing to user fees that might impose financial burdens or even hardships on these 
constituencies. Such an expectation seemed legitimate given that the Ghanaian economy had 
deteriorated such that the entire public could feel its negative effects. As Baidoo (2009) 
indicates, “the economic crisis led to most Ghanaians becoming skeletons overnight 
and…eating whatever they lay their hands on – mostly poisonous roots and leaves” (p. 43). 
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Second, by introducing user fees, the PNDC also stood the risk of being deposed, as 
almost all the governments that had attempted such a change had faced a similar fate. In fact, 
this should be expected in the case of the PNDC, given its political reliance on the working 
class, who, in addition to being potentially affected by the policy, had consistently shown their 
aggression towards user fees in the past (Hutchful, 2002). Beyond the working class, user fees 
had a tendency to inflame protests from the general public and the armed forces, whose 
historical aversion towards user fees were also evident (Arhinful, 2003). Despite these factors, 
the user fee policy was not only implemented, but also sustained for a number of years. In fact, 
existing accounts show that, by the time the government left office in 2000, the fees had risen 
dramatically, sometimes by over 5000% (Coleman, 1997; Nyonator & Kudzin, 1999).  
 Drawing on both the document reviews and the in-depth, semi-structured interviews, 
this chapter explains how the economic crisis of the 1980s, combined with other factors, 
including the strategies and commitment of key reformers, ensured the transition to user fees. 
In this context, this chapter confirms the theory of actor-centred institutionalism, showing its 
applicability to the issue of health care change in Ghana in the 1980s. Contributing to this 
theory, this chapter also suggests that additional mechanisms – frames, legislative inaction and 
coercion – help explain path-departing policy change. 
 
5.2 Examining the Magnitude of the Change 
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the transition to the user fee policy, it is crucial to 
examine the nature and magnitude of this change so as to properly conceptualize it. Like that 
of the NHS system, the magnitude of the shift to user fees is explored in reference to spending 
and institutional factors.  
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5.2.1. Spending Change 
Contrary to the general expectation that it would fall, public expenditures on health care 
eventually rose after the introduction of user fees (Hutchful, 2002), increasing from 6.5% of 
total government expenditure in 1980 to 8.7% in 1985, after a short-lived fall to 4.4% in 1983 
(Demery, Chao, Bernier & Mehra, 1995). By 1987, public spending on health had ballooned 
to about 12% of total government budget, although it fell to 8.7% in 1994 (Demery et al., 1995). 
The trend in public health care expenditure in relation to the GDP reveals similar results; it 
shifted from 0.9% in 1980 to 0.38% in 1983 and to 1.07% in 1985 (Demery et al., 1995). 
However, as seen in Table 3, below, much of the increase in public health care 
expenditure can only be seen in nominal rather than in real terms, when real public spending 
for the period after the user fee policy was introduced is compared to the period preceding the 
policy change. In the period just before the policy change, the economic crisis had worsened 
deeply, resulting in the government’s inability to invest in the health sector as needed.  
Table 3 Nominal and real government health expenditures of Ghana 1978 - 1988 
 
Source: Waddington and Enyimayew (1989, p. 42) 
However, real public spending for the period after the user fee policy was introduced was still 
lower than that of the period from the 1960s to 1980s, when the NHS system was in operation 
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(see Waddington & Enyimayew, 1989, p. 42). For example, as Coleman (2011) notes, “the 
Ministry of Health expenditures in 1984 amounted to only 45.4% of what they had been in 
1978” (p. 14). The majority of the increased expenditure had also gone to pay for the salaries 
of health care personnel rather than expanding access to health care (Nyonator & Kutzin, 1999; 
Hutchful, 2002). For example, in their study involving 24 facilities in the Volta Region, 
Nyonator & Kutzin, (1999) found that between 67% and 88% of public spending focused on 
staff salaries. 
The rise in public expenditure on health care also occurred at the same time as the 
growth of private health care expenditure. As Demery et al. (1995) note, private spending on 
health care accounted for 51% of the total health expenditure in 1995. The African 
Development Indicators (2001) reported a similar trend between 1990 and 1997, with private 
health expenditure relative to GDP still higher than public health expenditure as a portion of 
GDP (1.6% compared to 1.4%). The World Health Organization (WHO) noted that private 
health care expenditure had surpassed public expenditure significantly, reaching about 60% of 
total expenditure on health care in 2002 (WHO, 2004). The implication of the above is that 
under the regime of user fees, and for the first time in post-independent Ghana, private 
expenditure on medical care outpaced public expenditure. User fees “accounted for about two-
thirds of health centre non-salary revenues and more than 80% of hospital non-salary revenues 
in public sector facilities in the Volta Region” (Nyonator1 & Kutzin, 1999, p. 335). As 
illustrated by Figure 2, Ghana’s total user fees revenue was the highest across SSA, with an 
average of just 5% of the operating costs of health care (Creese, 1991).  
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Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Revenue from fees as % of ministry of health budget 
 
 
User fees also formed an important portion of the income of medical care users. 
Describing the impact of the policy change on service users, Lavy and Quigley (1993), for 
instance, note, “these are very poor households. On average one consultation costs 877 cedis 
or only about US$3.00. But per capita income is only 71, 000 cedis a year. Therefore, one 
medical consultation in a four-week period consumes roughly 15% of monthly income” (p. 10, 
cited in Hutchful, 2002, p. 131). Consumers of the user fee system also bore the full costs of 
the drugs, which represent one of the largest shares of the total health care costs in Ghana 
(Arhinful, 2003; Coleman, 2011). As well, it was the largest share of total private health 
expenditure (Ramanchandra & Hsiao, 2007). 
Much of the increased public expenditure on health care also increased regional 
inequities in health service provision. For example, whereas per capita health expenditure for 
Greater Accra, the country’s most urban and developed region, was 2,442 cedis (Ghanaian 
currency) in 1992, it amounted to 1,546 cedis and 1,289 cedis in Central and Volta, which are 
Source: Vogel (1989) cited in Creese, (1991, p. 6) 
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among Ghana’s poorest and most rural regions, respectively (Demery et al., 1995). Hutchful 
(2002) witnessed a similar situation between 1989 and 1992. He notes, “in 1989 urban dwellers 
with one-third of the population received 42% of health spending. In 1992, this rose to 48.7%, 
while the proportion of rural areas fell from 58% to 51.3%” (p. 130). Also, whereas per capita 
subsidies for urban dwellers rose from 2,223 cedis to 5,808 cedis (Ghana currency), rural 
dwellers’ subsidies increased from 1,459 cedis to only 3,039 cedis (World Bank, 1995, p. 39 
cited in Hutchful, 2002, p. 130). Part of the reason for the inequity may be the government’s 
overriding focus on reducing costs rather than building more health care facilities to cover 
people in more rural and poorer regions of the country. It could also be because a 
disproportionate share of health care facilities was located in the better off urban areas and in 
the South rather than in the North and in rural areas that needed those facilities the most 
(Hutchful, 2002). Thus, although government support for the health sector increased, a greater 
proportion of that was allocated to the better off at the expense of the poor (Adjei, 2013). 
 
5.2.2. Institutional Change 
Beyond changes in public expenditure, user fees created structural and qualitative changes with 
respect to rights and responsibilities under the Ghanaian health care system. In particular, as 
indicated in Table 1, user fees shifted the provision of health care from the basis of universalism 
to targeting, whereby only a small fraction of the population, particularly paupers, children, the 
aged, and health staff, could legally obtain free services.  
Referred to as “the most comprehensive cost recovery legislation in West Africa” 
(Arhinful, 2003, p. 87), Ghana’s user fee legislation also caused a shift from the provision of 
comprehensive benefit coverage offered under the previous NHS regime to a minimum benefit 
package for targeted populations only. With this change only consultations for certain 
communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis and leprosy, and immunizations were exempted 
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from fee payment, leaving all other services subject to user fees, including medications, 
inpatient care, outpatient care, laboratory tests, accommodation and meals in hospital (see 
Table 1). 
The change seems even more radical when one considers the fact that the few 
exemptions under the user fee policy were never effectively implemented (Ofori-Birikorang, 
2009). In fact, the majority of the people, including those potentially exempted from user fees, 
were not even aware of the existence of the fee exemption schemes. For example, based on his 
interview with key stakeholders, Maclean (2002) observed that only 4.5% of them knew about 
the legislated fee exemptions. This implies that normally, in practice, not only was free health 
care non-existent, but also the people who should have been legally exempted nonetheless paid 
the user fees, or avoided care because of the user fees (Adjei, 2013).  
Before the introduction of user fees, health service was delivered mainly by facilities 
that were owned and managed by two main actors - the public sector, represented by the MoH 
at the time, and the non-profit private sector, which included mission or religious-based 
facilities. With the creation of the user fee model, new sets of actors emerged. Within the public 
sector, for instance, the Ghana Health Service (GHS) was created in 1997 to take away the 
responsibility of service delivery from the MoH, which was left with the obligation of 
policymaking. In addition to the non-profit private actors, there was also an aggressive 
emergence of several for-profit private actors, comprising mainly of self-financed providers, 
including hospitals, maternity homes, clinics, pharmacies, chemical sellers, and laboratories 
after the introduction of the user fee policy (Makinen, Sealey, Bitrán, Adjei & Muñoz, 2011). 
For example, by the 1990s, there were about 41 hospitals and 64 clinics in Ghana that belonged 
to about 45 not-for-profit private institutions27, as well as 12 hospitals, 402 registered clinics, 
                                                          
27 Most of these non-profit delivery agents were the same as the Religious-Based Providers (RBP) that existed 
during the NHS regime. 
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362 registered pharmacies and 3,077 licenced drugstores that were owned by for-profit private 
organizations (Demery et al., 1995). As reported by the 2000 Ghana Living Standard Survey, 
taken together, the private-for-profit and the private-non-profit actors accounted for about 52% 
of the total market of health care in Ghana (Makinen, Sealey, Bitrán, Adjei & Muñoz, 2011). 
The implication of the above is that the user fee policy transformed the face of the health sector 
from one that was nearly monopolized by the government under the NHS-type system to one 
that was dominated by the private sector. That said, the public sector continued to command a 
significant share of all hospitals and hospital beds (63% and 70%, respectively), even after the 
introduction of user fees (Asenso-Okyere, 1995). 
Furthermore, access to health care declined. For instance, outpatient attendance reduced 
from 10-11 million people in 1973 to about 5 million in 1987, representing about 38% of the 
population at the time (Lavy & Germmain, 1995). In some hospitals in Ghana, utilization rates 
declined 32.4% (Waddington & Enyimayew, 1989, 1990; Criel, 1998). The greatest impact 
user fees had was on poor and rural Ghanaians who could not afford the fees (Asenso-Okyere, 
1995; Senah, 2001; Ofori-Birikornag, 2009). For instance, barely 20% of the poor sought health 
care relative to about 51% of people in the top quintile in 1989 (Demery et al., 1995). These 
observations indicate clear cases of commodification under the user fee regime, which supports 
the argument that the transition to user fees under the PNDC was a significant change in health 
policy in Ghana. 
Despite these significant changes in health care, there were some points of continuity. 
For example, the government continued to bear the full cost of the salaries and wages of MoH 
staff and, significantly, of those of mission hospitals, although their incomes were also 
supplemented by the fact that many of the exemptions offered under the scheme went to them 
rather than the poor (Arhinful, 2003). Also, although some repair work done in the facilities 
was paid by user fees collected, as Hutchful (2002) notes, “the services infrastructure 
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…training expenses and health education and promotional programmes” were largely paid for 
by the government (p. 56). Like its predecessor, the user fee system was also curative- and 
urban-biased, as little attention was paid to promoting preventive and primary health care 
(Waddington & Enyimayew, 1989, 1990; Kraus, 1991; Criel, 1998; Hutchful, 2002). In spite 
of these points of continuity, the changes seen after the implementation of user fees were 
significant.   
 
5.3. Why and How the User Fee Policy Occurred 
Analysis of the data shows that a number of factors combined to ensure the shift from NHS to 
user fees in the 1980s. I back this claim by tracing the development of user fees from problem 
definition and agenda setting through formulation, adoption, implementation and 
sustainability.  
 
5.3.1. Problem Definition and Agenda-setting 
Not long after the implementation of the NHS system, it became apparent that it could not be 
sustained (Adjei, 2013). For instance, government revenue for the health sector diminished 
dramatically (Arhinful, 2003). In response, as indicated in the preceding chapter, the Nkrumah 
government introduced import and foreign exchange restrictions, but as Arhinful (2003) notes, 
these aggravated the situation, leading to shortages of the “capital intensive equipment, 
essential drugs and supplies” health professionals and facilities needed (p. 50). The intensity 
of the situation led some actors to question the validity of the NHS system. The GMA was the 
first to register its disapproval of the existing health system (Adibo, 2013), followed later by 
bureaucrats in the MoH who basically “questioned the rationality of the approach of extending 
health services to the majority of the people through construction of health facilities” 
(Coleman, 2011, p. 13).  
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Despite these complaints, it was not until the late 1960s when the NLC rightist 
government created a committee, led by Dr. Easmon, to investigate the problem of health care 
reform that the idea of introducing user fees to address the financial shortfall in the health sector 
was first recommended. As Arhinful (2003) indicates, “because of the…recommendations [of 
the Easmon committee], a statutory dispensing fee (30 new pesewas) was introduced in 
February 1968, but the directive was withdrawn following public outcry” (p. 50). Another 
committee, known as the Konotey-Ahulu committee, was set up in 1970 to examine user fees 
in the country. After travelling to almost every corner of Ghana and digging deep into the 
archives, that committee recommended the introduction of hospital fees, thereby becoming the 
second to contribute to the user fee agenda. Arhinful (2003) notes that “on the basis of … [the 
Konotey-Ahulu committee’s] recommendations, the government introduced the Hospital Fee 
Act of 1971 in government health facilities with the aim of reducing excessive demand and 
contributing to recovering part of the costs of curative services” (p. 51). Coleman (2011) 
emphasizes, however, that “though the user fee policy was given legitimacy through 
legislation, it was not implemented because the proponents of the policy were [soon put] out 
of power” (p. 12). Consequently, as Adibo (2013) noted, “under Limann [’s administration in 
1981] ...an LI [for user fees]… was passed, lying [in parliament] for the 21 days28 [to elapse] 
when [the] Limann administration was overthrown [by the PNDC on December 31, 1981]” 
(Adibo, 2013). 
When the PNDC came to power in 1981, the GMA, together with the Pharmaceutical 
Society of Ghana (PSoG), again proposed the introduction of user fees (Adibo, 2013; Adjei, 
2013; Agyepong, 2013). Adibo (2013), a key member of the user fee reform team, explains the 
circumstances leading to the introduction of the user fee policy. 
                                                          
28 The parliamentary standing order of Ghana during the Limann administration (1979-1981) required laws 
passed by parliament to take effect only after 21 days of enactment   
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The economy was in distress: when we wanted money to import our essential 
commodities, drugs, and things like that, the Bank of Ghana or Ministry of Finance 
could not give money to the Bank of Ghana to establish the letters of trading. So there 
were shortages in the system. So I thought that if we sold drugs, charged other fees, 
kept the revenue that we generated, and put it in the Bank of Ghana, anytime we wanted 
to import things we could fall on the bank and take the money to establish the letters of 
trading. That was the basis of what came to be known as cash and carry [or user fees]. 
 
In this respect, the economic crisis crippled the country’s ability to even raise adequate revenue 
to import necessary materials for the health sector. According to Nortey (2013), the economic 
crisis combined with a rise in population growth, making it difficult for the government to 
sustain the economy. Consequently, the economic problems ended up affecting the other areas 
of the Ghanaian society, with the health sector being a critical part of those affected. Adams 
(2013), who was a key member at the policy design process, notes that the Ministry of 
Finance’s allocation to the MoH in the national budget dwindled. Other areas that were 
seriously affected as a result of the crisis involved the availability of equipment and drugs in 
health care facilities. As Akosa (2013) recounted during the interview process, 
It was felt that all the period before the user fees, the hospitals didn’t have equipment, 
the hospitals did not have drugs. So when you [people] went to hospital, sometimes 
prescriptions were written for you [them] to go and buy in private pharmacies. And, of 
course, let one also realize that the economy wasn’t doing well and therefore money for 
health was very limited and the hospitals, frankly, did not have anything [resources] so 
it was thought that user fees was going to give the hospital money for them to acquire 
things [the needed health care resource]. 
Akor29 (2013) also confirmed the impact of the crisis on the health system.  
All the hospitals were facing shortage of medicine in the pharmacy. They can only buy 
a small package and then when they bring it, sometimes, the quantities get missing 
because even health workers were pilfering the drugs; some were taking it for their own 
relations and so forth. Within a short time, it is gone, everything is finished, so how do 
we tackle that? Then it meant patients should pay for the drugs so that we can set up a 
drug recovery fund to be able to replenish the stock. That is how come the need for a 
user fee policy came to the table.  
The above argument suggests that, in the face of the shortages of drugs and other consumables 
in medical facilities, some health care staff sought to protect the few available medical supplies 
                                                          
29 Akor was a public health physician during the 1980s and a key implementer of the user fee model. 
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for delivery to their relatives after work. But that trend worsened health care quality and equity, 
as Akor (2013) explained in the same interview, 
Quality was impoverished from the patient or client perspective. For example, I expect 
to get drugs or medicines prescribed and bought from the premises, but there was no 
medicine. I had to go and buy them from a private source outside the hospital. It was 
not the thing that most clients were happy with. So out of that situation, government 
saw the need to do something. And for practitioners, you want medicine for your clients, 
especially, those in the ward and since it is not available, you have to run out to go and 
find it... It is not an incentive for you to even practice; it is frustrating that you want to 
do something for your client or patient and you can’t do it at the time when you need 
it. 
Notey (2013) of the Ghana Registered Nurses and Midwifery association also confirmed the 
impact of the health care situation on the morale of medical staff.  
The drugs are not there, equipment are not there to work with and the patients are 
coming. When I need a thermometer to measure your temperature before I give you 
medicine, the thermometer is not there and I cannot not go and buy thermometer and 
put it there. It affects my work, I know what to do, but the things are not there so it 
affects my work and I cannot give care to the patients, the patients cannot also die or 
have complications so it affects our work. 
The above experiences, among others, informed policymakers about the apparent need to 
introduce user fees. Given the nature of the situation, as described above, it was predictable 
that the GMA and PSoG would be the first to complain and call for the introduction of user 
fees. But in addition to them, as Adibo (2013) noted during the interview, in 1982, when the 
health care problem had worsened, the MoH was also compelled to develop a user fee proposal 
for the PNDC government. However, the government rejected the proposal, arguing that it was 
politically inappropriate to introduce user fees at the time (Adibo, 2013). As a socialist regime, 
the PNDC’s government rejection of the introduction of user fees should not be surprising. 
Also, as indicated, the preceding government was in the process of introducing user fees when 
it was ousted by the PNDC. Hence, turning back to introduce a similar policy was seen as 
potentially troublesome for the regime’s reputation and survival. The public might be 
disappointed, especially as the coup was popularized as a vehicle to end the hardships of the 
Ghanaian society.  
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Having rejected the MoH’s user fee proposal, the government began to explore a 
socialist-based alternative to health care financing (Hutchful, 2002). In 1982, for instance, it 
sent emissaries to the Eastern bloc for financial support. Nevertheless, the Eastern bloc agenda 
not only failed, but the representatives of the PNDC were advised to negotiate with the IMF 
and the World Bank for assistance. While it appeared simple, the advice was a bitter pill for 
the PNDC, given its leftist orientation and support-base (Adjei, 2013). Coleman, (2011) notes 
that the government “expressed an unequivocal commitment …to primary health care”, which 
was to be financed through the imposition of tax instead of user fees (p. 13). Its main purpose 
was to extend health care coverage to at least 80% of the people in rural areas and urban shanty 
towns by 1990 (Coleman, 2011). Although user fees were then higher on the policy agenda, 
the PNDC bypassed them and ordered a revision of the primary health care policy, referring to 
it as “a revolutionary way of looking at the whole health system with a view of ensuring social 
justice to all citizens” (Coleman, 2011, p. 13). The failure of Ghana’s primary health care policy 
deepened the urgency for reforms but still, instead of user fees, the government decided to 
impose surcharges on medical imports such as drugs and equipment (Arhinful, 2003). 
Nevertheless, that policy was also unsuccessful, resulting in “the inability to purchase 
necessary medical supplies and medications, as well as a decay of health care infrastructures 
and the cancellation of the existing programs on immunization” (Arhinful, 2003, p. 52).  
At the height of the crisis, as Arhinful (2003) notes, “patients did not only have to 
‘scavenge’ their drugs from private sources, but they, in addition, had to carry their bedding, 
food requirements and sometimes even stationery with them when attending some public 
facilities” (p. 52). These conditions created a disincentive for patients to purchase care in public 
medical facilities. Consequently, usage of public medical facilities declined immensely (by 
about 40%) in the period between 1981 and 1983, when the government finally agreed, 
although grudgingly, to the policy change (Adibo, 2013).  
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The interesting thing with this decision was that it coincided with a number of factors. 
As Adibo (2013) noted, “after the drought and bush fires30, the returning of the one million 
Ghanaians [expelled from Nigeria], the economic crunch on Ghana was too strong so when we 
raised [health policy change] again they [members of the PNDC government] saw the point”. 
This implies that, apart from the failure of earlier socialist measures, the gravity of the 
economic crisis after the 1983 drought and the expulsion of Ghanaian emigrants from Nigeria 
contributed significantly to pushing the PNDC government to agree to the user fee policy. 
However, that decision also coincided with the period during which the government adopted 
the World Bank and the IMF’s Structural Adjustment and Economic Recovery Program 
(SAERP), which mainly required the country to pursue fiscal discipline by increasing revenue 
and reducing spending. This was confirmed by Agyepong (2013) during the interview; as she 
noted, “the World Bank put all these conditionalities that is how these user fees came”. 
Explaining the conditionalities, Agyepong (2013) added, “it wasn’t only Ghana it was all over 
Africa and I think it’s a good example of ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’- the countries 
were desperate, they were on their knees so you know if the World Bank says you have to do 
this before I give you money, they really have no choice so that’s how the user fees came, so 
again it was a response to drastic changes in the environment”. However, this cannot be 
interpreted as an imposition in the strict sense of the word. As Akor (2013) noted, “it wasn’t 
like an imposition, but it was happening around the time when we had started the economic 
recovery program. The environment was ripened for the introduction of this [user fees] 
already”. Agyepong (2013) seems to agree with this argument, at least to some extent. He said, 
Everybody talks about the World Bank but the truth is that providers were actually 
pushing for user fees…We had major problems. There were shortages of everything, 
nothing was available, and so providers had been pushing that if government cannot 
pay for these services, allow us to charge people something because we cannot do our 
work. So it was structural adjustment, but like I said things were bad. And even what 
                                                          
30 In the early 1980s, a series of bush fires and severe drought occurred in Ghana, resulting in a dramatic 
reduction in the production of major food and exportable commodities in 1983. In addition to food crops, the 
bush fires also destroyed most of the cocoa, Ghana’s major foreign exchange earner (Anyemedu. 1993).  
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was theoretically free was not free in practice. And there were under the table charges 
and people were given prescriptions, and asked to go and buy gloves, to go and buy 
cotton wool. 
The above passages suggest that the domestic context was perfect for the introduction 
of user fees even before the World Bank and the IMF came onto the scene. In fact, as indicated, 
some patients were already paying “under the table” to be able to receive drugs and services in 
public medical facilities. According to Seddoh (2013), the intensity of the situation created the 
impression that, most likely, introducing user fees would even be to the benefit of the poor. As 
he argues, 
It was popular because the drugs were not there, there was nothing in the facilities, any 
time people went to the health facilities, they were given prescriptions and the economic 
cost of travelling twice for the poor person is big, you go to the hospital and they put a 
piece of paper [prescriptions] in your hands, you struggled hard to come to the facility 
only to be told you have to go another 5km to go and find another drug store and you 
go there and the drugs are even not there and the person dies. It was very high and had 
to do something about it. 
Thus, beyond revenue generation, the user fees were also deemed necessary to promote equity, 
quality and accessibility in health care. 
Explaining how the user fee policy moved onto the agenda, therefore, requires 
recognizing (a) the number of factors that interacted to create a window of opportunity for the 
change, and (b) how the open window was seized by key policy entrepreneurs to push the 
proposed policy change onto the governmental agenda. The window of opportunity was created 
by the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, which adversely affected health service delivery 
in the country; the failure of socialist policy approaches to tackle the crisis; the return of 
Ghanaians emigrants from Nigeria in the early 1980s, which worsened the already precarious 
economic situation; and a domestic and international environment favourable to change, as 
characterized by the support and diffusion of the idea of  user fees by the GMA, the PSoG, 
MoH and the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s. Leaders of the above organizations seized 
the window of opportunity by pushing user fees onto the PNDC’s agenda. While all of these 
actors contributed in placing user fees on the agenda, the IMF and the World Bank appeared to 
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have had the most impact, as they backed their proposal with financial aid that would benefit 
the entire economy (Hutchful, 2002). The policy was first announced as part of the April 1983 
budget (Hutchful, 2002). The policy’s announcement in the national budget suggested that the 
government has finally agreed to introduce the user fee policy.  
 
5.3.2. Formulation/Design  
Dr. Moses Adibo, the head of the Policy, Planning and Monitoring Unit of the MoH, led the 
design of the user fee policy with the involvement of other bureaucrats in the ministry. This 
was because, in the face of the severe economic situation, and coupled with earlier failures to 
address the situation through user fees, Ghanaian politicians had generally left health care 
financing to the bureaucrats (Coleman, 2011). In the absence of politicians’ involvement, as 
Coleman (2011) notes, “technocrats began, for the first time, to significantly influence policy, 
particularly the organization and delivery of [health] services” despite the fact that the user fee 
model was clearly at odds with the ideology of the PNDC (p. 12). 
According to Adibo (2013), the priority at the time was to develop a Legislative 
Instrument (LI) to guide the policy’s implementation. In fact, as noted above, a policy of similar 
magnitude had been sent to parliament and passed in 1981, during President Limann’s regime, 
when the government was overthrown by a coup d’état. In 1982, the MoH, led by Dr. Adibo, 
had also made a proposal to the PNDC to introduce user fees, which was rejected. This means 
that the ministry and Dr. Adibo had already gained significant experience in the development 
of user fees policy before the PNDC’s decision to adopt them in 1983. Hence, what they 
basically did was to amend those earlier proposals (Adibo, 2013). Particularly, they changed 
the levels and composition of the fees, the exemption schemes, and the systems for managing 
the fees collected. 
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Various stakeholders in the health sector, including the GMA, regional directors of 
health, experienced theatre nurses and important medical doctors, among others, were involved 
in the design of the policy. The inclusion of these actors helped in generating a list of services 
and procedures relevant for the user fee policy, as well as the appropriate price tag for each of 
those services and procedures. As Adibo (2013) recounted during the interview,  
I met the medical association and planning unit. First of all when the idea came, I 
discussed it at the meeting of regional directors… I told them what was going to be 
done, how it was going to be done.., but talking to doctors can be intimidating, so I 
dared not send a nurse or physician. I decided that I would do that myself. And I … 
invited the heads of the various sections in the hospitals and they came and I told them 
what I wanted, so I got a list from them … [they include] operations, major operations 
and something else. There were three things that we agreed on. They listed them and 
we met, they presented the list, and there was consensus that these are the activities to 
include in the policy. 
Upon receiving the list of the various procedures to be included in the policy, the ministry then 
went ahead to cost them. For example, Adibo (2013) indicated how the cost for a caesarean 
procedure was established as follows:  
In a theatre, there is a theatre nurse who makes sure that everything including swaps 
that were used in operating were there, so a theatre nurse can tell you that we need so 
much of this so much of that for one operation and you need to know these basic facts 
to be able to estimate the cost of operation. So I worked with nurses like that and the 
surgeons themselves before we arrived at the cost of each operation. [That was] because 
I wanted this to be very professionally done. So we did it and I had to ask them of the 
number of hours one could spend on a caesarean section for example. They told me. I 
knew their salary so [I could determine if] two hours of their salary was what goes into 
the costing. Then [I also asked, for example] the theatre nurse how many swabs, how 
much cut guards, how many of this how many of that was required. We wrote all those 
things down, cross checked with the surgeon. If he agrees, then we put cost to it. So I 
didn’t sit in my office and conjure the figures. No! I got the data from them.  
A similar data collection procedure was employed in identifying the specific drugs to be 
included in the policy. In this case, the one-man design team benefited immensely from 
experiences at the district hospital level and numerous trips made to Osu Oxford Street, one of 
the principal business centres in Accra, Ghana. As Adibo (2013) noted, 
Having worked at the district hospital level, I wrote down the list of drugs with which 
anybody could run the district hospital effectively...I realized that prices were going up 
so I wrote down the most important drugs and once a month I went to Oxford Street. 
There were a number of pharmacies there and I had my yellow card. And I asked [for] 
122 
 
the drug and I asked how much is the drug? They told me and I wrote it down. What 
about this one, what about that one? And I was monitoring the price movement over 
time.  
When everything was done, the ministry submitted its design to the PNDC government for 
approval.  
The implication of the above is that, unlike that of the NHS system, design of the user 
fee policy was entirely performed by technical experts within the MoH, with no participation 
from the general public. Additionally, actors from other departments or sectors of the economy 
such as interest groups, non-profits, politicians and donors were ignored. This approach limited 
the opportunity for potential opponents of the policy to disrupt the design process. Hence, 
design of the user fee policy was carried out rapidly. 
 
5.3.3. Adoption 
Because Ghana was under military rule, the adoption of the user fee model was expedited. 
Since the PNDC performed the dual role of cabinet and parliament during the introduction of 
user fees in 1983 and its amendment in 1985, opposition to the policy was minimized. 
However, some potential obstacles still remained. For example, as a socialist party, the PNDC 
had the tendency to keep the fee levels lower than needed. As Adibo (2013) noted during the 
interviews, 
[Having] sat down with the professors in the medical school, some surgeons and 
[ascertained that] the cost of a major operation in those days would cost 10,000 cedis. 
When I presented this to them, the PNDC told me that the average Ghanaian cannot 
pay 10,000 cedis … Eventually they said 1000, so I said, sir, what this means is that 
government is subsidizing the cost of operation by 90%. [Also, when] I said [or asked 
them] how much should foreigners pay? They said 1500 [cedis]. 
According to Adibo, the final document was prepared to account for the above changes.  
Although from the quotation above, it appears the one-man design team was 
flabbergasted by the way the amendment was carried out, it should have been expected. Despite 
the crisis, it took some time for the PNDC to move away from its leftist ideals they had held 
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for several decades. As Grindle and Thomas (1989) emphasize, “in crisis-ridden 
reforms…technical analysis, bureaucratic interactions, and international pressures often 
assumes importance,…but usually remain subordinate to concerns about stability or survival 
of the regime in power or the longevity of its incumbent” (p. 232). Thus, the PNDC had to 
tread carefully. This might have motivated its decision to water down the professionally 
determined fees in order to protect itself from potential overthrow by opponents, including 
disgruntled party members.  
Despite the grey area discussed above, the design team was able to dominate in other 
areas. For instance, the policy document stated that part of the fees to be collected should be 
kept within the respective medical institutions to be used for improving services and buying 
drugs. The PNDC disagreed vehemently with the design team on this issue because they 
thought that all the monies should be deposited into the National Treasury, as Adibo (2013) 
indicated, 
Kwesi Botchwey was the minister of finance at the time. He asked me if the ministry 
of education too wants to keep the revenue they generated, what will happen to the 
government. So I said the two are not comparable. The two are different. We are not 
going to chop [misuse] it. We are going to put it in the bank so that when we need to 
import things, we can take the money from the Bank of Ghana [for it]. 
Campbell (2002) argues that in order to achieve a far-reaching policy change, the reformers 
must craft their policy ideas in a manner that could appease even potential detractors. Having 
framed the decision in the way that sought to support the health sector rather than any particular 
interest, the design team was able to get the government to approve their request. Hence, 
according to the user fee law, half of the fees to be collected should be delivered to the MoH 
(which included all the public medical providers), while the other half was to be deposited into 
the National Treasury.  
  The design team was also victorious in how much the drugs were to be sold for under 
the user fee policy. Again, as Adibo (2013) noted, the design team’s success in this area was 
due to how the idea was framed. 
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Fortunately for me, if you go and look at section 5, which deals with drugs, I said drugs 
could be sold at costs. My experience of the escalating price of drugs in the drug stores 
on Oxford Street was what gave me the idea to write drugs to be sold at cost so if you 
go and buy it for one cedi if you buy it at 5 cedis [then you sell it at that price]. So 
fortunately for me, nobody saw through this. They didn’t argue. When the LI went to 
the PNDC it was approved.  
Had the design team proposed a mark-up to the cost price of the drugs, it would probably have 
been rejected by the PNDC. This is because it would have sent a signal that the team was 
seeking to privatize the public medical care system, a move that would have definitely 
backfired given the socialist orientation of the PNDC government.  
According to Béland and Orenstein (2009, p. 705; 2010, p. 630), in order for policy 
elites to pursue change, they must show that “change is necessary”. Through a series of 
questions I posed to the design team, it became evident that a sense of urgency and momentum 
for change existed. In the passage below, Adibo (2013) explains the team’s framing strategies, 
which enhanced their proposal for change. As he notes, 
We had a problem and I tell you as it is - take it or leave it. I know [I] am an advisor, 
but I must say that I had worked with PNDC secretaries who were very understanding. 
Maybe I know how to put my case convincing...As professor Bene once told me … you 
the way you write things you have to take it. If you don’t take it, you would look like a 
fool so you have to take it. So that’s how I write.  
From the above, it appears the team had significant levels of boldness and the ability to 
convince and so to influence the decision of the government. Interrogating this issue further in 
the interview, it came to light that usually the facts were embellished in a manner that tilted 
choices towards the preferences of the team. As Adibo (2013) noted when explaining the 
strategies he usually employed to convince the policymakers, 
I state the fact, and I write it in such a way that if you don’t see it, then it’s a problem. 
I state my case very strongly … When I am writing, I don’t say that this is the way it 
should be done. [Rather], I tell you there are a number of ways to do it. If you do it this 
way, this will be the outcome. If you do it that way that would be the outcome. Then I 
ask you to look at the three options. I then decide that this is the best option. If you 
disagree then you can choose one.  
The ministry representative was able to convince the PNDC to adopt the ministry’s user fee 
proposal using this approach. He explained, 
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I told them how much there had been shortages - you go to the hospital even paper to 
write on [was not available]. So at one point we started asking patients to come with 
exercise books. So do you keep the exercise book or you give it to the patient? …If the 
patient keeps it and doesn’t bring it the next time you don’t remember what you saw 
the patient for, so this wasn’t helping the system. And so we need to run the system 
properly. So we need to charge minimal fees … I set out how I arrived at the fees and 
so everybody saw that yes we had a problem maybe for now the immediate problem 
was to charge some fees whilst we think about the long term solution (Adibo, 2013). 
Like the above lead actor of the ministry, many of the interviewees at the ministry 
acknowledged how much of their discussions and meetings with the PNDC were centred on 
making user fees a temporary rather than a permanent policy (Adjei31, 2013). That frame may 
have also contributed to convincing the PNDC to shift their policy direction while they 
searched for a permanent solution to the health care problem later.  
The design team’s proposal was also accepted because of the fee exemptions provided 
for indigents, pregnant women, the aged and children, as well as for those suffering from 
diseases like tuberculosis and for immunization services. The incorporation of the exemption 
clauses suggested that the marginalized, who formed a significant base for the PNDC, would 
not suffer under user fees. Because it was a mere political strategy, not much attention was paid 
to the determination of the exact content of the exemptions or their implementation. For 
instance, the team did not attempt to estimate the number of people the exemptions were likely 
to cover. As Adibo (2013) noted, 
We said government would refund to any health institution the cost of treating the poor 
and the destitute. So one day Kwesi Botchwey [Finance Minister] called me and said 
what percentage of your clientele is made up of the poor and destitute?...That is when 
I learnt that Ghanaians don’t like taking decisions. When they asked me I called the 
regions, but nobody had done it. Only Korle bu had done it at the time and they said 
10% of their clientele were classified as poor and destitute so I told Kwesi Botchwey 
that maybe for the time being let’s use that for the nation but I will try and see if I can 
get the [the rest but] I never got any so we still don’t know that one for sure. 
In addition to the marginalized, health care staff were exempted from paying user fees under 
the user fee policy to encourage them to collect the fees on behalf of the government (Adibo, 
                                                          
31 Adjei was involved in the racking or monitoring of the implementation of the user fee policy. 
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2013). Because the exemption package was politically motivated, it could not be effectively 
implemented. The next section provides more details on this issue. 
 
5.3.4. Implementation 
Grindle and Thomas (1989) note that agenda setting and formulation are simply the genesis of 
policy change. The actual work of policy change resides in implementation, where reformers 
tend to face their main opponents. In order to successfully navigate through the rocky politics 
of implementation, it is argued that political leadership is required (Gilson & Di McIntyre, 
2005). With respect to a more contentious issue like user fees, as Kajula, Kintu, Barugahare 
and Neema (2004) note, “the reforms must be owned and directed by the central government” 
(p. 151). The importance of having the support of the central government is that apart from 
having the ultimate power to pursue change, as politicians they also have the tendency to 
withdraw from doing so when facing significant opposition. This happened under Ghana’s 
NLC military regime in 1968/9 (Arhinful, 2003) and also in Uganda in the early 2000s (Kajula 
et al., 2004). It appeared the design team did a great job in getting the PNDC on their side. As 
Adibo (2013) acknowledged, 
The PNDC secretary launched it [the user fee policy] on radio and TV… immediately 
after that we had a discussion on “talking point”, [a Ghanaian Television program]. I 
appeared on it [“talking point”] to explain it [the user fee policy] and defend it. When 
the government accepts these things they don’t run away from it. 
Thus, the PNDC went beyond the adoption stage to showcase the policy on national radio and 
television followed by public education, with Dr. Adibo at the forefront. Given that they had 
nationwide coverage, the media offered a significant opportunity for the PNDC and the 
ministry team to shape public perception about the content of the new policy. Adams32 (2013) 
                                                          
32 Mr. Adams is an officer at the Ministry of Health. During the transition to the user fee policy, he was then 
working as a public health officer at the regional hospital in Accra. 
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also noted that other sensitization programs were held for the general public on the fees. Thus, 
as he emphasized, “so people knew that when they came for service, they had to pay”. 
Thereafter, information was passed on to the various regional offices and health 
facilities in the country to implement the cost recovery policy. The content of the policy, as 
hinted above, included charging users for the costs of drugs, consultation, diagnostic 
procedures and other services as enshrined in the law. Also, fees were supposed to be based on 
service level (i.e., health centre or hospital), treatment location (urban or rural), age (child or 
adult), service type (curative, preventive, disease or procedure), and nationality (Ghanaian or 
non-Ghanaian). Thus, health centres were supposed to charge lower fees than district hospitals, 
district hospitals were also supposed to charge lower fees than regional hospitals, which, in 
turn, were to charge lower fees than teaching hospitals (Waddington & Enyimayew, 1990; 
Asenso-Okyere; 1995). Compared to those in rural areas, facilities in the urban areas were 
required to charge higher fees, while adults were also made to pay higher fees than children. 
Additionally, while postnatal and prenatal services for pregnant women and care for people 
affected by diseases such as leprosy and tuberculosis were exempted from all fees, people 
battling with communicable diseases such as typhoid, schistosomiasis, viral hepatitis, tetanus 
and cerebrospinal meningitis were only exempted from the care provided. They still had to pay 
the cost of the drugs provided, which, indeed, was a significant share of the costs of medical 
care (Waddington & Enyimayew, 1989; Asenso-Okyere; 1995).  
However, systematic studies of the implementation process (Waddington & 
Enyimayew, 1989, 1990; Asenso-Okyere, 1995; Coleman, 1997; Nyonator & Kudzin, 1999) 
revealed that some marked changes occurred at the stage of implementation. For instance, it 
was observed that beyond the legal fees above, patients were paying unauthorized fees, some 
of which amounted to 700% above the amount stipulated in the law.33 Also, the clauses 
                                                          
33 Much of those extra billings flowed into the pockets of providers. 
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emphasizing price disparities between rural and urban dwellers and hospitals and health centres 
were not implemented precisely. In addition, there were multiple payment points, which 
encouraged bribery in the health care facilities. Many customers were also not issued receipts 
for the services they purchased. Asenso-Okyere (1995) also noted that, on average, children 
paid between 50% and 67% of the fees paid by adults, while foreigners paid between 133% 
and 267% of the fees paid by Ghanaians. Above all, revenue mobilization rather than service 
improvement became health facilities and professionals’ overriding concern (Coleman, 1997; 
Nyonator & Kudzin, 1999).  
According to the user fee policy, 50% of the fees collected were to be returned to the 
Government Treasury, while the MoH would retain the remainder34 (Demery et al., 1995). 
Health facilities were also required to deposit all monies collected in a central account in order 
for them to receive drugs and other medical supplies from the central medical stores through 
its regional branches (Coleman, 2011). When the fee levels were raised or amended in 1985 
(through LI1313), however, both district and regional hospitals could retain 50% of their 
collections, while health centres retained just 25% of their collections (Demery et al., 1995; 
Coleman, 2011). Over time, particularly after 1990/1992, the government agreed to forego all 
its own revenues from user fees, which led to the facilities retaining all the fees collected 
(Demery et al., 1995; Coleman, 2011). At the same time, however, as Adjei (2013) and Adams 
(2013) noted, the facilities continued to receive drugs and pharmaceuticals from the central 
medical stores, the purpose of which was to allow them to build seed capitals to payback any 
drug they had been supplied (Adjei, 2013; Adams, 2013). However, the arrangement bred a 
significant level of corruption on the part of the providers, as “only 10% of the cost of input 
                                                          
34 The service providers collected the fees directly and transferred them to the MoH. Upon receiving the fees 
into its general revenue account, which was separate from that of the Treasury, the Ministry then transferred the 
share of the Treasury. Administratively, this led to corruption on the part of the providers, as not all the monies 
collected were accounted for. 
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[which they received from the central medical stores was]…actually…paid back” (Adjei, 
2013). This problem, among others, culminated in the idea to “introduce a system whereby you 
[the providers] go and pay...and collected your [their] medicines” (Adjei, 2013). This system 
led to the concept of cash-and-carry or pay-before-service in the Ghanaian health politics.  
The cash-and-carry system was first piloted in the Greater Accra Region and was 
extended to the other regions of the country in 1992, when an official amendment to that effect 
was enacted. Interviewees typically stressed that the cash-and-carry system enabled them to 
purchase drugs from the central medical stores or even the private sector, reducing the 
bureaucracy involved in obtaining drugs under the previous system (Adams, 2013; Adjei, 
2013). Also, the facilities were able to replenish drugs whenever they were depleted. As a 
pharmacist at the regional level at the time emphasized, “we didn’t run short of drugs and 
nondrug items” (Adams, 2013). It also freed health facilities to purchase drugs from either the 
central stores or the private sector. That way they were able to purchase drugs from the most 
cost-effective source (Adjei, 2013). Additionally, it changed “management perspective and 
style of operation of the hospitals”; with the new policy, they could generate and manage their 
own resources rather than depending on the government for resources that, in reality, were 
hardly available at the central medical stores (Akosa, 2013). Additionally, as Adams35  (2013) 
indicated, “even when equipment broke down, we had money from the cash-and-carry to 
repair”.  
However, the cash-and-carry approach made health care expensive, resulting in a 
significant underutilization of the public health care system (Agyepong, 2013; Nortey, 2013). 
For example, while it was clear in the law that providers should grant exemptions to those 
entitled to them, that part of the law was ineffectively implemented (Seddoh, 2013). The 
                                                          
35 In the 1990s, Mr. Adams was then working at the central office of the Ministry of Health. As the key person 
behind the formulation of the cash-and-carry, he is generally referred to by his colleague in the Ministry of 
Health as the architect of the “Cash and Carry” policy.  
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reasons for the ineffective implementation of the exemptions were all at once design-based and 
administrative. Design wise, as Adams (2013) noted, the “guidelines were not adequately spelt 
out. For example, if children under five are to be exempted, for what? Everything?” Also, 
although the law was clear on who and what to be exempted, it did not specify who would pay 
for the exemptions (Adams, 2013; Arhinful, 2003). This gap created confusion for those in 
charge of implementing the exemptions. As Adams (2013) noted, “we don’t have any business 
giving free services, somebody should have to buy the service for the poor”. Also, the authority 
to exempt was vested in the provider staff at the top hierarchy rather than the frontline 
bureaucrats in the healthcare facilities. Hence, beneficiaries had to go through a chain of 
bureaucratic procedures before they were exempted (Awittey, 2013). In fact, the lengthiness of 
the process frustrated and deterred potential beneficiaries from using the exemption scheme 
(Agyepong, 2013).  
The failure of the exemptions was also ideationally driven36. For example, as Adams 
(2013) revealed, “I am providing a service and then I’m generating funds based on the 
service...and the same time you want me to exclude some people from paying … we are not a 
social welfare institution, we are a service-oriented institution. So if you ask us to provide the 
exemption, we were hopeless at that, we couldn’t do it, even though we were trying to 
implement it”. This belief may have been aggravated by the cash-and-carry system. As Adjei 
(2013) indicated, “hospitals became so much focused on recovering their seed capitals” rather 
than improving the medical conditions of their patients. Another factor that may have 
contributed to the failure of the exemptions was the subculture, referred to as “kalabule”, which 
emerged during the economic crisis when everyone tried as much as possible to cheat their 
counterparts out of the hardship37 (Adjei, 2013). It is argued that the policy made some doctors 
                                                          
36 Those responsible for implementing the exemptions did not even believe that it was their fair share of 
responsibility to cover the costs for these exemptions. 
37 During kalabule, most sellers take advantage of buyers by inflating prices of their products. 
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and facilities inflate the costs of services in order to replenish what they may have lost to 
personnel outside their health facilities.  
As a result of the above problems, additional changes to the policy were made at the 
level of implementation. For instance, minimum deposits were instituted in the provider 
facilities so that inpatients had to bear those costs before being offered treatment (Agyepong, 
2013). Also, the exemption scheme was often not implemented. For example, as Nyonator and 
Kudzin (1999) observed, less than one in a thousand patients were exempted by most facilities 
in the Volta Region in 1995. Also, the majority of the exemptions (71%) went to health care 
staff rather than to the marginalized, who needed them most. In particular, the facilities charged 
for the costs of drugs and consultations for antenatal care, although they were supposed to be 
offered free of charge under the user fee policy. In addition, the introduction of unofficial fees 
became a widespread phenomenon in the mid-1990s.  
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Table 4 Changes to the user fee policy at implementation as of 1997 in a number of 
facilities in the Brong Ahafo Region. 
Stipulated prices compared with mean prices charged in government district hospitals 
Service  Stipulated price Mean price % increase 
Outpatient 50 350 600 
Inpatient 100 325 225 
Delivery 100 2000 1900 
X-Ray 200 2000 900 
Urine 40 575 1338 
Caesarian  1000 55000 5400 
Hernia 500 28333 5567 
Proportion of Facilities Charging for Consultations and Laboratory for Specific Exempted 
Illnesses 
Disease Fee type Regional hospital District hospital 
Measles Consultation 
Laboratory 
0/1 
1/1 
10/11 
6/11 
Typhoid Consultation 
Laboratory 
0/1 
1/1 
11/11 
11/11 
Hepatitis Consultation 
Laboratory 
0/1 
1/1 
11/11 
11/11 
Tetanus Consultation 
Laboratory 
0/1 
1/1 
11/11 
11/11 
Sickle Cell Consultation 
Laboratory 
0/1 
1/1 
11/11 
11/11 
Percentage Of Government Facilities Charging For Exempted Supplies By Level 
Item District hospital Health center Rural clinic 
Gauze 81.8 78.3 90.0 
Plaster 63.6 75.0 80.0 
Gloves 90.9 70.0 77.8 
Antiseptic 33.3 52.4 44.4 
Needles 90.9 87.0 90.9 
Syringe 81.8 78.3 90.9 
Bandage 81.8 70.0 60.0 
Source: Coleman (1997, par 19-29) 
As indicated in Table 4, above, the cost of delivery, which was officially pegged at 100 
cedis was being offered for 3000 cedis (an increase of 1900%) in some district hospitals. 
Services such as Caesareans were provided at 5400% higher than the official cost in some 
hospitals. Patients were required to pay for medical consumables such as plaster, gloves and 
bandages etc., which were supposed to be provided for free under the law. These examples 
demonstrate the extent to which the user fee policy was changed at the level of implementation. 
This confirms Grindle and Thomas’ (1989) argument that “the distribution of implementation 
outcomes is not bi-modal” (p. 235). That is, beyond the possibilities of it succeeding or failing, 
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the implementation process could also result in a third possibility of significant policy change. 
The changes that occurred during the implementation of the user fee policy was so remarkable 
that one could hardly compare the official policy with the one under implementation.  
An inquiry into the causes of the change revealed an interesting result. As suggested in 
the passage below, much of the blame should be put on the PNDC for failing to agree to revise 
the fee levels over time. Adibo (2013) noted, 
For years nobody ever varied the fees. The institutions themselves started it. I wasn’t 
happy with that so I went to [the ministry of] Finance. The present vice president 
[Amissah-Arthur] was the deputy minister of finance at that time, so I went to him…He 
was my friend so I went to him and I said since 1985 July the fees have remained the 
same. Now institutions are introducing their own fees and it’s not nice so we want your 
authority. He said why don’t you do it like Electricity Corporation, bit by bit…and 
[that] our operation would cost so much...But I had thought that we would sit down and 
review the whole package so that we would make amendments and then it would be 
approved and the minister would sign that is how I thought it would be but he didn’t 
want us to do it that way. 
Further inquiry into the government’s decision also showed that some of the members were 
also afraid of potential reprisal from other members. In answering why the above deputy 
minister preferred an incremental approach to the fee change, Adibo (2013) declared, 
Because he didn’t want to face the PNDC. [Despite the fact that he himself was a 
member of the PNDC?]. Yes but when the whole team meet, you don’t know what the 
other members - about 20, 21, 25 - would say. And then if they ask me why have you 
brought this thing and I say I consulted the deputy minister of finance, I will be putting 
him in trouble... So he was playing it safe. 
The implication here is that although the PNDC was aware of the problems with user fees, it 
was not interested in increasing the fees. What was even more surprising about the issue was 
that those responsible were allowed to go scot-free, despite the significant power and 
opportunity the regime had to enforce compliance with the law.  
However, a MoH circular concerning unofficial charges at the facility level suggested 
that the ministry might also be blamed for the situation. For instance, as the circular indicated,  
This policy of providing free medical consumables to the health institutions appears not 
only outdated but economically unbearable to the system since it is a fact that almost 
all the institutions have been charging patients for these same items (MOH, 1997 cited 
in Coleman, 1997, “study area”, par. 6).  
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My analysis with respect to the government and MoH’s toleration of the unofficial charges is 
that it was probably part of their strategy to escape blame for increasing the fees. This approach 
can be related to Jacob Hacker’s (2004) conception of policy drift as “changes in the operation 
or effect of policies that occur without significant changes in those policies' structure” (p. 246). 
Policy drift involves a change in the policy context as a result of the inability to pursue formal 
changes. In Ghana, however, both the Rawlings regime and the MoH had the opportunity to 
change the fees, but just decided to do nothing. In the long-run, this strategy can derail the 
sustainability of the policy, an issue that is the focus of the next section.  
 
5.3.5. Sustainability 
Sustaining the policy was difficult, as it led to a significant reduction in access to health care 
throughout the country. As Awittey (2013) notes, “the poor couldn’t access health care which 
was supposed to be affordable and accessible...Because of their financial status, it has become 
unaffordable and inaccessible to them”. Consequently, “utilization dropped” propitiously 
(Adjei, 2013). Seddoh (2013) confirmed this, arguing that only “0.3 or 30% of the population 
was actually using services which was way below the globally accepted norm of one”. 
Academic studies have also revealed that the user fee policy was very unpopular among the 
general public. For example, in their study involving 306 households in the Eastern Region of 
Ghana, Asenso-Okyere, Osei-Akoto, Anum and Appiah (1997) found that about 80% of the 
households were displeased with the user fee policy. Arhin (1994) observed a similar situation 
in Osudoku sub-district, where most household heads were also dissatisfied with the policy.  
Despite its unpopularity and the regressive manner in which it was implemented, the 
user fee policy was sustained until the early 2000s, when it was officially abolished. The 
common answer from interviewees as to why this was the case was that the implementation 
process faced little opposition, even from the TUC, which is noted for its vibrancy at protecting 
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the interest of its members even under authoritarian regimes (Hutchful, 2002). Although they 
were aware that the user fee policy was problematic for their members, the TUC generally 
failed to directly attack the policy through street demonstrations as they had done in similar 
situations in the past (Herbst, 1991; Jefferies, 1991; Hutchful, 2002). Instead, it decided to 
battle the policy through indirect means such as conference presentations and media statements, 
which failed to yield any real benefit for them (Herbst, 1991; Jefferies, 1991; Hutchful, 2002). 
For example, the TUC issued a statement at its Third Delegates Congress at the University of 
Cape Coast in March 1988. They argued, among other things, for the “restoration of free 
education and universal health care” (Hutchful, 2002, p. 174). Using this kind of approach to 
convey their grievances to government was uncharacteristic of the labour movement in Ghana, 
which is noted for its radicalism (Hutchful, 2002). Indeed, “a lot of them [the labour unions] 
took [upon themselves] the responsibility of providing [health care38] for their members” 
(Akor, 2013). The implication is that labour basically acquiesced to the government, resulting 
in the continuation of the user fee policy despite its detrimental effects on members. Another 
group of stakeholders that had a successful record of opposing user fees was the military. For 
example, as indicated, they overthrew both the Busia and Limann governments, in 1972 and 
1981 respectively for reasons that included the user fee policies of the governments. These 
military takeovers, resulted in the inability of the governments to implement their user fee 
policies (Coleman, 2011). The final group involved the general public, who basically decided 
to exit the health system rather than make direct opposition to the policy (Adams, 2013).  
But after having been so powerful in the past, why was opposition against user fees 
ineffective in the 1980s? For instance, whereas past attempts to introduce user fees had been 
thwarted by resistance from civil and military groups, why did their efforts fail to prevent the 
                                                          
38 An interview with an officer of the TUC confirmed that they established community-based health insurance 
schemes for their members in order to cope with the hardships posed by the user fee policy (CSO 03, personal 
communication, March 27, 2013. 
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adoption of the user fees in the 1980s? Why did labour groups fail to directly attack the user 
fee policy at that time? Though the PNDC only intended to implement user fees only 
temporarily, why did they fail to withdraw the policy when it had become clear that the policy 
was not serving its intended purpose?  
One key factor lies in how user fee politics played out between opponents (workers, the 
general public, opposition political parties and the army) and proponents (the PNDC 
government) of the policy. Overall, through political leadership, underground tactics (policy 
drift), framing and repression, the PNDC was able to shield the entire society and, by extension, 
the health care system from the kind of politics that led to the collapse of the user fee proposals 
of the past. First, as indicated, although the policy was designed by the MoH, the introduction 
of user fees was first publicized only in the PNDC’s April 1983 budget. Hutchful (2002) 
summarizes the key aspects of the 1983 budget, which includes the introduction of the 
following: 
(a) a system of export bonuses and import surcharges ranging from 750% to 990%...(b) 
an increase in the cocoa producer price from 360.00 cedis to 600.00 cedis per load of 
30kg.; (3) increase in the minimum daily wage from 12.00 cedis to 21.19 cedis and (4) 
increase in the price of fuel (100% in the case of petrol), in medical fees (up to 1,500%), 
and in the price of meat and other basic consumer items (up to 500%). (p. 36).  
The significance of using the budget process to foster the health care reform is that it channelled 
opponents’ attention towards challenging the broad economic policy of the government, 
including education, health care, devaluation, pay, subsidy, jobs etc. (Adibo, 2013). Opponents 
were forced to address almost every problem in Ghana at one time, making them unable to 
pursue their interests effectively. Consequently, this created the perception that they were 
opponents of the regime rather than actors that were pursuing a genuine interest of their 
members (People’s Daily Graphic April 27, 1983, cited in Herbst, 1991, p. 182). Viewed as 
opponents of the regime, these actors put themselves in a position of incurring the displeasure 
of the PNDC. The Secretary of Finance also reportedly labeled opponents as “disloyal” 
(People’s Daily Graphic April 27 1983 cited in Herbst, 1991, p. 182). 
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Through rhetoric, the PNDC leadership also attempted to generate support for the 
policy. In his defence of the budget on radio and television, the chairman of the PNDC, 
Rawlings, for instance, tried as much as possible to align the goal of the policy to the public 
interests of the country as a whole. He stated, 
Only a government which places the interest and the very survival of the nation before 
its own interests would have come out with such an austere budget. If the PNDC 
Government was concerned with cheap popularity, we would not have presented you 
with such a budget. The medicine is bitter, I agree, but it is necessary (Rawlings 1983, 
p. 16, cited in Jebuni, 1995, p. 36) 
When the PNDC’s rhetoric failed to quell opposition to the policy - that is, two months 
after delivery of the budget - Rawlings shifted from merely expressing his commitment to the 
budget to also declaring his readiness to crush opposition, no matter how much it took to do 
so. He declared,  
We may anticipate that soon the floodgate of protests against human rights violations 
will be opened as the next tactical move of organized hypocrisy, but for the defence of 
our revolution we will run that risk. If we must use our strength to crush actions which 
threaten the process so be it (Rawlings 1983, p. 25, quoted in Jebuni, 1995, p. 33). 
Thereafter, the government resorted to violence and intimidation against opponents of its 
policies. Ninsin (1991) notes, 
The government relentlessly festered out and detained or intimidated critics and 
organized opposition within the Trades Union Congress (TUC); radical organizations 
such as the New Democratic Movement (NDM), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary 
Guards (KNRG), and others that operated clandestinely or from exile; and the National 
Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), the students organization based in the country’s 
three universities (p. 55).  
The government also sought to divide unions in order to prevent them from launching a 
common attack against the government’s policies. Ninsin (1991) commented that, 
As punishment for potential critics and opposition groups within the labour movement, 
the government pursued a policy of denying some Unions access to resources under the 
ERP while giving preferential treatment to others by improving salaries and benefits or 
assuring them access to resources under the ERP. The Civil Servant’s Association, the 
railway workers, the mine workers have benefited from such special treatment as has 
the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU). The first three of these workers’ 
groups have a tradition of militancy (p. 55). 
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By trying to oppose everything that was included in the budget, the labour unions could 
not also build the requisite consensus to effectively oppose the user fee policy. For instance, 
when some of the aggrieved members of the TUC launched a coup on June 19, 1983 – and 
almost deposed the government - “the WDCs [Workers Defence Councils]39 mounted 
roadblocks and rallied to support the regime” (Herbst, 1991, p. 181). On 4 June 1987 and 9 
May 1988, the TUC’s Hall of Trade Unions was also blockaded by groups of workers that 
reportedly had allegiance to the PNDC, such as the Progressive and Militant Workers of Ghana 
and the defence committees. Finally, as Hutchful (2002) wrote, 
Militant union leaders were subjected to frequent attacks and vilification in the 
government controlled media; at the same time close control over the media isolated 
the union’s leadership and prevented it from presenting its case to the public (p. 176).  
This was also confirmed during the interviews, as Akanzige (2013) said, 
Labour groups had been cowed…in Ghana. Rawlings era was dictatorship. Even 
Rawlings …constitutional era (1992-2000) was a constitutional dictatorship. Because 
of his era, from 1992 everybody was afraid of him. 
The PNDC also silenced opposition political forces in the country by banning their 
activities (Afriyie, 2013). It also created a “culture of silence” where critics were arrested, 
detained and molested. For instance, the head of the political department of the TUC, K. Adu-
Amankwah, was picked up in 1987 and detained for opposing the policies of the PNDC 
(Hutchful, 2002). These actions bred fear, as Professor Adu-Boahen, who became the candidate 
of the opposition political party in 1992, confirmed in his 1988 Danquah lectures. He said,  
We have not protested or staged riots not because we trust the PNDC but because we 
fear the PNDC! We are afraid of being detained, liquidated or dragged before the CVC 
or the NIC or being subjected to all sorts of molestation (quoted in Jeffries, 1991, p. 
169). 
But the violence was not directed towards only unions and political organizations; 
almost everybody was threatened. As Herbst (1991) indicates, “it was clear that even the 
                                                          
39 The WDCs were formed by employees of businesses across Ghana in support of the PNDC’s effort to 
revolutionize the country. They were supposed to help the PNDC to wrestle power from the elites to the 
commoners.  
139 
 
ordinary person was susceptible to repression” (p. 183). A PNDC official confirmed this when 
he said, “the message gets down that if you do something against the regime do not expect a 
lawyer to get you out of jail. The regime will only trial you when they get around to it” (Herbst, 
1991, p. 182). Awittey (2013) confirmed the above situation during the interview. He argued, 
At that time, the system was not as democratic as we have now. So people could not 
walk on the street. But you could see the sentiments of people in the form that they 
could not afford the user fees and so they stayed home. That was the silent probably 
sentiments that you could observe... You didn’t find people on the streets that were 
protesting but they couldn’t afford and so that was also the worrying factor. Because 
then there were people who were going to remain with their disease without having 
access to care. 
Furthermore, military personnel believed to be opposed to the regime’s policies – most of 
whom were leftists and so felt betrayed by the PNDC – were molested, detained, executed or 
purged, while many others were kept under strict surveillance (Hutchful, 2002, p. 47). The 
army’s command structure was also reinvented and parallel military groups were formed and 
empowered to monitor the activities of de jure military body. Some of these groups include the 
Armed Forces Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (AFCDR), which basically served 
as a PNDC wing within the military. The others included the Forces Reserve Battalion and the 
Civilian Militia, which were basically established outside the military to provide to check on 
the military. After the failure of the June 1983 coup attempt, the PNDC made sure that the 
armed forces were briefed on all initiatives before implementation in order to gain their support 
(Hutchful, 2002). Also, as Hutchful (2002) indicated, “a dialogue was subsequently maintained 
with the armed forces, with durbars [official meetings] to educate and inform the forces, 
attended by government secretaries and other officials, being held with some regularity at 
Burma Hall and in the barracks” (p. 48). Finally, within the PNDC, Rawlings ensured that he 
was surrounded by trusted associates, such as Kojo Tsikata, Tsatsu Tsikata, Kofi Awoonor, 
Major Quarshigah and Obed Asamoah, who were from his ethnic group (Hutchful, 2002). 
These trusted associates served as a shield for the regime and, by extension, its policies.  
140 
 
The PNDC and adherents of user fees, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the public 
service, particularly the MoH and the Ministry of Finance, maintained a close relationship, 
which may also explain why the policy was sustained overtime. As Afriyie (2013) noted during 
the interview, “it was between the devil and deep blue sea and, this IMF and World Bank, they 
were going to pull the plug [if the government had refused to carry on with the policy] so it had 
no choice”. For example, the World Bank put pressure on the PNDC to continue 
implementation of the user fee policy in its formal report on user fees. The report, titled Agenda 
for Reform (1987), detailed the Bank’s plans and support for user fees in developing countries. 
In Ghana, as elsewhere in the developing world, the World Bank continued to support user fees 
even after UNICEF (1987) had revealed that they were unsustainable. Instead, in response to 
the UNICEF study, and together with the PNDC, the Bank introduced a Program of Action to 
Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), which basically focused on helping the 
vulnerable to cope with the governments’ market-based policies, including user fees (Adibo, 
2013). The PAMSCAD, however, was not effectively implemented, leading to its failure 
(Hutchful, 2002).  
Additionally, because the user fees provided a reliable source of revenue for the health 
sector, the MoH and the service providers at large were stuck with it (Nyonator & Kudzin, 
1999). For instance, in their study involving some health centres in Ghana, Waddington and 
Enyimayew (1989) observed that “in no case did a health centre worker say that it would be 
good to return to a free health service, though they did acknowledge that fees caused patients 
to present rather later with their illnesses than they might otherwise have done” (p. 22). The 
potential vested interests of these actors may explain, at least partly, why they (together with 
the World Bank and the IMF) persistently framed alternative health financing measures like 
health insurance as being “impossible” in Ghana and why the PNDC’s efforts at introducing 
such policy after 1987 generally failed (Amoh, 2013). For example, having been charged with 
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introducing health insurance, the MoH launched committee upon committee and study upon 
study until the agenda finally fizzled out (Amoh, 2013).  
 
5.4. Causal Interactions 
In this section, I will summarize how particular causal factors interacted over time to ensure 
the adoption and implementation of user fees in Ghana, in spite of countervailing factors such 
as vested interests supporting the status quo. First, the introduction of the user fee policy was 
largely triggered by a decade of economic crisis, which, in turn, led to the 1981 coup that 
brought the PNDC military government to power. Over time, the crisis affected various sectors 
of the Ghanaian economy, including health care, compelling the need for change. In the 
process, user fees came on the political agenda through proponents such as the MoH, the GMA 
and the PSoG. In fact, MoH officials went the furthest in their support of user fees by 
developing a memorandum proposing the introduction of user fees. However, because of its 
left-leaning ideological orientation, the government rejected their proposal. Instead, it 
introduced measures in line with its ideology, including surcharges on import licencing and 
primary health care related schemes. It also attempted to solicit assistance from the Eastern 
bloc. However, all these measures failed. This difficult situation was compounded by the 1983 
deportation of about a million Ghanaians from Nigeria, where they were allegedly living 
illegally. Having realized the gravity of the situation, the government then backtracked from 
its earlier stance by listening to alternative ideas, which brought user fees proponents such as 
the MoH and the IMF and the World Bank to the forefront of the policy discussion. At that 
time, however, the World Bank and the IMF were the most appealing not only because they 
had a more coherent agenda for economic reform, but also because they had the loan money 
the government needed. By getting user fees onto the governmental agenda, the IMF and the 
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World Bank made them part of their policy recommendation (SAERP), which, in turn, became 
a condition for further assistance to the government.  
The MoH was responsible for designing the user fee policy. The MoH, as indicated 
above, was a key proponent of the policy, with the head of the Policy and Planning Unit, Dr. 
Adibo, leading the process. Having led similar processes in the past (1981 and 1982), Dr. Adibo 
was seen as the most appropriate person for that task. As the key policy entrepreneur and one-
man design team, he determined the content of the policy and which other actors would be 
involved in the design process. He performed these tasks based on his own expertise and 
experience, as well as, by drawing lessons from earlier models the country had implemented. 
For instance, his experience at the district level and outside the health sector proved helpful in 
determining the kinds of drugs that should be covered under the policy and the price at which 
they should be sold. Where his expertise was limited, he solicited the assistance of other actors 
with such expertise. He also gleaned much information from prior policies, such as the 1971 
legislation and the 1981 and 1982 proposals on user fees. For example, the decision to exempt 
the poor was shaped by the above legislations. However, the idea to exempt health care staff 
was largely shaped by the perceived need to encourage them to collect the fees. Having 
occurred within an atmosphere of neo-liberalism, it was also possible that the decisions of the 
design team would be influenced by the neoliberal doctrine at the time (Wireko & Béland, 
2013). In this respect the notion to exempt, mostly, the marginalized such as indigents, children 
and pregnant women should be driven by the neoliberal doctrine that welfare policies should 
be targeted at the vulnerable groups in society (Adesina, 2011; Haque, 2008; McCoy & Peddle, 
2012; Mkandawire, 2001).  
After the initial policy was designed, the MoH, once again led by Dr. Adibo, submitted 
the draft user fees proposal to the PNDC for approval. This stage was also marked by an 
interaction between the institutional configuration of the state at the time, the ideology of the 
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government, and the strategies of the ministry’s reformers. The authoritarian nature of the 
political system shortened the adoption process by removing the stage of Parliamentary 
approval, which could have delayed the process. Despite the fact that the concentrated nature 
of Ghana’s political institutions at the time favoured adoption, the reformers still had to deal 
with the government and its ideology. As a socialist government, the PNDC insisted on 
watering down key aspects of the ministry’s proposal in order to protect the marginalized, 
which formed its support base. However, by making those changes, the PNDC was also trying 
to mitigate the potential for resistance, thus drawing lessons from how earlier measures of a 
similar magnitude had failed. Despite these obstacles, the ministry’s team managed to convince 
the PNDC to adopt a user fee policy that changed the trajectory of the existing health care 
system significantly (Waddington & Enyimayew, 1990).  
Although the MoH was still involved, actors at the point of delivery, rather than at the 
ministry’s head office, implemented the user fee regime. They included clinics, health centres, 
hospitals, facility mangers, medical doctors, nurses, pharmacists and so forth. How these actors 
performed their respective roles led to further changes in policy. For instance, the practice of 
charging fees above and beyond the stipulated levels, introducing additional fees, and charging 
people for services that should have been exempt became widespread. The situation occurred 
as a result of a confluence of factors, including deficiencies in the law, administrative 
inefficiency, contextual changes, ideational factors and reformers’ strategy of allowing such 
changes to occur without being noticed. These align with Hacker’s concept of policy drift. 
According to Hacker (2004), policy drift can be a subtle way to pursue a significant policy 
change, especially when a formal policy change appears unlikely. 
Despite ultimately being regressive in nature, the user fee policy was sustained longer 
than expected. Investigations into why reveal the interactive role of vested interests, 
institutions, political ideology, policy legacies and the strategies of both reform proponents (the 
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government, the Ministry of Health and the IMF and World Bank) and opponents (labour 
unions, political parties, actors from the left of the political divide, including in the military, 
and the general public). For instance, new constituencies developed among beneficiaries (legal 
and illegal) of the policy, including provider facilities and staff, as well as that fraction of the 
general public who experienced some improvements in their health care conditions as a result 
of the new policy. The centralized institutional configuration of the state also minimalized the 
potential for opposition, while empowering reformers. However, the above factors largely 
facilitated rather than determined the outcome of the policy change. For example, the 
concentrated nature of Ghana’s political institutions created a wide window of opportunity for 
reformers to employ all possible strategies – even repression – to pursue the policy change. 
Because of their vested interests in the user fee policy, the MoH and the IMF and the World 
Bank also consistently described an alternative policy like health insurance as impossible for a 
developing country like Ghana. The World Bank and the IMF also introduced PAMSCAD in 
order to mitigate the costs of the policy on the marginalized, who formed the largest base of 
the PNDC. The above reasons, among others, led to the sustainability of the user fee policy 
through time.  
 
5.5. Theoretical Implication of the Change to User Fees 
The foregoing discussion is consistent with the theory of actor-centred institutionalism, 
particularly as Kingdon (2003) and Grindle (2004) posit. It shows how policy change may be 
moderated by interactions among politico-economic factors and actors across different stages 
of the policy process: problem definition and agenda setting, design, adoption, implementation 
and sustainability. While they seem to be independent of one another, these stages are 
interrelated. That is, an issue on the policy agenda sometimes influenced developments at 
subsequent stages. Similarly, the political temperature at the adoption stage could shape how 
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policy was implemented, which, in turn, could impact its sustenance. For example, because the 
fees were watered down on ideological rather than technocratic grounds at the adoption stage, 
actors at the implementation stage neglected those fees and introduced their own unauthorized 
fees, which were charged on top of the official fees. Also, the policy’s positive effect on 
beneficiaries at the facility level generated a strong constituency around its sustainability.  
The analysis also revealed the extent to which the transition process occurred within an 
atmosphere that was characterized by context-specific politico-economic factors and actors, 
including institutions, the economic crisis, vested interests, political ideology and policy 
entrepreneurs. However, the contextual factors influenced rather than determined key policy 
entrepreneurs’ choices. For instance, in relation to Kingdon’s (2003) framework, I found that 
the economic and health care crises created a window of opportunity for various actors to 
propose policy change, in this case the introduction of user fees. However, in line with 
Grindle’s (2004) model, the ideological orientation of the government structured the way the 
PNDC regime approached the proposed policy change. In particular, the government’s socialist 
orientation led to both the rejection of user fees when they had been proposed before and the 
watering down of their levels at the adoption stage. The socialist orientation of the government 
may have also mediated in the PNDC’s decision not to increase the fees through official 
processes, leading to policy drift. Similarly, the concentrated nature of Ghana’s political-
institutional configuration minimized the opportunity for labour groups to prevent the adoption 
of user fees, while giving the government the leeway to repress opponents of the policy. Also, 
the failure of previous populist measures to address the situation and the subsequent 
aggravation of the economic crisis contributed to the appealing nature of the proposal of the 
IMF and the World Bank, among others, to push the government to backtrack from its earlier 
stance against user fees. Although user fees were part of the conditionalities of the World Bank 
and the IMF, whether or not, and how, they were implemented depended significantly on the 
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evaluations, decisions and strategies of domestic reformers at various stages of the policy 
process.  
The transition also shows that not all the reformers or policy entrepreneurs were crucial 
at every stage of the policy process. For example, although it was a significant actor across all 
stages of the policy process, the PNDC government was not a principal actor in setting the 
agenda, which was largely the result of the work of the MoH, the World Bank and the IMF. 
That said, while they were significant at the agenda setting stage, the World Bank and the IMF 
were almost entirely absent from subsequent stages of the policy process, particularly the 
design, adoption and implementation stages, which were mainly shaped by the design team, 
the MoH and the PNDC government. As well, while the implementation stage was largely 
shaped by the MoH and service providers, the sustainability stage was largely the result of the 
efforts of the government and vested interests, including the MoH and the IMF and the World 
Bank. Thus, while policy entrepreneurs were crucial in the success of the reform, different 
policy entrepreneurs were critical at different stages of the policy process. This observation 
confirms Grindle’s (2004) argument that policy change should be explored beyond the agenda 
setting stage.  
In her study, Grindle (2004) suggested that socio-cultural factors shape the strategies, 
motivations, characteristics and actions of policy actors, which contradicts the popular 
argument that these factors determine policy change (Wilsford, 1994; Weyland, 2008). This 
study observed that the socio-economic environment cannot be trivialized as just shaping the 
strategies of the policy actors, as they also created a window of opportunity for policy change. 
However, even during windows of opportunity, contextual factors alone do not determine 
policy change. For example, whereas the interviewees stated that the economic crisis triggered 
the introduction of user fees, the fees could have been levied in various ways. For instance, the 
government could have introduced an insurance premium or a co-payment system rather than 
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resorting to a user fee system. Also, policy actors were not and must not be viewed as mere 
passive objects that simply responded to the dictates of the policy environment. To bring about 
policy change, political actors needed to seize the window of opportunity and express their 
agency, regardless of the external-contextual pressures they faced. For example, as indicated 
above, the decision to adopt, implement and sustain the user fees was also mediated by 
cognitive, ideational and rational factors that cannot be related to contextual influence in the 
strict sense of the word. Thus, actors used political strategies to shape the policy environment 
to either favour or oppose change and determine its outcome. Some of the strategies reformers 
used to bring about the user fee policy included policy drift, ideational framing and coercion. 
These strategies largely explain why user fees were not only adopted, but also implemented 
and sustained. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined how and why the user fee policy became successful, despite 
the ideological conflicts and vested interests, and the fact that similar efforts in the past had all 
failed. The analysis, as summarized in the table below, reveals how the perception of crisis 
pushed the PNDC to introduce far-reaching user fees despite all odds (ideological, political, 
and historical) and transform the health care trajectory in Ghana.  
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Table 5 Summary of factors leading to the introduction of the user fee model 
Factors Specifics Contributions 
 
 
Conjunctures 
 The 1980s economic crisis 
 Fiscal crisis of the health sector 
 The 1981 coup, resulting in the 
PNDC coming to power 
 Global trend towards small-
government  
 They created a window of opportunity, 
urgency or motivation for policy change 
rather than self-determined the change 
needed.  
 
 
 
 
Policy entrepreneurs 
 The GMA, MoH, PSoG, IMF 
and World Bank 
 The Rawlings government 
 The Adibo design team 
 The committee of secretaries 
 Service providers 
 New stakeholders the policy 
developed over time 
 
 They seized the open window to establish 
the user fee policy across various stages of 
the policy process. 
 Different policy entrepreneurs playing 
different roles were identified across 
various stages of the policy process. 
 What made them unique and relevant for 
the changes were their leadership, 
strategies and commitment to the change. 
 
 
Institutions 
 Military political system, with 
no parliament 
 The transition to a democracy in 
1992 where the government 
held majority of the seats in the 
party-disciplined parliament  
 These concentrated institutions minimized 
veto points for interests to overturn the 
user fee policy.  
 They also made it less difficult for policy 
entrepreneurs to adopt the user fee policy. 
 
With regard to how the change occurred despite ongoing ideological conflicts, I argued 
that it was largely the result of the failure of earlier socialist measures to address the economic 
crisis, the consequent aggravation of the crisis itself, the PNDC’s decision to introduce the 
SAERP and, most importantly, the policy entrepreneurship of principal stakeholders of the new 
policy. The failure of socialist policies and the gravity of the economic crisis created a climate 
of uncertainty where bearers of alternative policy ideas were able to shift the government’s 
attention towards an ideologically polarizing policy like user fees. However, as indicated 
above, it required a significant level of political will and strategies to ensure its implementation 
and sustenance. 
An increased number of vested interests opposed to the policy emerged even from 
within the PNDC, the army, labour and the general public. Yet they were overpowered by the 
reformers’ high level of political commitment and effective strategies, including the PNDC 
government’s willingness to use coercive force, to protect the policy. In fact, because of the 
ruthless nature of the strategies of the reformers, those opposed to the user fee policy kept a 
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low profile compared to earlier ones (1968, 1969, and 1981) that had failed (Arhinful, 2003; 
Apoya & Marriott, 2011; Coleman, 2011). This study contributes to actor-centred 
institutionalism by providing additional mechanisms – frames, legislative inaction or drift and 
coercion – to reinforce its capacity to explain path-departing policy change.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE INTRODUCTION OF SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
6.1. Introduction 
In the early 2000s, another milestone in health policy change occurred in Ghana: the 2003 
passage of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) Act (Act 650). Act 650 introduced 
social health insurance (SHI) and prepayment mechanisms into the health care financing and 
delivery processes and made it mandatory for every Ghanaian to belong to the policy. The 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) was established as the principal body to 
implement the policy. With the goal of universal coverage in mind, the policy sought to abolish 
the pay-before-service principle underlying the existing user fee model for a universal health 
coverage through SHI. In this chapter, I will examine the process of transitioning from the user 
fee model to the NHIS of Ghana. 
As with user fees, examining how the NHIS was introduced is critically important for 
understanding not only how path-departing health care change occurs, but also how it can occur 
within a context characterized by factors that should theoretically prevent such an outcome. 
For instance, when the NHIS was introduced, not only had Ghana not met, the underlying 
conditions to successfully introduce a SHI system, but also believed to be far from meeting 
them. (Shaw & Griffin, 1995; Ensor, 1997; Criel, 1998; Saleh et al, 2012). These conditions 
include a) a high population density, particularly in urban areas; b) a disproportionately high 
percentage of formal-sector workers and; c) a high per capita income and growth rate (Criel, 
1998; Gertler, 1998; McIntyre, 2007). Ghana, on the other hand, had a high (87.1%) age 
dependency ratio and its economically active population hovered around just 43.8% (Ghana 
Statistical Service [GSS], 2005). With the rural population accounting for about 52.8% of the 
entire population in 2000, Ghana’s population patterns were unripe for a SHI system (GSS, 
2005). Ghana’s informal sector was also much larger than the formal sector, accounting for 
151 
 
about 70-90% of the total workforce (Rosa & Sheil-Adlung, 2007). As for the economy, in 
2001 and for the first time, Ghana was ranked as highly indebted and actually joined the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program, pleading for debt forgiveness. Also, as seen in Table 
6, Ghana’s economic situation does not compare with any of the four countries Gertler (1998) 
studied during the periods they introduced universal SHI systems. 
Table 6. Economic conditions when Universal Social Health Insurance was instituted in 
selected countries compared to Ghana 
Country Real $GDP per 
Capita 
Real GDP Growth 
(1960-1992) 
% Urban 
*Japan (1961) 9, 290 - - 
*Korea (1989) 5, 371 10.49 66 
*Singapore (1986) 8, 464 7.90 100 
*Taiwan (1995) 9, 750 9.17 57 
#Ghana (2003) 2, 238 1.8 (1990-2003) 45.4 
Sources: *Gertler (1998, p. 730)  
  # McIntyre (2007, p.56)  
For example, while all the countries in Table 6 had per capita GDP of between $5000 and 
$10,000 at the time they introduced universal health insurance, Ghana’s GDP per capita was 
just above $2,200. Also, at the time they introduced their policies, all the other countries had a 
faster economic growth, averaging about 8% a year, compared to Ghana’s growth rate of about 
1.8%. Finally, Ghana’s level of urbanization was significantly lower compared to these four 
countries. 
Other potential challenges to the change included the rightist-orientation of the 
government (NPP) that introduced the policy. That should be problematic given that 
ideologically right regimes are generally believed to be biased against broad social programmes 
compared to their left leaning counterparts (Hick, 2011). This was confirmed through the 
interview process, as the minister in charge of the policy development process noted, “within 
my own party, within my party, they meant well, but they were very apprehensive” (Afriyie, 
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2013). Another former minister made a similar observation. He said, “I remember at that time, 
cabinet, my colleagues were saying why should I make it government, it should be private... 
give it to the private sector” (Anane, 2013). Especially baffling in this regard was the fact that 
the new policy was introduced against the wishes of powerful international actors, including 
the World Bank and the IMF, among others, who preferred to maintain the status-quo (Adusei, 
2013). In fact, to a majority of the external actors, SHI was impossible in a developing country 
like Ghana due to its vast informal economic sector (Agyepong, 2013).  
The above argument is not to suggest, however, that all opportunities for change were 
closed. Key domestic stakeholders seemed unanimous in their belief that the existing user fee 
model was unsustainable (Alfers, 2013). By 2003, public opinion was also strongly in favour 
of health insurance (Babooroh, 2013; Niitreb, 2013). Additionally, there had been an important 
transition from the NDC to the NPP, the two main political parties in the country. This change 
seemed conducive to new policies (Kingdon, 2003; Adams, 2013). Nevertheless, many of these 
opportunities were limited by a number of factors. Particularly, although there was strong 
public support for health insurance, the specific type of insurance was still in doubt (Seddoh, 
Adjei & Nazzar, 2011; Agyepong, 2013; Benya, 2013). As Benya (2013) put it, “you see a lot 
of political parties in their manifesto proposing to implement one form of insurance or the other 
even though the specifics were not given”. Nortey (2013) confirmed the same point and noted, 
“we were expecting a change but we didn’t know it will be this way”. Also, as indicated above, 
the government that emerged from the political transition in 2001 subscribed to an ideological 
orientation that should have made maintaining the status quo preferable to change (Afriyie, 
2013; Akor, 2013; Anane, 2013). Based on much of the political economy literature that 
analyses the interactions between opportunities and threats in policy change, it could also be 
expected that the latter would prevail over the former, thus favouring the status quo (Pierson, 
1996). In this way, even if it had miraculously made it on the policy agenda, the NHIS could 
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still have been expected to fail in the face of opposition. Yet not only was the NHIS introduced, 
it was implemented and has since been sustained, despite grave challenges (Andoh, 2013). 
In the sections that follow, I will examine why and how the NHIS became law in the 
early 2000s and how it was implemented and sustained. However, as in the previous two 
chapters, this chapter begins by exploring the nature and magnitude of the change before 
accounting for why and how it occurred. It also stresses the utility of dynamic institutionalism, 
and particularly the combined heuristic power of Kingdon’s (2003) window of opportunity 
framework and Grindle’s (2004) dynamic political process model in explaining the advent of 
path-departing health care change in Ghana. 
6.2. Examining the Nature and Magnitude of the Change 
6.2.1. Spending Change 
Alfers (2013) notes that, “the softening of neo-liberal policy during the 2000s has allowed for 
some improvements in the rather dire situation which the Ghanaian health system was in by 
the end of the 1990s” (p. 5). For example, there was a rise in both total and per capita health 
expenditure since the introduction of NHIS, from US$ 547.6 million in 2006 to US$ 1093.72 
million in 200840 (Seddoh et al., 2011), and from US $11.00 in 1999 to US $21.66 in 2007, 
respectively (Global Social Trust, 2003; Ministry of Health, 2008). As well, public expenditure 
on health care increased, from 41.4% as a percentage of total health expenditure in 2000 to 
59.5% in 2010 and 56.09% in 2011 (World Bank Indicators, 2015). Government expenditure 
as a share of the total budget on health care also experienced increases, from 8.0% in 2003 to 
a high of 16.2% in 2006 before falling back to 12.8% in 2009. (Gyapong et al., 2007; Seddoh 
et al., 2011). In a similar manner, general public expenditure on health care as a percentage of 
GDP increased from 2.4% in 2000 to 4.7% in 2005, before dwindling to about 3.0% between 
                                                          
40 These figures were converted from GH¢502 million to GH¢1,157 million, using average exchange rates of 
US$ 1= GH¢0.916452 (2006) and GH¢1.057858 (2008), respectively. 
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2010 and 2012 (World Bank indicators, 2015). The MoH’s share of the total budget increased 
from US$522.29 million in 2006 to US$ 602.79 million in 2007, US$711.09 million in 2008, 
and US$ 654.41 million41 in 2009 (Seddoh et al., 2011). As Seddoh et al. (2011) note, the health 
sector received the third most funding in the 2006 budget, after economic affairs and education.  
 Much of the increased public expenditure on health care had also gone to support issues 
and areas that benefit the poor. For instance, in 2006, for the first time in over two decades, 
Greater Accra, the most urbanized and developed region in the country, received one of the 
lowest rates (4.7%) of government funding for the health sector, while the Central and the 
Upper West regions, two of the poorest regions, received much more (12.4% and 8.3%, 
respectively) (UNICEF, 2009). That trend, however, reversed afterwards (UNICEF, 2009).  
 In contrast to the rise in public health care expenditure, private expenditure on health 
care as a percentage of total health expenditure dropped from about 60% in the 1990s to about 
40% in the early 2000s42 (WHO, 2004). A similar thing occurred with respect to private health 
care expenditure as a percentage of GDP, dropping from 4.2% in 2000 to 2.1% in 2011 (World 
Bank Indicators, 2015). In addition, out-of-pocket expenditure declined significantly, from 
47% of the total health expenditure in 2000 to 37% in 2009 (Saleh, 2013) and from about 80% 
of private expenditure in 2000 to 66% in 2010 (World Bank Indicators, 2015). In fact, out-of-
pocket spending was halved between 2004 and 2007 (Saleh, 2013). The NHIS, which 
accounted for about 80% of the internally generated funds of the MoH facilities in 2009 
(Schieber et al., 2012), surpassed user fees as the major source (80%) of revenue for public 
health care providers in the country (Nyonator, & Kutzin, 1999). In this respect, it can be argued 
that the NHIS has resulted in a significant change in the financing of health care in Ghana. 
                                                          
41 The original figures include GH¢ 478,654,800 in 2006, GH¢563,756,400 in 2007, GH¢752,233,368 in 2008, 
and GH¢ 921,929,472 in 2009. They were converted into US dollars using the following exchange rates: US$1 
= GH¢0.92 (2006); GH¢ 0.94 (2007); GH¢1.06 (2008) and GH¢1.41 (2009). 
42 However, Schieber et al. (2012) report a drop in private expenditure on health as a percentage of total health 
care expenditure, from 56% to 47% between 1995 and 2009. 
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6.2.1. Institutional Change 
In addition to the changes to financing, there has also been a significant shift in the 
institutionalisation of health care since the introduction of the NHIS. For example, by 2010, 
about 66% of the population had registered with the policy, and 59.5% were card-bearing 
members (Kotoh, 2013). The cumulative membership size increased to about 70% of Ghana’s 
population in 2011 (NHIA, 2011). However, due to a high rate of non-renewals, annual active 
membership of the NHIS has been significantly lower than the total membership, averaging 
only about 35% of the population in 2012 (NHIA, 2012).  
In terms of service provision, the introduction of NHIS has led to a shift from limited 
benefit coverage of only public health related issues such as immunization and treatment for 
tuberculosis to a much more comprehensive benefit coverage, covering about 95% of all 
diseases and health conditions in Ghana (Osei43, 2013). As Table 1 illustrates, among other 
things, NHIS covers the costs of drugs, inpatient care, both specialist and general outpatient 
care, eye care, and dental care. It excludes only the most expensive, specialized services such 
as brain and heart surgery other than those resulting from accidents and organ transplant, 
among a few other things (Saleh, 2012; Kotoh, 2013). 
The basic institutions for health service delivery have also transitioned, with the 
creation of additional bodies such as the National Health Insurance Council (NHIC) and the 
NHIA, complementing existing institutions like the MoH, the GHS and religious and other 
private actors. In this new structure, the MOH serves as the main agency for policymaking for 
the health sector, whereas the GHS and the private-based actors serve as providers and must be 
accredited before they are allowed to operate under the NHIS. Figure 3, below, shows that 
                                                          
43 Osei was an officer of the Planning and Monitoring Unit of the Ghana Health Service. He was involved in the 
preparatory work on the NHIS by determining its financial implications on the health sector. 
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about 3575 provider facilities, including hospitals, clinics, pharmacy shops and laboratories, 
among others, had been accredited to operate under the NHIS by 2012.  
Figure 3 Number of accredited providers under the NHIS as of 31/12/2012 
 
Source: NHIA (2012, p. 29) 
The NHIC basically serves as the governing board for the NHIA. In place of direct cash 
payment at the point of service, a National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) has also been 
established. The NHIF entails a 2.5% National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) charged on 
certain goods and services, 2.5% deduction from the 17.5% social security contribution 
(SSNIT) of formal sector workers, annual budgetary allocations to the scheme, returns from 
investments by the scheme, grants and donations from philanthropists, as well as annual 
premium of between GH¢7.20 to GH¢ 48.00 from members of the informal sector, depending 
on their economic standing. As seen in Figure 4, at the end of 2009, the NHIL formed the 
majority (61%) share of the total revenue of the NHIS, followed by investment income (17%) 
and formal sector workers contributions (15.6%) to the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT) fund. 
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Figure 4 Inflow to the NHIS as of 31/12/2009 
 
Source: NHIA (2009, p. 34) 
There has also been a significant change in access to and utilization of health care since 
the advent of the NHIS (Mensah, Oppong & Schmidt, 2009). For example, whereas only 
626,765 people used Ghana’s health care system in 2005, the number had shot up by about 
2,708% by 2009 (Akum, 2014). Both inpatient and outpatient utilization also doubled between 
2005 and 2007 (Ministry of Health, 2008 cited in Kotoh, 2013), much of which is attributable 
to the relatively generous premium and benefit coverage under the policy. 
 As seen in Figure 5 below, the policy also has a broad exemption category. It 
encompasses children, aged, indigents, and SSNIT pensioners (Appiah, 2012). If SSNIT 
contributors 44 are added, total exemptions account for over 60% of the members of the NHIS.  
 
                                                          
44 SSNIT contributors are generally formal sector workers. Although they contribute towards financing the 
NHIS, the law includes them under the exemption category because they were able to strike a deal with the 
government during the reform process to use their contributions as a loan, which is only to be returned with a 
gratuity from the government in case their pension fund runs bankrupt. However, it became clear in the 
interviews that, because no formal documents related to this decision were signed between labour and 
government, leaders from both sides appear to have conflicting interpretations on the matter.  
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 Despite these changes, there are some areas of continuity in contemporary Ghanaian 
health care policy. For instance, as can be inferred from Figure 4, revenue from taxes (NHIL 
and budgetary support) funds 63.3% of the NHIS. The number of health facilities under the 
NHIS has also remained relatively constant, perpetuating the problem of urban bias in health 
service delivery. Also, while a significant number of marginalized people have enrolled in the 
health insurance system, much of the lowest-income population are reportedly still without 
insurance due to a number of reasons, including the lack of capacity in identifying who is really 
poor (Apoya & Marriott, 2011; Osei, 2013). Despite the above points of continuity, the changes 
witnessed since the introduction of the NHIS have been significant. Importantly, consumer 
satisfaction with the health service delivery system has greatly improved across all income 
groups from 57% in 1997 (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS], 1997) to about 90% in post-2003, 
when the NHIS was introduced (NDPC, 2009; Turkson, 2009; Twum, Selotlegeng & Cheng, 
2015). For example, 94% of selected the patients in facilities in the Komenda-Edina Eguafo-
Abrem District were satisfied with the health system and willing to recommend it to colleagues 
(Turkson, 2009). In the section that follow s, a critical examination of the policy change 
process, showing how and why the transition to NHIS occurred, is provided. 
Source: NHIA (2012, p. 20) 
Figure 5 Composition of Membership of the NHIS as of 2012 
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6.3. Why and How the Change Occurred 
6.3.1. Problem Definition and Agenda Setting 
Although the legislation was passed in 2003, NHIS first appeared on the policy agenda under 
the Progress Party (PP) government in the 1970s (Adjei, 2013; Afriyie, 2013). However, it was 
not given as much attention as the user fee model, resulting in its disappearance from the 
agenda until the 1980s and then again in the early 2000s. Moreover, the government was 
overthrown by the 1972 coup, leading to its inability to pursue the policy any further (Andoh, 
2013). In the early 1980s, the GMA invited the People's National Party (PNP) government to 
explain its manifesto on health care to its members for an informed discussion. During that 
discussion, the representative of the government also spoke highly of NHIS, but he concluded 
that although it was a more appropriate policy, NHIS was unfeasible in a developing country 
like Ghana, where a large informal sector would make premium collection impossible (Adibo, 
2013). This, of course, was in line with the popular notion at the time.  In the end, user fees, 
rather than the NHIS, were implemented. 
The challenges created by implementation of the user fee model, some of which have 
already been highlighted in the preceding chapter, were generally highlighted by the 
interviewees as having triggered the shift towards NHIS in the 2000s. As Awittey (2013) noted, 
“with the cash-and-carry, now you have the drugs there, now you have anaesthetic drugs 
available, but the people’s ability to pay, to access health care was making it inaccessible for 
them”. The situation was even graver for people in rural areas who were already facing 
geographical access problems. As Akosa (2013) stressed, “the nearest hospital was greater than 
10 miles… [and] finding a vehicle … to get to the hospital itself was a big problem” (Akosa, 
2013). Under such conditions, the sick would likely suffer greatly during emergency situations. 
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As Anane45 (2013) noted with respect to a woman who had come to his hospital to deliver her 
eight child, 
Normally, they will be confident that they can deliver, [but] this woman couldn’t 
deliver. Her womb was ruptured, the baby was extruded into the abdomen. They were 
at home, according to her, she was in labour for more than two weeks.…all her eyes 
were even yellow, she was dying, that’s how the family met and found some money, 
carried this woman from over 20 miles in the cocoa area…they arrived at Komfo 
Anokye [hospital] at 1 am. This woman was going to die. The fortunate thing was that 
at that time my friends in the US had sent me some drug samples very powerful drug. 
It was the drug we used for the woman. She is still alive, but here was a woman who 
because of lack of money had raptured her uterus, the baby had gotten rotten in her 
abdomen, she had gotten septic and was on the verge of dying.  
The above passage illustrates the ordeal many vulnerable people faced during the user 
fee regime because of their inability to pay for medical care. In fact, many of the people who 
found themselves in the above situation reportedly died, making the user fee policy one of the 
most dreadful policies in the country at the time (Nortey, 2013).  
The user fee policy resulted in a drastic reduction in attendance and utilization of 
medical care. As Adjei (2013) noted, “attendance by a person was once in three years instead 
of once in a year. And it was basically because they said they didn’t have money”. The drop in 
utilization was particularly greater for outpatient services compared to inpatient services 
because most patients waited until their sicknesses worsened before seeking medical care 
(Akanzige, 2013). The situation was “worst among the poorest”, a situation that significantly 
widened “the equity problem” with respect to access to health care in the country (Agyepong, 
2013). 
There was significant public dissatisfaction with and agitation against the user fee 
policy. As Adjei46 (2013) stated, the press continually blamed the government for introducing 
“hospital fees system at the instigation of the World Bank to the detriment [of the public] and, 
so something should be done about it”. The issue that attracted overwhelming media attention 
                                                          
45 Anane was the first minister of health during the Kufour Administration. He initiated the design of the NHIS. 
However, he was soon removed from that post due to a cabinet reshuffle by the President. 
46 At this time, Adjei was serving as a member of the design team of the NHIS. 
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involved the practice of detaining nursing mothers in health care facilities because they could 
not pay for their deliveries. As Akor47 (2013) indicated, the media consistently revealed 
numerous patients that were “detained because they couldn’t pay”. In addition to being 
detained, the majority of the mothers had to endure horrible conditions such as “bare floors, 
congestions [overcrowding] and so forth, which were creating problems”. The role of the media 
in spreading this news was facilitated by the democratic process that Ghana entered into in the 
1990s. The process resulted in an upsurge in media stations, which contributed in popularising 
the challenges of the user fee policy.  Seddoh48 (2013) declared, 
Between 1998 and 2000 …there was a huge increase in private media, especially, in 
the local languages.  If you remember the famous fight between Peace FM and Radio 
Peace at that time, that was when news radio was coming on board. And they were all 
in the local language. So the education on the issues were picked up in local languages, 
which the people could easily engage with. So it was easy for them [ordinary people] 
to pick a phone and call into a radio station and talk about the real issues facing them 
in the languages that they could express themselves. So that became a big issue, and 
health care was always in the media at the time.  
Besides the media, the situation attracted the attention of government officials and 
parliamentarians, most of whom “were [already] at the receiving end where within their 
constituencies people were always coming and asking for money and other things” (Seddoh, 
2013). Another effect of the democratic process was that it introduced an electoral system, 
which offered additional windows of opportunity for change. For instance, as Seddoh (2013) 
argued, 
From 1998 to 2000 was an election period. In fact, it was a heavy electioneering period. 
We had the elections at that time, and every politician… in fact, all [of them] were very 
quick to pick up on what the people too were picking up on. And for any politician, 
popular opinion is the voice of God. So as health became the main issue, it was easier 
for them [the politicians] to bash at each other on health care.  
                                                          
47 Akor was the chairman of the design team of the NHIS. 
48 Seddoh was also a member of the design team of the NHIS. 
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Elected officials, therefore, began to discuss the user fee policy’s impacts in parliament. Adjei 
(2013), for instance, recounted the extent to which the user fee problem was debated in 
parliament during the 1990s: 
I still remember one of the editors of the newspapers, who was called Mr. Jewu Chem. 
He had been elected as a member of parliament, and so he was very strongly against it 
[the user fee policy]. He tabled the whole issue in parliament. He tabled it because some 
students from the University of Ghana were involved in an accident. They were 
travelling on a bus and got an incident. When they were taken to the Police Hospital for 
treatment, the Police Hospital said if you don’t have money to pay [for the treatment, 
then] it won’t see them [the students]. So the university students [in Accra] got very 
angry and they went on street demonstration ... So Mr. Jewu Chem took it up and tabled 
it in parliament. And there was a lot of discussion and debate on the issue. 
Thus, by the 1990s and early 2000s, the adverse effects of the user fee policy were well 
known. In fact, according to Seddoh (2013), “you didn’t need literature to tell you that [the 
user fee was problematic], the obvious thing was there and it was showing that the indicator, 
per capita utilization of health services, which is simply the number of times somebody uses 
… [or is] likely to use health services were low”.  
In view of this predicament, as Adjei (2013) noted, “a whole [political] movement about 
abolishing cash and carry then started”. In response, the politicians began to consult heath care 
experts in the MoH for solutions (Agyepong, 2013; Seddoh, 2013). Although it had begun 
earlier under the PNDC’s military regime, these consultations became a common phenomenon 
after the transition to democracy in 1992 (Agyepong, 2013; Akanzige, 2013; Seddoh, 2013). 
In the process, NHIS was once again pushed onto the agenda of government officials and 
members of the opposition political parties alike (Agyepong, 2013; Seddoh, 2013). During the 
interview, Agyepong (2013) explained how NHIS became the focus of so much attention: 
Ghana had already come from British style to provide free tax funded after 
independence and we found we were not generating enough taxes, our economy 
couldn’t support it… And then we tried out-of-pocket fees and we also found...there 
were huge equity problems... So if you have already come down a particular road, 
looking for a solution, you don’t go back that road. So people were kind of saying how 
else do people fund health care? 
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In this respect, NHIS was seen as the only alternative left for dealing with the access problem 
in the health sector. This perception may have been fuelled by the predominance of local thrift 
associations or practices as “susu49” and “nnoboa50”, which embodied social insurance related 
elements such as energy and revenue pooling to support members during times of need. 
Andoh51 (2013) confirmed the impact of these local systems on the transition to NHIS during 
the interviews. He noted, “the concept of solidarity has always been there, and we find it in the 
villages [more] than in the cities. People die in the village, attend funerals and give money to 
the people just to make sure they don’t suffer”. Mensah52 (2013) made a similar comment, 
declaring that, 
If you look at even when insurance started, the local communicates did well, the rural 
areas... Because in the local areas, you have that nnoboa, that solidary concept where 
your brother’s concern is yours, you know the next person living next door so that thing 
helped.  
 Another important factor was the widespread existence of the Community-based Health 
Insurance Schemes (CBHIS) in the country at the time (Adusei53, 2013; Akor, 2013). Led by 
the Catholic Church, CBHIS began to spring up across the country in the face of the 
government’s failure to address the health care accessibility problem and the rising 
phenomenon of default payments in many provider facilities across the country. Whereas only 
one CBHIS was established by the Catholic Church in Nkoranza in 1992 (Akor, 2013; Mensah, 
2013; Sorsy, 2013), “about 159 [of such] schemes had been established as at 2001” when the 
NPP government began the process of “moving to health insurance and they were in about 60 
                                                          
49 Susu is a micro-saving scheme in communities in Ghana. Usually a trusted member of the community 
establishes it and ask other members to contribute any amount they could it. The owner comes round daily or 
weekly to collect the contributions. At the end of the month, members are allowed to withdraw their total 
savings. However, they lose one of their contributions to the scheme owner for his/her service. 
50 Nnoboa is an informal agreement among farmers in Ghana to help each other during times of needs such as 
land cultivation and harvest. It involves sacrificing time and money to help each other during times of need. 
51 Andoh was a key member of the NHIS design process and a secretary to the Minister of Health (Dr. Afriyie). 
He also spearheaded the policy’s implementation in some districts in the Western Region of Ghana. 
52 Mensah was involved in the coordination of the role of the Christian Health Association of Ghana in the 
journey towards introducing health insurance in Ghana and the implementation the NHIS.   
53 Adusei was also a member of the NHIS design process, serving as a representative of the Ministry of Health 
and secretary to the chairman of the design team. 
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districts across the country” (Andoh, 2013). They were, however, limited by the fact that most 
of them focused only on hospitalization and their numbers were small (1% of the population) 
(Adjei, 2013; Amoh, 2013; Mensah, 2013). Nevertheless, as Mensah (2013) noted, these 
CBHIS “played a role in terms of advocacy and pushing the policy [NHIS] agenda”. For 
instance, they utilized the annual stakeholder meetings in the health sector as opportunities to 
make presentations on the positive effects of their policy ideas (Akanzige, 2013). Hence, as 
Akor (2103) argued, these CBHISes created the impression among government officials that 
“it [health insurance] is doable, it’s feasible”.  
Key policy entrepreneurs in the MoH also made a conscious effort to push NHIS high 
onto the agenda of government officials and political parties, as Seddoh (2013) noted during 
the interviews. 
We invited government officials and political parties to the Health Partners’ summit. 
Some of the participants were members of parliament. Some of them were also on the 
parliamentary select committee on health. We kept inviting these actors to the Health 
Partners’ summit which was held twice a year to discuss these [health care] issues and 
possible solutions to them.  And so we started to convince them about the ease with 
which we could do social insurance…that should be able to take away the problem we 
were having with health financing. So with that [the help of the summit] we could build 
popular allies. 
The implication of the above is that the design team managed to frame the policy idea to 
convince core policymaking bodies in the health sector.  
In addition to the above, as Seddoh (2013) emphasized, “we used the media. Used 
scientific articles. Because they go to the world health assemblies, we tried to get those issues 
adopted in resolutions. At the World Health Assembly ... In 2000 and the late 90s, they debated 
the issues [of the health sector] heavily”. Some of the scientific articles the interviewees 
frequently cited that helped them push their ideas forward involved studies on health care 
financing by scholars such as Nketia Amponsah, Nyonator and Kudzin, Asenso Okyere, Chris 
Atim, and Professor Lambo (Adjei, 2013; Akor, 2013; Seddoh, 2013; Sorsey, 2013). Hence, 
beyond the rhetoric to abolish the user fee policy during the 2000 elections, Benya (2013) 
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noted, “you see a lot of political parties in their manifestoes [also] proposing to implement one 
form of insurance or the other”. Afriyie54 (2013) confirmed this and also argued, “the whole 
[political] atmosphere was very expectant” of health insurance. One of the key political parties 
that proposed introducing NHIS during the election was the NPP, which was then in opposition. 
Speaking about the role of the opposition party in keeping the NHIS on the agenda, Andoh 
(2013) revealed, 
The then government which was in opposition managed to convince the population that 
if they were voted into power they were going to leave them with the Health Insurance 
Scheme and fortunately they won the power. And for me, it was like a social contract 
with the people and they had no basis to default that promise, so eventually when they 
came to power, of course, the first thing was for policy development and legislating all 
these structures, building up the structures that will drive them to the implementation 
process and so eventually in 2003 the law was passed. 
The 2000 elections that Andoh (2013) describes above were a crucial moment in the 
transition to NHIS because it brought in a new government that was bent on introducing NHIS, 
no matter the odds (Agyepong, 2013; Sorsey, 2013). For instance, responding to the question 
as to the number one factor that made the NHIS successful, Seddoh (2013) emphasized political 
will. He said, “It is the political will of the government to do it irrespective of what anybody 
thinks”. Almost all those interviewed for this study emphasized the NPP’s commitment to 
introducing the policy. This commitment can also be seen in how the NPP shaped the policy 
process after winning the election. In particular, “the president, on appointing his ministers, 
decided to make health insurance one of his performance indicators for that minister” (Seddoh, 
2013). This was confirmed by the Minister of Health at the time, who highlighted that his “main 
agenda was to spearhead the introduction of the health insurance scheme” (Afriyie, 2013). 
Beyond helping to push NHIS high on the agenda, the election helped to shift public discussion 
from “private health insurance to government ownership…or social health insurance” 
                                                          
54 Afriyie was the minister of health after Anane. He spearheaded the development and implementation of the 
NHIS. 
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(Benya55, 2013). Thus, besides the user fee crisis and the policy entrepreneurship provided by 
the CBHISes and the MoH, the 2001 election was also crucial in the introduction of the NHIS 
to the political agenda. Explaining the agenda setting process, therefore, requires looking at 
both the conjunctural factors that created the window of opportunity for change and the policy 
entrepreneurs that seized the moment to propel the policy idea onto the governmental agenda. 
 
6.3.2. Policy Formulation/Design 
The Minister of Health put together a seven-member design team with a mandate of helping 
the MoH develop an NHIS framework, including determining the basic benefit package and 
financial modalities for running the scheme (Agyepong, 2013). Unlike that of the user fee 
model, the membership of this design team was broadened to include experts outside the public 
sector. However, the members were united by the fact that they had some expertise or 
experience in health insurance, either as current operators or as facilitators of a similar process 
in the past (Agyepong, 2013). The members were drawn from the MoH, the GHS, the TUC, 
the Ghana Healthcare Company, and the Dangme West Mutual Health Insurance and Research 
Centre. With such diversity and since the various stakeholders were expected to bring their 
own perspectives to the process, it was expected that the team would come up with a more 
representative policy (Akor, 2013). Unfortunately, each party promoted its own interests, 
leading to inability of the team to progress. As Seddoh (2013) noted, “the academics [on the 
team] wanted the academic way and so they were like, we haven’t finished exhausting the 
academic debate. And we need to write more papers”; whereas others on the team thought that 
“there was already substantial research - the fact that it was not published in scientific journals 
                                                          
55 Benya was part of the team that was put together to explore the development of the NHIS before the 2000 
election, which resulted in a change in power from the NDC to the NPP. 
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did not mean that the evidence was not there”. Alternatively, as Akor (2013) argued, “there 
was a lot of disagreement among the committee and this led to it disintegration”. 
In addition to procedural conflict, there was disagreement over “the form of health 
insurance” (Akor, 2013). For instance, the chairman and most members of the design team 
preferred a CBHIS, while the minister and a few others wanted a centralized system (Anane, 
2013). My investigation into the matter revealed two main interesting but contrasting ideas. 
Those supporting the centralized approach had the intention of preventing corruption that could 
result from leaving the process entirely in the hands of communities. As Anane (2013) 
commented, 
My feeling was that if we permitted the mutual [CBHISes] schemes to pass, at that time 
there were about 118 districts and we would have 118 mutual schemes. To me it also 
meant that we would have 118 management centers with a very big overhead cost. 
Apart from that, we would have118 centers of corruption…I knew that we didn’t have 
enough personnel who had knowledge about this national health insurance schemes so 
if you were making 118 district schemes, who were going to manage it? 
On the contrary, those who were rooting for the CBHIS approach were claiming that the 
centralized approach did not work. As Agyepong (2013) notes, 
the NDC [past government] was also searching … Their approach had been to set up a 
health insurance unit in MOH, i.e. a centralized approach. That [approach] didn’t work 
because some of these things, this is my personal approach, I think sometimes, if you 
are too heavy at the centre with initiatives that have a lot of downstream, you may not 
succeed ... There were all those experiences that a centralized social health insurance 
system was … probably not going to work for us. When t the one by MOH collapsed 
… the government tried it also with SSNIT …The government put money into SSNIT 
and failed. So even the NDC government had been exploring insurance; it’s just that 
the root they took didn’t work.  
 
The above quotes suggest that the design team was in disarray. According to Seddoh (2013), 
this ultimately led to “total paralysis”. However, because the majority of the members were in 
favour of a community-based approach, in the end, the team recommended that rather than 
getting actively involved, the government should just encourage various groups to establish 
their own CBHISes (Anane, 2013).  
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While this recommendation seemed technically sound and evidenced-based 
(Agyepong, 2013), it was rejected by the minister, who was more interested in a radical policy 
change (Anane, 2013; Amoh, 2013; Seddoh, 2013). Thus, soon after, there was a cabinet 
reshuffle and the minister was changed (Anane, 2013). The new minister set a time frame 
within which he wanted the entire policy design to be completed and taken to cabinet, as well 
as a time frame for when public input may be required (Afriyie, 2013). He anticipated that the 
policy’s overall implementation date would be before 2004, when the government would be 
seeking a re-election. Hence, the minister reconstituted and transformed the design team, most 
notably by replacing the chair and bringing new members who favoured path-departing policy 
change. As the new minister noted, when he was asked to explain the criteria he used to 
reorganize the design team, “if you are not with me policy wise, if you think that we should set 
up a vertical system, [which would take] two or three years to set up, I had no time. So I kicked 
them out nicely to only constitute some committees, calling in some new people” (Afriyie, 
2013). Explaining the circumstances surrounding his appointment, the new chair of the design 
team stated, “there was a lot of disagreement among the committee so …I was brought in to 
reorganise them, that is what happened and I took over and led the process” (Akor, 2013). 
Agyepong and Adjei (2008) also note that the members of the design team who suggested 
anything contrary to the government’s wishes were tagged or labelled as anti-government or 
as siding with the opposition to sabotage the government’s work. Consequently, some of the 
early team members who were dissatisfied with the new developments also left the design team 
on their own. They were replaced by new members believed to be political associates of the 
regime and thus favourable to reform (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008). By the time the final decision 
on the policy was made, only a single original member remained on the design team (Agyepong 
& Adjei, 2008; Kotoh, 2013).  
The Health Minister described the design team’s final plan as  
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A federation of district health insurance schemes supported by the centre, that is 
government, but largely autonomous in their own self, having their own boards and 
their own directors and then dispensing claims and what not according to a minimum 
national criteria that they have to fulfil...We drew up a minimum national package, you 
could go above the minimum package but not below it…even two or three political 
districts which were contiguous could form a mutual health insurance district (Afriyie, 
2013). 
This new system was not entirely centralized, as the government had originally intended.  That 
decision may have been influenced by the fact that some members of the new design team, 
including the new minister, did not support a wholesale centralization of the NHIS process. For 
example, as the minister stressed, “if you do a centralized thing and you don’t succeed, then 
the whole part falls down” (Afriyie, 2013). Hence, blending the centralization agenda with 
some levels of decentralization was seen as critical for sustaining the policy over time.  
The overall implication of the above is that the reorganization project helped reformers 
overcome the forces within the design team who were militating against the path-departing 
health care change the government advocated. An LI to support the NHIS implementation was 
also designed afterwards through a similar process. Key aspects of the design included a 
provision for establishing three types of health insurance schemes: District Mutual Health 
Insurance Schemes (DMHISs) for the various local government units in the country, Private 
Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (PMHISs) for the not-for-profit sector and Private 
Commercial Health Insurance Scheme (PCHIS) for the private-for-profit sector. These major 
schemes were to be regulated by the NHIA. The final plan also included a multi-sourced 
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), whose components are explained above. 
A number of factors underlay the successful work of the reorganized design team. The 
first factor involved the compatibility of team members. In particular, the reorganization 
resulted in a team that was cohesive, as a majority of them knew with each other prior to joining 
the team. As Seddoh (2013) revealed, “we were friends, we were actually friends, those of us 
who were in the middle were already friends not because of insurance, but because we served 
common interest so we became like team champions in the sector”. The second factor relates 
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to the fact that most of the members had no obvious stake in the status quo, as they were never 
part of any former or existing process of establishing a health insurance system in the country. 
Hence, they were interested in pursuing the change despite the odds (Agyepong, 2013).  
The third factor is that the reorganized design team shared their ideas and brought on 
board multiple stakeholders, including detractors, enabling them to both consolidate and 
legitimate their choices. As Andoh (2013) noted,  
We needed to have engagement with stakeholders to discuss the issues, so there were 
series of stakeholder engagements, involving civil society organizations, key 
stakeholders in the health sector like the Ghana Health Service, the Ministry of Health, 
the Christian Health Association of Ghana. The engagements were necessary because 
of the contribution component of the scheme, which was going to take the form of 
payroll deductions. So we needed to consult the Employers Association and the Trade 
Union Congress and then the private insurance schemes. There were a few private 
insurance schemes in the system and we needed to engage them in order to let them 
know that despite the National Health Insurance Scheme, their market will still remain 
as it is. Besides, Mutual Health Insurance Organizations were also in the system. In 
fact, about 159 schemes had been established as at 2001 when we were preparing to 
move to health insurance and they were in about 60 districts across the country. So they 
also had to come in and, of course, the Ministry of Local Government and rural 
Development had to come in a well. 
Akor (2013) made a similar point. He said, “we had to go to the public so many times to make 
presentations. We had to do four zonal presentations. We brought all of them [civil society 
organisations] to these meetings, involving the four zones and one national …to listen to the 
people’s view”. Representatives of civil society organizations like the PSoG confirmed that 
these meetings had taken place. As Awittey56 (2013) noted, “we as stakeholders contributed 
our quota in helping to shape the policy. As major stakeholders who understand the dynamics 
of the procurement and supply of medicines and, therefore, we were very much involved so 
that … we didn’t come out with a policy that was at variance with the law regarding supply of 
medicines”.  
                                                          
56 Awittey is the president of the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana (PSoG). 
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In convincing apathetic stakeholders to embrace its design, the design team employed 
ideational frames. Amoh57 (2013) recounted his role during the stakeholder consultation 
process. 
I went to the Teachers Hall and they were bashing the health insurance, particularly, 
the 2½% contribution by workers. They were trying to convince SSNIT contributors 
not agree... But they didn’t realize that I was there. So I got up and explained to the 
SSNIT contributors that the health insurance was good for them because it would save 
them disposable income. At least, their health care delivery expense would be out of 
their household budget. We went for lunch …As soon as we returned and I sat down, 
about ten people came and threw me out of the room, teachers Hall. But it was too late; 
I had already convinced them”.  
The fourth factor is that the design team read broadly, reviewing various models of 
health insurance across the globe. Describing the team, Akanzige (2013), for instance, noted, 
“this was more of a working group, practically sitting down, writing, looking at our situation, 
doing literature review of what has happened elsewhere”. They buttressed those reviews with 
frequent travels around the world to directly observe how the various models they had read 
about operated. For example as Seddoh (2013) affirmed, “we looked at the German system 
which had a similarity to a certain extent on what is happening and then we also look at Chile 
which had a certain example of a similar system and then we looked at Thailand”. The minister 
also travelled to the UK, Germany and Zimbabwe (Afriyie, 2013). Responding to why they 
undertook all those studies and whether they actually shaped the final decision of the team, the 
former minister responded, 
To get the historical perspectives and the evolution of health insurance. The history 
behind it from Otto Von Bismarck to now in Germany is very instructive... It helped to 
the extent that it made me feel confident… it made me feel that this thing has been done 
somewhere before and if I noticed and took account of our peculiar situation especially, 
our weaknesses, then it made me feel confident that we could do it. Not that we said 
that we were going to copy somebody‘s things (Afriyie, 2013). 
Adjei (2013) made a similar argument. He noted, “at least we could tell people when they ask 
us why we did it. We could tell them, we have been here, we have been there and we decided 
                                                          
57 Amoh is a system designer and the main consultant during the design and implementation of the NHIS. 
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to design our own”. Adjei (2013) added that, “…at least the England and the Germany ones 
helped in developing the concept of the hybrid [tax and contribution-based] system that we are 
using”. Seddoh (2013) agreed to the above assertion. He argued:  
Based on these countries we decided to basically just scale up our system ... The only 
unique thing about ours is the tax system which is not so unique because even the 
German system is based on the tax system, but ours simply had the VAT system so we 
introduced that component to it and then we used some innovative financing like the 
social security and national insurance trust (SSNIT), which is not any different from 
taking payroll tax. 
The implication of the above is that although they borrowed some foreign ideas, the design 
team did not do a wholesale importation of those ideas. Rather, they adapted them to suit the 
Ghanaian context. When I asked him about why they did not do a wholesale importation of the 
models they studied, the minister said, 
Comparatively no jurisdiction at that time had the informal sector in the heart of this 
kind of social intervention ... if the economy of Thailand is such that (maybe) the formal 
sector is over 60%, then you may want to use it [a wholesale importation], but in our 
situation, it was a no (Afriyie, 2013). 
The above quote confirms earlier arguments that Ghana’s large informal sector should 
have made it impossible for a health insurance policy to work, the conventional wisdom being 
that the formal sector must be larger than the informal sector for such a policy to be successful. 
Ignoring conventional wisdom and designing a health insurance system that reflected the 
unique situation of Ghana, the minister noted, “we focused mostly on the informal sector and 
as it were the formal sector was an added on ... In other words, we were not too aggressive 
about teachers joining, we were not too aggressive about miners joining but we were very 
aggressive about market women [joining] and we had targeted farmers, etc.” This process of 
adapting foreign models to suit domestic context is what Campbell (2004) refers to as 
translation, and Rose (1991) as lesson drawing. However, responding to the concern as to why 
they did not import Thailand’s model given its contextual proximity with Ghana, Adjei (2013) 
noted, “that one wasn’t a high level delegation, it was some [delegation] from the health service 
- it wasn’t like the minister. Even though some MPs also went there later on, it wasn’t a high 
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level delegation”. This suggests that beyond contextual influences, the calibre of the delegation 
involved in the lesson drawing process also shaped the lessons that were ultimately drawn. 
 Although it seemed to be quite technical, much of the lesson drawing process had 
political undertones, involving conscious attempts to avoid opposition from key vested 
interests. For instance, in response to why the team deducted the workers’ contributions to the 
NHIS from their pension (SSNIT) fund instead of their payroll, as observed in the social 
insurance nations they visited, Amoh (2013) noted, “we didn’t want to stress them up”. In the 
passage below, Seddoh (2013) makes the above argument clearer, noting,  
It was uncomfortable asking workers to pay directly from their payrolls. Already labour 
agitations in the country around that time was bad. If you recall, there was a lot of labour 
agitations round 2000. In 1999, 2000, 2001. In 2001 alone doctors were on strike for 
about 49 days, teachers were also on strike. All these strikes were related to pay, so 
going to take anything off their pay slip would be a problem. Therefore, the thinking 
was that if they were already contributing to another pot of money [i.e. SSNIT] which 
were being invested, then why not invest part of such money in their health?  
Deducting workers’ contributions from their pension fund was seen as a convenient 
solution because pension pays were based on the workers’ “best three years” of pay in active 
service rather than on the amount of money they had accumulated in their pension funds 
(Kuntulo, 2013). A similar strategy was employed with respect to how the informal workers’ 
contributions were calculated. Afriyie (2013) commented, “our research showed that majority 
of our farmers …could afford more than that [the official amount], two times in certain areas, 
even three times what we were collecting then, but we decided to set the bar low so that people 
would enrol”. The design team rejected suggestions to introduce co-payment so as to reduce 
the potential of moral hazard on similar grounds, as Afriyie (2013) emphasized in the following 
passage: 
Somewhere along the line, the concept of co-payment came up. But given that we were 
evolving from a cash-and-carry system, any semblance of the patient paying something, 
even a little token, at the beginning would have been pounced on politically by our 
opponents. Besides, our illiterate population would not have been able to differentiate 
the co-payment arrangement from the cash-and-carry., So we decided to postpone it. 
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The design team was also successful because they accommodated the interests of the 
existing community and private-based health insurance schemes, which had a significant 
following across the country, including donors (Akor, 2013). To avoid resistance from such 
great constituencies, as Agyepong (2013) noted, we “said we will have private mutuals [CBHIS 
and PCHIS] and public mutuals [DHMHISs]”. The minister agreed.  
I didn’t want to exclude my private sector people, so we set the parameters. You can 
compete out there. That means a private mutual health organization should get some 
space to operate and also private for profit. It was for the purpose of providing a 
comprehensive service or the minimum services that we set the private schemes in 
competition with the government-based district mutuals. They also served as an added 
incentive. For example, prescription glasses were not on our original list, but I noticed 
that some private mutual health organizations allowed prescription glasses especially 
among school children. And so those were some of the things that happened. They have 
their clients now and they are growing, so am very happy. It’s also because of my 
ideological outlook. In fact, if I had my way, I would have shrunk those mutual health 
organizations. But, I saw this as a historical thing (Afriyie, 2013).  
The minister’s response, however, suggests that there was also an ideological twist to 
the design team’s strategy of accommodation. This was also confirmed by another member of 
the design team in the passage below.  
The government in power was the one that talks about private sector, private sector. So 
why do you build a social health insurance scheme that would collapse the private 
sector? Hence, we made it optional…Before the NHIS, there were other companies that 
were running private insurance schemes. They should remain. They should continue to 
run their private insurance (Andoh, 2013). 
 Thus, the strategy of accommodating private participation was also meant to deflate resistance 
from people on the far right, most of whom were believed to belong to the political party in 
power. However, in order not to reveal this, this strategy was sold to the public as not wanting 
“to collapse the existing mutual [CBHISes] …Rather, they were introducing a basic [scheme] 
for everybody, but if somebody didn’t like that one or wanted an additional package, then he 
can have it. That was why three types of schemes were introduced” (Tony58, 2013).  
                                                          
58 Tony was a representative of the Ministry of Finance on the development of the NHIS. He was a member of 
the delegation that travelled across the country to solicit ideas from the grassroots to enrich the NHIS. 
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In order to accomplish their goal within the stipulated timeframe, the team also 
neglected technical details and a rational approach to decision making, which sometimes 
extend the process of policy change. As Seddoh (2013) indicated, 
The public servant has a traditional way of doing things. Through evidence, you build 
consensus, you get all the technical opinions, then you submit it to another technical 
opinion and then the committee has to agree. That is how we used to do 
policy…However, it was not predetermined that things should go that way, especially 
when you have a lot of technical people on board. When the issue is of public interest 
and it has gained its own momentum, you have to take advantage of the momentum. 
Under that circumstance, sometimes you sacrifice technical expediency for the political 
momentum, otherwise you will lose it…Technical is only from my opinion about 25% 
because you need evidence not to go wrong, but it will go wrong so you might as well 
model it as long as the base concept is correct and the base concept has already been 
validated by experiences in other countries, it is also validated on a small scale by all 
pilots that had happened in the past and the committees themselves mobilizing 
themselves for insurance. 
Adjei (2013) confirmed all of this when he noted, “we can never design a perfect system, we 
can never discuss an insurance, so we could go on and debate and debate. And so the 
philosophy at that time was that, you sail your ship and build it at the same time. You just need 
to check and see if the ship can float and there were certain elements to make sure that the thing 
can take off”. Seddoh (2013) also made a similar argument in the quote below, with respect to 
the extent to which the design was shaped by technical analysis, arguing that, 
Technical analysis is only from my opinion about 25% [of the number of factors that 
influenced the policy] because you need evidence not to go wrong. But it will go wrong 
so you might as well model it as long as the base concept is correct and the base concept, 
[in this case] had already been validated by experiences in other countries. It had also 
been validated on a small scale by all the pilots that were conducted in the past and the 
communities themselves mobilizing themselves for insurance. Once that concept is 
already validated in real life evidence and real life field experiment, you do not need 
another technical opinion from so called experts to be able to go ahead to do what is 
right. You might miss that window of opportunity that has opened at that time, and so 
with that expedience you just have to go ahead. 
Technical analysis was also sidelined in determining payment modalities. As Akanzige (2013), 
a key member of the premium committee emphasized, “in one of the meetings, we were there 
trying to deliberate the premium when one [man’s name withheld] …came from castle [the 
seat of government] and said that government has decided that the premium should be between 
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GH¢7.00 and whatever…, so we said that then other alternatives should be found” (Akanzige, 
2013). Thus, as Seddoh (2013) added, “if we continued engaging only the technical people and 
tried to get the technical design right, we would never have been able to introduce the 
insurance”.  
Moreover, the team had a strong sense of purpose, motivation and the desire to create 
a path-departing change, even without the support of international actors. In the first place, as 
Adjei (2013) reported, “there was a compilation by ILO that in developing countries, insurance 
will not work because there was too many unemployed, because social health insurance 
practically means taxing – payroll tax – to finance health care, but the proportion of the 
population that was on formal payroll was not big enough to sustain it”. In a similar light, 
Agyepong (2013) argued,  
When we started, a lot of the development partners who were actually in Ghana were 
sceptical. In fact some of them even tried to discourage us...I think they actually tried 
to discourage it… they were kind of sceptical, it can’t be done. It’s in a low income 
country, largely informal sector so I think some of them really thought Ghana was over 
reaching itself and so on and so forth and I think it couldn’t have flown with them. It 
[finally] flew because the local actors said we don’t care, government said we will do 
it. So the general idea was that it will not work so nobody took it seriously. Yea they 
felt this couldn’t be done.  
 
Beyond this, as Amoh (2013) stated, the international agencies “were not in agreement with 
the speed [fast pace] at which we were moving …they thought that how can you have a health 
insurance in just a year or two years, while Germany took 100 years and so forth”. They thought 
that “Germany has taken 130 years… so they couldn’t see how we could do…the health 
insurance in Ghana within less than 10 years”. In the passage below, Seddoh (2013) notes 
additional areas the external agencies expressed dissatisfaction with the NHIS. 
The external partners were never interested, they didn’t want health insurance in the 
first place. It was first seen as socialism and most of our development partners were 
capitalists, so they didn’t really accept that anything should be free. That is their first 
position. Secondly, they didn’t like our design, most of them were already financing 
community based schemes and anything national they didn’t trust government to do it 
so they couldn’t trust government and so they were not prepared to centralized social 
insurance as it were. Thirdly they saw it as creating another Nkrumah-type NHS…The 
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international community was very milky at a point in time. ..In one of the quarterly 
business meetings, they walked out and threatened to go to the presidency and 
parliament to go and protest it. They called their bluff. 
The design team was, however, bent on pursuing their agenda without international 
support. As indicated, they were motivated by the successful introduction of health insurance 
at the community or informal level. They were also inspired by the positive public opinion 
around the policy, as well as the tendency of a government to lose the next election if they 
failed to carry out the promises they made during the election campaign (Agyepong, 2013).  
To introduce the policy without external interference, the team backed out of all 
activities that involved international agencies. This situation was captured in the annual review 
of the Programme of Work (POW), which reported the following:  
Donors have complained of being excluded from planning and policy discussions in 
2002 and the MOH itself admits it wants some space to itself to determine its focus and 
priorities. Informal relations between MOH and partners have cooled considerably 
compared to 2001. MOH officials report that they require space to develop their own 
thinking and position on key issues. Some partners have interpreted this as a snub; as a 
result there has been a loss of goodwill, which is an important ingredient in effective 
team working…On the whole MOH and donors both want to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the health services. However, tensions have risen because of 
different expectations of implementation pace and the extent to which donors were 
involved in defining policy and core MOH functions (Coleman, 2011, p. 36).  
The final but perhaps most important attribute of the reorganized design team was its 
ability to establish a strong alliance with the cabinet and, particularly, the president. This 
approach was crucial for sustaining the agenda because, as indicated, some members of cabinet 
were initially apathetic towards the NHIS (Afriyie, 2013; Anane, 2013). After presenting their 
work, however the team brought a majority of cabinet members on board to support its design. 
Adusei (2013) explains this strategy in more detail in the following passage: 
We did presentations in cabinet, about two times. In fact, it was the first time that I saw 
civil servants giving presentations to cabinet. Normally, in cabinet, it is the minister 
that has to do a presentation, civil servants are not allowed. But for the first time, it was 
Dr. Arko [chair of the design team] that did the presentation, and afterwards, the whole 
thing was packaged to parliament. 
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The president was also singled out and frequently briefed on the design process as a way to 
secure his support. As Adusei (2013) reported, 
Government had to really support it. For the policy to work, it needed the full backing 
of the government. Indeed, in Ghana here, it must be the president because he has 
executive powers in this country. If it is just the support of the minister, it is nothing; 
you really need the support of the president for …every big project to work. Otherwise, 
it is not going to work. And this one [i.e. the NHIS], the president himself was involved. 
This is because once a while, we went and briefed him. Yes, we had the opportunity to 
brief the president.  
Co-opting the president was important because, as one of the team members noted, “health 
insurance is a security risk; if we don’t do it well we will have a lot of problems, including 
bashing from the community...so he was involved” (Adusei, 2013). Afriyie (2013) confirms 
this.  
I used to go and give him [President Kufour] good briefing not on the working day, but 
Sundays. I used to call him wofa [uncle] and I will give him a good briefing day by 
day- always premising it on sound concepts … I told him, it may not be scientific but 
… this thing will sell, and I even pointed out to him that he should listen to the villagers 
because at that time we had done some marketing, we had done some education and all 
that. At that time it was not for nothing that when you heard the cocoa farmer or even 
a yam farmer from Konkomba [a village] talking about the health insurance...it looked 
as if they were even more knowledgeable about health insurance than let’s say an the 
average teacher. 
The president also utilized the opportunities offered by these briefings to interrogate the design 
team so as to share the plan with other countries that were interested in the Ghanaian reform. 
As Adusei (2013) stressed, 
Apart from people inside here [Ghana] who were doing it, there were people outside 
who were also very interested and actually listening to whatever is happening in this 
region, so he [the president] was aware and actually asking very relevant questions and 
the way he wanted to go. Apparently, he agreed on all the things we said about the 
policy. 
 Over time, these executive briefings appeared to have paid off; they made the government 
bolder in the face of international pressure at subsequent stages of the policy process.  
 However, some of the design team’s decisions were shaped by policy legacy rather than 
strategy in the strict sense of the word. One example includes the decisions on the type of drug 
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to be supplied under the policy. When asked about the factors that informed the drug list, the 
minister responded, 
Fortunately, we had a national treatment guidelines already there to guide the 
committee that was set up to work on it. I remember I said that I didn’t want to 
complicate things … So for the drug list, I said any drug that can be prescribed by a 
practitioner in a clinic… should be on the list. Even before the health insurance scheme 
was passed, we reviewed it [the existing drug list] and added some more items to it. So 
you could find about 90% of those drugs on the NHIS dug list. 
Similar factors appeared to have shaped the policy’s exemption scheme. Beyond policy legacy, 
the exemption scheme was influenced by cultural and experiential factors, as could be inferred 
from the quote below by Adjei (2013): 
Although it [the NHIS] was supposed to be pro-poor (i.e. to address the needs of the 
poor), we didn’t have targeting mechanism for the poor. Hence, we used big groupings. 
So everybody above 70 years was not supposed to be able to afford the annual 
contribution. Children would also not be able to afford it. Later on pregnant women 
were also included as indigents…We ended up exempting almost everybody. And if 
you have a very large exempt group, then you have to find another means of financing 
their health and that was where the tax element...the concept of the VAT or National 
Health Insurance Levy, came up. 
The minister confirmed the cultural and experiential bases of the exemption scheme when he 
was asked why the design team fixed the exemption age for the aged at 70 years minimum 
instead of 60 years, which is the official retirement age (Sorsey59, 2013). 
We set it at 70 because we knew that even operationalizing it will be difficult. Most 
Ghanaians do not know their age, especially, in the informal sector and even in the 
formal sector, a lot of people have sworn affidavit that is not their correct age, we have 
a phenomenon called civil service age. Unfortunately, you [we had to] work against 
that because somebody may be 65 years and yet when he goes to civil service he will 
say he is 59 years (Afriyie, 2013).  
The above passage suggests that the experiences of being unable to identify people who truly 
deserve to be exempted influenced the decision to set the exemption age for the aged above the 
socially accepted level. While this has the tendency to reduce excessive health care spending 
on the part of government, it could as well have an adverse impact on the people who have kept 
their true age and so deserve to be exempted under the policy.  
                                                          
59 Sorsey is the executive director of Help-age, one of the non-governmental organizations that suggested 
amendments to the NHIS through a memo to the parliament of Ghana during the enactment of the NHIS. 
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6.3.3. Policy Adoption 
The draft policy was submitted to the Minister of Health, who tabled it before the cabinet and 
then parliament. The aspects of the draft policy that attracted the most attention and debate at 
the cabinet level related to the funding modalities, particularly concerning the introduction of 
the NHIL and the three main schemes to be incorporated into the policy.  
 The original term used by the design team with respect to the NHIL was Value Added 
Tax (VAT). The proposal to increase VAT became a controversial issue in cabinet because of 
a number of reasons. It had been introduced in the 1990s by the NDC in the face of opposition 
by the NPP government, which was in the opposition. At that time, as Anane (2013) 
emphasized, NPP members of parliament “walked out” of parliament in order to register their 
opposition to the policy. Beyond that, the NPP organized a massive demonstration, which was 
themed, “Ku mi preko”, i.e. “you better kill me than let me live under VAT” in Accra (Seddoh 
& Akor, 2012). The VAT was seen as a “regressive tax regime” (Afriyie, 2013) and, as Afriyie 
(2013) noted, “any regressive tax regime impacts negatively on the poor”. Given the above 
background, most members of the cabinet thought that increasing the VAT was politically 
risky. In particular, as Afriyie (2013) stated, “there were some opposition from even within the 
cabinet on the VAT…Yes a lot. They said that if there is a proverb that says, if it moves like a 
cow, eats grass, and as big as a cow then it’s a cow”. In other words, some members of cabinet 
thought that, whether it was earmarked for health care or not, a VAT would be risky to 
implement. This issue reportedly led the cabinet to invite the design team to explain and explore 
possible alternatives (Amoh, 2013; Adusei, 2013).  
Most of the design team members interviewed indicated that the VAT was needed to 
provide seed money for the proposed policy (Adjei, 2013; Seddoh, 2013). Consequently, as a 
member of cabinet at the time indicated, “we concealed it” as a National Health Insurance Levy 
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(NHIL) instead of a VAT (Afriyie, 2013). Seddoh (2013) confirmed this. He noted, “we had to 
change the name [VAT] to National Health Insurance Levy”. Also, cabinet reduced the rate of 
this levy from 3.5% to 2.5% to minimize its impacts on the public (Seddoh & Akor, 2013). 
According to Seddoh and Akor (2013), it took about half a year to come to an agreement on 
the financial modalities. 
In addition, whereas cabinet approved the three types of schemes the design team had 
suggested, it decided to layer the PMHIS and PCHIS on the top of DMHISs, which were the 
new schemes the government intended to establish. It did so by inserting an additional clause 
into the proposed design that gave exclusive room for the DMHISs to access subsidies from 
the central government. As could be inferred from the passage below, besides technical and 
ideological reasons, cabinet’s intention in layering the existing schemes over the new ones was 
to ensure the dominance of the latter over the former. As Afriyie (2013) noted, 
In fact, if I had my way, I would have shrunk these mutual health organizations. I saw 
this as a historical thing and during our era, we had no choice because of the structure 
of our Ghanaian situation. If you decide that you will use the private mutuals as the 
spring board for your action, in 4 years, we will be out of the place [i.e. power] so that 
was why [we didn’t collapse the existing mutual health organizations]. And this one, 
the government could actually influence it [the decision]. 
In a manner not clearly visible to the constituencies affected, the layering strategy was intended 
to make the existing schemes disappear over time. Andoh (2013) confirmed this.  
There were communities that had community-based health insurance schemes, we are 
not saying that they should collapse, you go ahead…But if you agree to collapse into 
the district-wide mutual health insurance schemes, you would get funding from the 
government - and this is exactly what happened. It was a nice way of telling them that 
the fragmented schemes…will not help…their financial base is too small and insurance 
thrives on numbers. So there was the need to bring all of them together, but you cannot 
force them. You can incentivize them for them to buy into.  
The above quotes align with the argument of other members of the design team that the 
merging of the schemes was a backstage deal, done without prior consultation with the design 
team members, who thought that giving all the three schemes equal treatment was the best way 
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forward. When asked to explain why the three different insurance policies should be clumped 
under the NHIS, Agyepong (2013) responded, 
There was a particular group that felt threatened because their major opposition was 
coming from the already existing mutuals which were saying we don’t want to be 
swallowed up. We like our independence. We are succeeding. We want a place at this 
table verses the desire that everybody must come under one umbrella. So it was a small 
group of people who had a lot of political links, they changed, I remember so well, they 
changed the wording at the last minute, I saw it and I said what are you doing this is 
going to create a problem and they said we will have private mutuals and public 
mutual…If you want to get any of it, you have to get the public mutual that tolls the 
line. And by virtue of putting that clause in the line, most of the mutuals which could 
have ended up as they put in the category of private mutuals were the already existing 
mutuals and they couldn’t succeed and reach out to the poor …so they all joined the 
public system… Yes, so this is my take on what happened over here, it was a purely 
self-interest motivated [decision]. But, again, it comes to the issue I said about power - 
they did have very strong political links.  
Adjei (2013) confirmed this observation,  
The policy dialogue [at the design stage] was informal sector, formal sector which is 
linked to SSNIT and the private commercial, but when the law came, we have merged 
the formal and informal together and created two private groups, the private mutual and 
private commercial, so people couldn’t recognize the policy dialogue in the nature of 
the way the law was developed. So that caused a lot of agitation and protest from the 
trade union, from even some of the donors, like DANIDA who was supporting us at the 
beginning and several others. But you really needed to pay attention carefully to see 
that they have twisted the system slightly… That was the first time, so the district 
mutuals were set up as private entities and then the money had been collected centrally 
by the government and it was channelling the use of that money through these entities. 
Beyond demonstrating that power plays took place during the reform process, the above 
passages reveal the extent to which the adoption process created additional windows of 
opportunity for strategic actors, such as the minister, who also served as a member of cabinet, 
to shape the NHIS beyond the capabilities of other members of the core design team. It also 
confirms the importance of presidential support for policy change.  
Two months afterwards, i.e., in March 2003, the draft policy was delivered to the 
Attorney General’s Department for review and conversion into a bill for parliamentary 
approval (Daily Graphic Newspaper, May 15, 2003). In Ghana, there are four stages to the 
parliamentary approval process: First Reading, Second Reading, Consideration and Enactment 
(Coleman, 2011). The first reading occurs when the bill is first introduced to parliament, after 
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which a committee is set up to critically study the bill and submit a report for the beginning of 
the second reading. This is followed by consideration and finally enactment.  
The Minister of Health introduced the NHIS bill to parliament for the first reading on 
July 11, 2003, barely a week before parliament went on recess under a certificate of urgency 
or need, a strategy that suggested that parliament would not have adequate time to debate the 
bill before passing it into law (Alatinga, 2011). Due to the nature of the bill, it was referred to 
a parliamentary joint committee on Health and Finance for study; the committee would report 
back to parliament as soon as possible for the beginning of the second reading. As Tony (2013) 
explains, “it was a purely health issue, but because of the funding aspect, the speaker [of 
parliament] thought the two committees should look at it”.  
The committee published key aspects of the bill in the national gazette, requesting 
memoranda from various stakeholders for consideration. In the views of the leaders of interest 
groups interviewed for this study, this was the only opportunity for them to exert their influence 
on the reform (Sorey, 2013). Hence, in 2003, 16 memoranda were submitted to the joint 
parliamentary select committee on the policy, one of which was submitted by Help Age 
(Parliament of Ghana, 2003). In fact, Help Age submitted another memorandum during the 
repeal of the policy in 2012. In the passage below, the Executive Director explains the content 
of both memos.    
The memos were mainly on the reduction of the exemption age for the aged. That was 
because we had then gotten a national aging policy, which purged old age at 60… even 
though we have not given it a legal backing. When I asked, can we reduce the age from 
70 to 60? At the last engagement with the select committee, they were telling me that 
unless they understood the financial implication of reducing the age, it will be difficult 
to do so (Sorsey, 2012).  
However, Help Age was not able to produce the requested information because of lack of 
official data on the subject, leading to the organization’s failure in its pursuit (Sorsey, 2013). 
Expressing his view on the legislative process, Sorsey (2013) noted, 
One problem with policy development in this country is that it is almost like a 
confidential [matter]. We don’t announce policy at the formulation point. We never 
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complete the loop, unless it makes us popular. You listen to it and you will be there and 
they tell you this people submitted this bill to parliament and you ask yourself when did 
they start writing it? You will be reading newspapers and you will come across a 
publication that, this bill has been submitted to parliament for comments, for 
submission or whatever it is. Sometimes they give you a maximum of two weeks when 
you have not even been given a copy of the bill to write your comment. So what 
comments are you talking about? For the national health insurance, we never saw the 
draft bill in order to provide an informed comment. So the memos we were submitting 
were basically memos that were indirectly saying that please, in case you have not 
considered this issue, then consider it. And the memos were not based on the 
observation that a particular article or sub section would be ABCD, so you should 
change it. No! It is a weakness in our parliamentary system. They publish it [a bill] 
when it is not even available to the public, so what do we mean by memo? I have not 
seen the thing [bill], yet you are saying that I should suggest or submit a memo. Why 
didn’t that happen at the ministry level before the drafting of the policy was done? The 
information should be that we are going to draft ABCD policy, so…whatever direction 
or whatever information you think should be considered, let us have it so that we can 
include it.  Why was it not there at the drafting level? 
The implication here is that even legislative opportunities for interest groups to shape 
policy change remain limited; they are not given access to a full draft of a policy to be able to 
properly interrogate its content and shape the reform trajectory in any significant way. In the 
passage below, Sorsey (2013) also identifies other key limitations with respect to memo 
submission during the legislative process. 
You go there and they don’t ask you any relevant question about the memo. They give 
you the opportunity (e.g. help age Ghana) …we are listening to you… We give you 5 
minutes, any question? The members [then responds that] no question. Then they thank 
you ... That is what we are wasting time on. So when you talk about policy development, 
I have my problem with the process already and the [low] quality of the outcome is 
because the process is faulty. That is how it is. 
In addition to being inefficient, the opportunity interest groups had to shape the NHIS through 
the submission of memos was dictated by the parliamentary committee, which was dominated 
by members from the party in power. This made it even more challenging for the interest groups 
to adequately shape the policy. As Sorsey (2013) pointed out, 
You will submit a memo and you will be called to go and defend the memo. Before 
that, they knew we were talking about the issue outside. So the select committee will 
invite you. First they will just invite stakeholders they think can help them and then 
they also invite people who have submitted memo. I am sure if we had not submitted 
memo, they will still invite us but I don’t think that opportunity will be adequate for us 
because if they invite you, it is what they want to hear that you tell them. 
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In the face of these institutional obstacles to change, some groups adopted other means 
to pursue their interests. They used the media, resorted to street protests, wrote letters to core 
government officials and organized direct engagements with key parliamentary actors. For 
example, led by the TUC, labour used street demonstrations and issue statements to protest the 
government’s unilateral decision to deduct 2.5% of their SSNIT contributions to finance the 
NHIS, arguing that it was tantamount to collapsing their bona fide social security fund 
(Kuntulo, 2013; Mensah, 2013; Tony, 2013). The TUC then asked the government to withdraw 
the bill in order to allow labour to decide on the issue (Kuntulo60, 2013).  
Unlike the TUC, however, the African Women Leaders Network dealt directly with key 
parliamentary actors to push family planning onto the NHIS. Although it was referring to the 
2012 amendment rather than the 2003 reform, the account of the organization provides 
additional insights with respect to how interests in Ghana shape policy change despite 
institutional difficulties to do so. As Aboagye61 (2013) described, 
What we did was to engage with the various committees of parliament that had direct 
impact on the passage of the NHIS bill. So we worked with the women’s caucus. We 
worked with the parliamentary health committee and the parliamentary select 
committee on finance. We were in constant engagement with these three caucuses. We 
held a number of meetings. We spoke to the leadership of parliament. We convened 
them in October 2011 just to encourage them and to ensure that the bill was before 
parliament. We did that because from our understanding when a bill goes through a 
number of these processes some items are often dropped off the list. And so we wanted 
to fight and ensure that [family planning] commodities and services were maintained. 
We had opportunities to take some members of parliament from the health committee 
to meet some of our other partners. I think in 2012 we took about two or three sets of 
parliamentarians to different meetings where they had the opportunity to meet with 
some of our other partners in family planning initiative and to share experiences with 
the parliamentarians from other countries that were much more advanced in family 
planning issues…So we wanted to give them the opportunity to learn from and share 
with other parliamentarians from other countries. Basically that was what we did. And 
like I said, it wasn’t a solo effort; it was a joint effort that took a lot of time, maybe one 
and half years. 
                                                          
60 Kuntulo is an executive member of the TUC as the representative and General Secretary of the Health 
Services Workers’ Union. 
61 Aboagye is a representative of the African Women Leaders Network during the NHIS development process. 
186 
 
Basically, the group sort of “shut them up in a room, gave them lunch, gave them per diem, 
talked to them and ensured that they had it [our interests] on the bill” (Aboagye, 2013). Using 
this approach, the group was able to bring key parliamentary actors on board, such as Dr. 
Richard Anane, Matthew Opoku Prempeh, Honorable Cletus Avoka, Muntaka Mubarak and 
Gifty Kusi (Aboagye, 2013). 
Other groups that opposed the passage of the NHIS involved the main opposition 
political party (NDC), the Ghana Network of Mutual Health Organization (GNEMHO) and 
External Agencies such as DANIDA, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the World Bank. Using venues such as parliamentary proceedings, the NDC 
attacked the 2.5% NHIL, arguing that it would worsen ordinary people’s livings (Akanzige, 
2013). Referring to GNEMHO, Coleman (2011) argued that “by 2002, the community 
prepayment schemes had matured into an interest group ready to influence public policy” (p. 
24). Through meetings and media reports, the members of GNEMHO also complained about 
how the law discriminated against them and asked the government to give them the same status 
as the government-sponsored DMHISs (Coleman, 2011). As key stakeholders in CBHISes, 
external agencies such as DANIDA and the World Bank also joined in the opposition to the 
policy, asking the government to give up its role in health insurance to the existing CBHISes 
(Bruno62, 2013). As Seddoh (2013) noted, “most of them were already financing community-
based schemes and anything national [such as the NHIS], they didn’t trust government to do it. 
So they were not prepared to centralize social insurance as it were”. Adjei (2013) added that, 
“DANIDA, who was even supporting us a bit, was interested in community based health 
insurance schemes”. Confirming the above, Akor (2013) also indicated, 
DANIDA started supporting district health insurance in some parts of the country to 
assist communities or districts that wanted to start their own health insurance. And they 
provided them with technical expertise … at that time. Chris Atim was the lead person 
in Ghana with a PHR [Partnerships for Health Reform] group to provide technical or 
                                                          
62 Bruno is an officer of the Planning and Monitoring Unit of the National Health Insurance Authority. 
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capacity building for those who wanted to start their own scheme. But there was a 
problem in terms of how fast they were establishing the schemes in the districts. It took 
a long time. And even from their experience, we should have looked into why the 
growth of the existing schemes was slow so as to modify our strategy in terms of 
establishing new ones. That was also why people thought that we were moving [too] 
fast.  
Thus, from all indications international actors were not in support of the government’s agenda 
to introduce the NHIS. As such, they “threatened to go to the presidency and parliament to go 
and protest it” (Seddoh, 2013). Confirming one of their threats, Afriyie (2013) noted, 
I don’t want to mention the western countries; they actually wrote letters - it’s not like 
they whispered, formal letter – indicating why our proposal was flawed and why they 
thought it won’t work behind my back. They didn’t bring it to me and it was a couple 
of days to the passage of the bill… And it was coming from a western government that, 
I want to believe, meant well. For Kufour [the president] to have read their letter, and 
yet said that he was going with Afriyea’s [my] proposal was the ultimate compliment. 
Beyond showing that the president supported the reformers, the above quote suggests 
the extent to which their close relationship with the president, as discussed above, may have 
contributed to deepening the president’s faith in the reform, as well as in keeping NHIS high 
on the political agenda. In fact, the decision to introduce the NHIS was also risky because at 
that time donors were needed to support the implementation and sustenance of the policy since 
Ghana was a HIPC. External agencies identified this limitation and tried to exploit it. As Anane 
(2013) indicated, “I remember Friedrich Ebert Foundation [of Germany] came to me and said 
that…I should rather make it a [community-based] mutual scheme and that they were ready to 
help if I made it a mutual scheme. I listened to their presentation and the only question I asked 
was whether that was what they had in their country. They didn’t answer”.  
In view of the above protests and the polarized nature of the discussions surrounding 
the bill, the house gave the committee permission to organize additional stakeholder 
consultations across the country (Kusi, 2013). These stakeholder consultations offered 
opportunities for the committee, together with members of the design team, to address 
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stakeholders’ concerns (Kusi63, 2013). As Akor (2013) noted, “parliament had to move us [the 
design team] around the country to also go and listen to the people’s view to inform the bill”. 
Depending on the committee and design team’s own assessment regarding the credibility of 
the complaints and how much they could affect the fate of the policy, strategies ranging from 
inaction, sidelining, framing, compromise or compensation to accommodation was employed. 
For example, the committee saw the opposition of labour as a credible threat not only because 
unions were the true owners of the social security fund, but also because, by that time, some of 
them had formed their own mutual health insurance schemes. As Afriyie (2013) observed, 
“when we were starting, I noticed that the labour group had gone far in forming a health 
insurance scheme of some sort with the collaboration and support of ILO and they were even 
on the verge of receiving technical and financial support from the ILO, and here we came - we 
brought a system we wanted to subsume it on them-so they were very upset”. Additionally, as 
the minister added, “they were going on labour agitation... and it had to take a lot of skills from 
me and my officials…Their Secretary General had taken a militant stand. We managed them 
but they were still unhappy” (Afriyie, 2013). In addition to this, labour unions are typically the 
most vibrant vested interests in Ghana, so the inability to address their concerns was interpreted 
as potentially disastrous for both the policy and the government in power (Hutchful, 2002). 
With the 2004 elections just a year away, it was thought that if the concerns of labour were not 
addressed, it could adversely affect the fate of the policy, as well as the government’s chances 
for re-election. As Afriyie (2013) highlighted, “time was in essence, three years on our mandate 
politically speaking, so there was no time. So fortunately, 2003, the bill was passed into law 
(Act 650)”. Yet, the reformers also knew that without the 2.5% contribution from labor, the 
policy would not survive in terms of funding (Adjei, 2013).  
                                                          
63 Kusi was a member of the parliamentary delegation that travelled across the country to solicit ideas from the 
grassroots in order to enrich the NHIS.  
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Based on these considerations, the committee decided to enter into negotiations with 
labour, a process that ended with a seemingly generous compensation for labour. For example, 
as Adjei (2013) notes in the following passage, 
There was a compromise with the labour group; we could have charged them at the 
point of registration or taken their monies from their payroll for the social health 
insurance policy. Basically, they were not ready to contribute from their salary towards 
health insurance. So what the government said to the workers was that, ok, we will 
borrow from your SSNIT contribution because we need the money to finance the 
scheme. We will borrow 2.5% from your social [security] contribution. When it comes 
to the time you will be going on retirement, we are hoping that your social security 
money would have been adequately invested. It will make up for the money that we 
have borrowed so that you would not lose any benefit from your insurance when you 
go on retirement. 
However, as to whether the money taken from the workers’ social security fund to finance the 
NHIS was really a loan is still in doubt. As Seddoh (2013) argued when asked about the deal, 
Actually borrowing is yes and no. Yes, because you are taking workers money that is 
guaranteed by government.... You are borrowing in the sense that it’s not your money; 
you are taking what is for workers. It belongs to a particular group. But you are not 
paying it back. What government has done is to guarantee that if any worker at any time 
goes on pension, it [the 2.5% deduction to finance the NHIS] will not affect their 
pension. 
A representative from labour also confirmed the above argument. He said, “government 
literally gave a guarantee that in the event that the monies (i.e. the 2.5%) they were taking were 
creating a problem for SSNIT, government will make good [available] whatever shortfall 
arises” (Kuntulo, 2013). However, labour was also exempted from making additional payments 
in terms of their premium on top of their 2.5% contribution, which the government had agreed 
to take as a loan (Kuntulo, 2013). The implication of this is that, in addition to guaranteeing 
their funds, the government is also providing free health care for labour under the NHIS. Since 
pensioners are also exempted from premium payment under the policy, labour enjoys free 
health care till death, as long as this aspect of the policy is maintained. This may be interpreted 
as unfair to workers in the informal sector who are required to pay an annual premium even 
though they generally earn less income than their counterparts in the formal sector (McIntyre, 
2007). The argument about the unfairness of the policy, nevertheless, depends on whether the 
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government is able to guarantee the social security fund in the event of a bankruptcy. My 
investigation, however, revealed that the concession given to labour in the NHIS law was part 
of the strategies employed by the reformers to build additional constituencies in support of the 
policy change. This argument is based on the observation that no terms on the said loan 
appeared to have been officially signed between labour and government.  
In order to solidify their achievements with labour, the reformers buttressed the 
negotiation and compensation strategies with ideational frames. For example, the NHIS was 
commonly framed as being in the interests of workers. The reform team also informed labour 
that, “you must live healthy because if you don’t and you die, there will be no pension. So if 
you keep this 2.5%, and you are sick and you die, then you won’t go on retirement to be able 
to enjoy the 2.5% of your pension. So use the 2.5% now to secure your health so that you can 
live and enjoy your pension” (Tony, 2013). In a town-hall meeting, Amoh (2013) used a similar 
strategy. He asked, 
What do you use pension for in your old age? It is mostly health issues [he answered 
his own question]. This health insurance will take out your household health 
expenditure off your budget - individual and household health budget. If you have 
children in the household, grandchildren and the rest, they are all covered by the health 
insurance. You don’t have to pay anything. Your wife will have to pay for her own 
insurance, but if both of you are aged, then you don’t have to pay for health insurance. 
So, for your diabetes and whatever disease you have, you don’t have to pay anything… 
So when I told them this at the Teachers Hall, they agreed. 
Furthermore, the reformers built a strong public opinion at the grassroots level in support of 
change. As Afriyie (2013) indicated, 
I made sure that the rural people were on my side and for a long time, the air waves had 
been liberated, you should hear somebody from Domaa Ahenkro [a small town] 
speaking about health insurance, especially. Remember that even before the bill was 
passed, some institutions were given healthcare benefits so we will go to Ejisu Juabeng 
[district] and bring those who support the policy to speak good on the policy on our 
behalf.  
By directing attention to the informal sector, they came to be much more knowledgeable about 
the NHIS than even the formal sector. Afriyie (2013) argued that it was the support from those 
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in the informal sector and rural areas that enabled reformers to kill labour and the NDC’s 
resistance to the policy. 
The labour movement thought that they had put on a good fight. But at that time, the 
political environment was such that the labour group would have been labelled as 
selfish and all that. That’s why I am a politician. Because the informal sector was such 
a huge group, before we introduced the policy, I had made sure …that we had 
marshalled them on the social front. Therefore, we heard people saying that let’s bring 
it on, let’s bring it on…We went round the whole country because we thought that there 
were odd voices here and there, led by the NDC, our political opponent. 
The reformers also solicited the support of the media. For instance, as Seddoh (2013) noted, 
“we trained them [the media] in the things [about NHIS] in order to create diversion 
sometimes...We used them in diversion tactics [to divert labour’s attention from the SSNIT 
contributions]. When we were negotiating around the SSNIT, we kept on the open feed in the 
VAT debate which we knew we had already won to be able to divert their attention from the 
SSNIT issue. We deliberately manipulated the system”.  
It was not only labour, however, that resisted the 2.5% SSNIT contributions. The 
executives of SSNIT also did. To counteract them, as Afriyie (2015) noted, 
I just wrote a memo to cabinet about SSNIT. I said that I was not talking about 
embezzlement, I was not talking about corruption…Those were not my beef. My beef 
was that they were having it too easy: they were taking so much money from Ghanaians 
and paid lower benefits to them. So I brought a paper, a complete paper about the 
industrial average [of pension payment] across Africa and that was what convinced my 
government...otherwise, you know this institutional thing, they would be fighting me. 
So we got our way. We said to the SSNIT people, we were forcing their management 
to give workers the same benefit that they were given in the past [i.e. before the NHIS] 
and that the government was going to act as a guarantor, so that even if they defaulted 
[because of lack of funding], government would then stand in and that’s what squared 
the argument. 
In this context, in addition to the support obtained from the above appointment, the reform 
team researched the operations of SSNIT in order to obtain key information to sort of 
blackmail, or blame the perceived collapse of the social security fund on, the leadership of 
SSNIT. The team also managed to convince the government, which was determined to take 
money from SSNIT. As Seddoh (2013) noted, “SSNIT did not have a say because the president 
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made a decision, SSNIT didn’t really have a say. They were comfortable. They said that yes, 
of course, you can borrow the money. They used the term borrow”.  
Unlike labour, the NDC’s request to withdraw the 2.5% NHIL, which it sometimes 
referred to as VAT, was thrown out. The committee used these opportunities to explain how 
different from one another the VAT and the NHIL were, despite their similarities (Agyepong 
& Adjei, 2008). Also, instead of imagining that it would create hardship, the committee stated 
that the NHIL would relieve Ghanaians of the flawed user fee model implemented by the NDC 
(Tony, 2013). To a large extent, the design team also portrayed the NHIL (VAT) as a way to 
bridge the inequality between the rich and the poor. This can be seen when Afriyie (2015) 
commented that,  
Like I have done with the watchman, I said, look at me, a medical doctor, I earn so 
much. When you take 2.5% of my salary, how much? A lot! ... I also told them that 
when they drank beer [foreign wine], there was VAT on it. When they took akpeteshi 
[indigenous wine], there was no VAT on it. When they took palm wine [local wine], 
cassava [local food stuff], there were no VAT on them, but when they took spaghetti 
[foreign food], they went to restaurant [because they were rich], and when they smoked 
cigar, there were VAT on them. Those were the languages that we used, and the people 
embraced them. 
Using messages like this, the reformers intended to explain to the ordinary Ghanaian 
that the NHIL was in their best interests, as opposed to the interests of the rich, and so they 
must support the government in introducing the policy. It was also intended to create the 
impression among the majority poor in Ghana that opponents of the NHIL were the few rich 
people in the country, against whom the poor should protest. In the end, the NDC’s concerns 
were branded as mere political gimmick rather than as the result of a detached scientific policy 
analysis (Tony, 2013).  
In the same manner, the concerns of GNEMHO and external agencies such as the World 
Bank were discounted. It was possible to do so because some members of the committee saw 
the association as a potential competitor to the government’s agenda and their own personal 
interests (Agyepong, 2013). GNEMHO’s challenge was that not only did it not possess the 
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power to veto the bill, but also many of its members were located in rural areas and, they were 
few in number. As such, they could not turn the political landscape against any policy change 
on their own (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008). For powerful external actors, as indicated above, 
government limited its engagements with them in order to prevent them from stopping the 
reform.  
By 19 August 2003, when the committee finished dealing with the above matters and 
submitted its report, parliament had already gone on recess. Nevertheless, members were 
recalled on emergency grounds in order to consider the bill. The members from the opposition 
failed to show up, giving the NPP the opportunity to neglect key legislative procedures in order 
to fast-track the approval process. For instance, as Coleman (2011) indicates,  
The Joint committee on Health and Finance presented its report. That same day the 
Minister of Health requested the suspension of Standing Order 80 (1)…On August 20, 
2003, the bill reached the Consideration Stage. The Minister of Health requested the 
suspension of Standing Order 128(1)… the Consideration Stage continued through 
August 21, 22, 25, and 26. On August 26, 2003, the Minister of Health requested the 
suspension of Standing Order 131 (1) (p. 29). 
In other words, both the second reading and the motion to move to the second reading were 
pursued the same day, contrary to the 48 hours interval required under Standing Order 80 (1). 
A similar thing happened when the bill was moved from the second reading to the consideration 
stage on the following day, instead of the 48 hours required by Standing Order 128(1). The law 
was also enacted that same day (August 26, 2003), without the 24-hour interval required under 
Standing Order 131 (1). While suspending those standing orders was not necessarily illegal, 
they provided an additional explanation as to how the strategic choices of the reformers shaped 
the final policy outcome. In September 2004, the LI to guide the implementation of the NHIS 
was passed in a similar manner.  
 
6.3.4. Policy Implementation 
In the passage below, Adusei (2013) explains the importance of policy implementation. 
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If you have a law and you don’t create an institution and enabling environment for it to 
operate, it is still a law. So we have so many laws in this country which are just laws. 
Health insurance could have been one of those laws if we didn’t actually put in 
conscious efforts to set up institutions at various levels, especially at the district level 
to make it happen.  
 
In other words, the reformers saw the implementation of the policy as crucial. The first strategy 
the reformers employed to achieve change effectively, while at the same time guarding the 
policy against being hijacked by the existing CBHISes and their partners, including powerful 
external actors, was to decentralise implementation power to the local governments, 
particularly the District Assemblies.  As Adusei (2013) states, 
We gave money to every DCE [District Chief Executive] to set it [DMHIS] up. To set 
the programme up is not just by word of mouth, but you have to get a building, get a 
place, employ people into it, get the resources they need, issue health insurance cards, 
recruit IT people and all that. And we wanted the districts to actually do that…We got 
consultants for the district chief executives. Consultants who have crafted the law and 
who were part of us were recruited to go to the various districts. We gave them money, 
paid them money to help them set up the schemes.  
This means that, in addition to decentralising authority over implementation, staunch 
supporters of the policy originating from the core reform team led the implementation process 
on the ground (Amoh, 2013). For instance, the chair of the design process was appointed the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the NHIA (Agyepong, 2013). In addition, some of the 
political associates during the design process were made consultants, and were tasked with 
helping set up the DMHISs (Adusei, 2013).  
Moreover, like all the other stages of the policy process discussed here, the 
implementation process received strong political backing since the president had made it “part 
of the terms of reference of the DCEs, the District Chief Executives. They were asked to set up 
the mutual health insurance schemes in every district. And it was part of the terms of reference 
of the Regional Ministers as well” (Adusei, 2013). In other words, the president’s appointees 
in the various local government units (districts and the regions) were charged with paying 
particular attention to the implementation of the policy in their respective jurisdictions. Adusei 
(2013) notes that, as a result of the decentralization of the implementation process, the team 
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was able to make credible achievements “within a very short time”. Afriyie (2013) confirms 
this.  
As at 30th November 2004, for example, there were 15 [district] mutual health 
insurance schemes that were managing benefits and claims. 34 of them were ready to 
be operational and 44 who were collecting contributions…from the informal sector... 
Early as November 2004, even … Jaman North, Jaman South, Tanor North, Tanor 
South, Brekum, Domaa, Akuapim North, Damango West, Asuajaman, Nkuransah, 
Ajusu Jwabeng, Peshi, Okowoman, West Gonja were managing claims and benefits … 
That means we had moved very, very, fast for example in the [district] mutual health 
scheme. A key manager, an accountant, publicity officer, claims manager, management 
information systems manager, data entry clerk and so on and so forth had been 
recruited. And so [in terms of] personnel, we had 58 districts with all positions filled, 5 
positions for 52 schemes and so on and so forth. By 2004, key achievements involved 
the LI, administration instructions…Our challenges were capacity development, ICT 
networking, accreditation, costing identification system. Before we even brought in 
health insurance scheme, one thing that people did not know …was that, every place in 
this country where there was a human being had to have a unique address system. Even 
as I speak to you now, if you go to the villages, almost every village has a unique NHIS 
number and we did this from Apolonia to Zuaru, it was a big undertaken. We didn’t 
make any farce about it because without a unique address system, we could not run an 
effective insurance scheme. Because I had brought in a decentralized system, this thing 
went on quietly even without Ghanaians being aware of it. The key success was that we 
did it and it was the platform on which this health insurance was done. 
Beyond specifying the achievements of the decentralised approach, the above passage reveals 
the activities undertaken to implement the new policy. Some of those activities included 
providing residential address systems, recruiting personnel, accrediting providers, adopting 
claims management systems and issuing identification cards. Another benefit of the 
decentralised approach was that it enabled the various districts to take ownership of the policy. 
As Adusei (2013) explains,  
We were thinking that communities themselves should organise and relate to the health 
insurance, but we believed that if we have community based schemes, how many 
communities do we have in Ghana? More than 38,000 communities in Ghana. Are we 
going to have 38,000 schemes? So we thought that even if they should all be 
coordinated at one point at the district, that, at least, we can have communities 
representation at the district level in the form of boards. And then they can actually 
mobilize funds and bring it to the district-based boards. So we had district-based boards. 
We were proposing that in each community we should have representatives in the 
communities who will mobilize the community, get money from the community. 
People will pay the insurance premium or insurance whatever from community and 
they can bring it to the district and, of course, they will take their percentages, from 
whatever they bring. Yes, that is how we were seeing it and that is the reason why we 
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thought that it should be a scheme where the districts and the communities will work 
together to operate under the District Assembly.  
Besides it being “owned” and managed by the localities, the decentralised approach also 
facilitated the implementation process. As Amoh (2013) indicates, all that was left for the 
reformers to do “was to supervise and regulate their [the schemes’] activities and monitor 
[them]”. The effect of doing so was that the policy was quickly rolled out across the country. 
Consequently, as Amoh (2013) adds, “we took them [our opponents] by surprise … They 
realised that we were really on top of the issues”. Adusei (2013) confirms the above claim, 
indicating that, “if we hadn’t done this [the decentralisation], we wouldn’t have been able to 
implement it [the policy]”.  
Beyond its ability to help with implementing the policy, the decentralisation approach 
also allowed reformers to build new constituencies to guard over the implementation process. 
Some of these new constituencies involved the various District Assemblies, board members, 
Regional Ministers, chiefs of the localities, and personnel of the NHIS such as managers of the 
schemes, as well as officers of the various health insurance councils and boards. Indeed, this 
strategy was crucial, as some labour groups had still not acquiesced to the reformers despite 
the generous compromises they obtained during the adoption process (Daily Graphic, 
September 25, 2003). In fact, after the implementation had begun, some labour groups 
demonstrated on the streets, threatening to sue the government for taking their pension fund. 
Turnout, however, was low (CSO 08, 2013). In turn, the Minister of Health took advantage of 
the situation to further engage labour and once again frame the social security deductions as in 
the interest of the workers (Coleman, 2011). In the end, as the labour officer again emphasised, 
“we realized that government had no other alternative...we realised we would be serving a 
national cause” (CSO 08, 2013).  
Besides labour, the decentralised approach enabled the reformers to outwit external 
actors who had initially expressed misgivings about the policy. Agyepong (2013) confirms this 
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observation, arguing that, “it was as things moved on and we came out with a law and we 
started doing this and people realised we were serious then we started getting more support and 
… now the pendulum has shifted where we are getting a lot of external support”. Describing 
this situation, Andoh (2013) notes that the external actors actually “wanted to associate with 
the success”. However, it appears that some of the international agencies also voluntarily gave 
up on their initial position. As Adjei (2013) notes, 
But the good thing about the World Bank was that somewhere along the line they came 
in. In fact, I met one of them in South Africa and said please come and see what we are 
doing and advice, (he was an old friend, Alex Perg), and so he came in and saw what 
we were doing … we have passed a law and all that. And he said, if this is what the 
government wants, we would, the World Bank, have to respond to the government 
needs. And so they went back to their headquarters, they sent a team, which looked at 
it [the policy] and said, well, it sounds crazy but this is what the government is doing 
and we will be committed to supporting it.  
According to Adjei (2013), after the above incident, the World Bank “made provision for 15 
million dollars grants to be used to run the insurance” in 2005, although “it didn’t get 
operational until 2007”. Nevertheless, according to some of the officials, “at that time…the 
money they were bringing in was not even need[ed]”, Amoh (2013) concurred. In the end, the 
operationalization of the World Bank’s support on the ground was delayed because, initially, 
NHIA officials “didn’t want them [the World Bank] to have a say in the health insurance and 
therefore didn’t want their money” (Amoh, 2013). 
The first CEO of the NHIA and most of the consultants on the implementation process 
were relieved of their posts about three years into the policy’s implementation on allegations 
of financial malfeasance (Andoh, 2013). After this, what Agyepong’s (2013) calls the “shift in 
the pendulum” from local to external actors in NHIS implementation began. As indicated 
above, this shift was related to monetary assistance external actors offered. However, other 
strategies with ideational inclination were also employed to support implementation. For 
example, as Amoh (2013) notes, the international agencies were engaged in “making proposals 
and taking these people [authorities of the NHIA] to England, Holland, America, Canada and 
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all of these places, to go and look at their insurance schemes... They [also] tried to tell them 
that what we are doing here [in Ghana] is not correct”. Thus, as Amoh (2013) adds, “by the 
time those guys [officers of the NHIS] came back, all of them, their minds had changed,” and 
now supported external advice and involvement. Nonetheless, as the next section will show, 
this new development tended to limit local initiative and innovation, which undermined the 
potential sustainability of the new policy (Amoh, 2013). 
In addition to the adoption of the decentralised approach described above, the reformers 
employed ideational framing strategies to increase support for the policy. In rural areas, for 
instance, reformers capitalised on knowledge of the local solidarity initiatives explained above 
to promote the core idea of the NHIS. For example, as Andoh (2013) noted, “we were 
drumming in the ears of the people that the NHIS is just like the funeral donations, it’s like the 
susu that you make towards your finances. [The only difference is that] this one is towards your 
health so whether the person has it or not let the person contribute what he can and then we 
pool it together, government will support it and then everybody understood, so the concept was 
already there”.  
As part of their communication strategy, the reformers used the media to spread pro-
NHIS discourse throughout the country. As a member of the implementation team (Andoh, 
2013) explains,  
I had to court the friendship of the media and use them to sing the good side of 
insurance. So I remember I was invited to Peace FM and on one of their programs (In 
those days there was one program that people really listened to, called parliament on 
radio. I don’t know whether they still have it. I think they did it on every Monday at 
8pm)…They talked about political issues so they brought parliamentarians to come and 
speak on hot issues so when it got to that time everybody in Ghana wanted to listen. So 
at that time they told them that today we are not bringing a politician but we are also 
bringing something that is dear to politics, health insurance, so everybody should tune 
in their radios and ask all the questions that they have. ..I went to explain a whole lot of 
things to them and they took it up and then subsequently I was invited to TV3 they also 
had a program on Tuesdays and Wednesdays…it was a Twi program, very nice, but 
these days they don’t do it anymore...They also invited me to come and speak to health 
insurance. And when I went on Tuesday a feedback came that they wanted a repeat of 
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the program so the following Thursday I went and those who were not satisfied with 
questions or didn’t have time to ask questions at the previous time also did. 
As suggested above, the media also provided a platform for reformers to further explain key 
issues that were not clear to the public. This helped build additional constituencies in support 
of the NHIS. However, as Seddoh (2013) emphasises, the media “didn’t understand what was 
going on”, so they provided platforms to the reformers to sell their ideas rather than shaping 
the policy change process themselves. 
Another factor of the success of the policy’s implementation, as Alatinga (2011), noted, 
was that the schemes recruited “managers with political affiliations to the ruling NPP 
government” (p. 51). These recruits gave the implementation all the necessary political support. 
However, most of them had no “prior training on health insurance and how insurance works 
generally” (p. 51). One of the scheme managers noted that some of them had to work on the 
basis of “trial and error” as a result (Koah, 2013). Given that health insurance was relatively a 
new policy in the country, and that many of the personnel they recruited were not familiar with 
the concept, training programmes would certainly have helped to better implement the policy. 
However, because instituting the reform rather than technical expediency was the ultimate 
concern of the reformers (Rajkotia, 2007), training was neglected. The schemes did also 
employ a significant number of university and polytechnic graduates and service personnel 
who just needed jobs rather than necessarily being political (Seddoh et al., 2011). But, even 
then, the focus appeared to have been more on using them to boost support for the new policy 
and enhancing the government’s reputation for job creation than as providing technical support 
for the policy. 
Implementation of the subsidy system for DMHISs, as well as the generous benefit 
coverage, the membership premium and the exemptions, also enticed a significant number of 
people to enrol in the policy (John, 2013). As a result, not only had several schemes emerged 
nationwide by the end of 2005, as indicate above, but also, enrolment into the schemes soared. 
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For example, by mid-2010, about two-thirds of the Ghanaian population was enrolled in the 
schemes (Kotoh, 2013), and service utilisation had climbed remarkably (Asante & Aikins, 
2008; Akum, 2014). However, increased enrolment disproportionately increased claim 
payments. They increased 367% between 2005 and 2006 (National Health Insurance Authority, 
2010, cited in Akum, 2014). Besides the large enrolment, another factor believed to have 
contributed to the high claim payment was corruption and mismanagement on the part of some 
scheme managers and providers (Afriyie, 2013). 
There have been other implementation challenges that are worth considering in this 
study. The first involves the implementation of the NHIL. As Awittey (2013) notes, instead of 
the 2.5% NHIL being deposited into a separate fund, it was and still deposited into “the 
consolidated fund, from which all government expenditure is made”. Consequently, “the 
service provider who is supposed to be paid 60 days or 90 days after he or she provides a 
service and submits a claim is not being paid” (Awittey, 2013). An official of the Ministry of 
Finance explained this problem on both institutional and pragmatic grounds, arguing that, as a 
tax revenue, the NHIL could only be legitimately collected by the Ministry of Finance, the sole 
body in charge of financing and managing national coffers (Tony, 2013). In other words, 
despite being an earmarked tax, the NHIL cannot be collected directly by the MoH or the NHIA 
because they do not have the mandate to do so. The challenge with adding the NHIL to the 
consolidated fund is that the government could be tempted to use it for purposes other than the 
NHIS (Akor, 2013).  
Inquiring as to why the NHIS was generating less revenue than expected, the 
politicisation of the implementation process came up as a reason, among others. For instance, 
as Sorsey (2013) notes, “immediately this thing started, politicians started going out…we 
brought national health insurance and the only amount you have to pay to get free service is 
7.2 Ghana cedis and nobody talked about the 48 Ghana cedis [the maximum amount that the 
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rich were required to pay] …, so everybody ended up paying 7.2 Ghana cedis”. Also, many 
people reportedly refused to enrol into the NHIS at the early stage of the implementation 
process for partisan reasons - they thought that registering with the scheme would generate 
support for the party in power at the expense of the opposition party, which they sympathized 
with. Hence, as Andoh (2013) notes, “the registration was very low in those regions” where 
the opposition NDC party dominated.  
Another factor that adversely affected enrolment into the NHIS is the poor service 
provision under the policy. Sorsey (2013) explained that, 
People with special needs, older people the issue of physical strength to even go through 
the system - that tedious process of getting your health care service covered by national 
health insurance. And the fact remains that they are the last people who are seen in the 
hospitals, they will rather see the cash and carry people and the reason being that the 
national health insurance authority delay so much in paying providers for national 
health insurance. If hospitals will be concentrating on national health insurance, they 
will collapse. It is until recently that we have not heard about them - once a while, I 
think twice, thrice a year, you see them quarrelling with the National Health Insurance 
Authority. As I speak now, we are in 2013, I think the latest they got was around 
December 2012 in terms of payment and so you see hospitals doing a balancing up. If 
I give you a national health insurance it will take between three to six months for refund. 
Meanwhile, I am supposed to stock my basic drugs so I need to balance it. So sometimes 
you see real impediments, disguised impediments on the way of people having national 
health insurance card but that is how the hospitals also survive 
In addition to the above issues, there are frequent reports of shortages of drugs as a 
result of delays in claims payments to the providers (Awittey, 2013; Mensah, 2013). Many 
interviewees also complained about finding it difficult to renew their membership as a result 
of inefficient renewal procedures and methods. For example, as Sorsey (2013) indicates, 
“somebody heard about the scheme, joins but because of illiteracy, he cannot even determine 
when his card expires. He goes to the hospital before he realizes that he cannot be given 
services”. He adds that this is a major “challenge in the rural areas”, where the majority of the 
population lives (Sorsey, 2013). Despite the above challenges, the NHIS has been sustained. 
How that was achieved is the focus of the next section. 
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6.3.5. Sustainability 
Right from its inception, the sustainability of the NHIS was questioned. A year into the policy’s 
implementation, for instance, the ILO (2006) issued a report arguing that the generous 
exemption package under the policy could render the NHIS financially nonviable in the short 
to medium term. Oxfam’s report in 2011 also argued that enrolment of the NHIS was lower 
than the cumulative value and that the NHIS should be reversed to a NHS system by 2015 as a 
result (Apoya & Marriott, 2011). A World Bank report projected that the program would go 
bankrupt by 2013 (Saleh, 2012; Schieber, Cashin, Saleh, & Lavado, 2012). However, it is not 
only international organisations that predicted the failure of the policy. In her study involving 
16 communities in the Central and the Eastern regions of Ghana, Kotoh (2013) noted to her 
amazement how anxiety about the sustainability of the scheme was present at the grassroots 
level, particularly among members of the opposition party, NDC. One of her respondents 
explained why he did not enrol in the scheme: “I thought the NHIS cannot survive any change 
in government and that it was going to be a ‘nine-day wonder’ and will die when a new 
government comes to power” (quoted in Kotoh, 2013, p. 81). In Kotoh (2013), some officers 
of the scheme recounted how they had also been chased out of certain villages purported to be 
strongholds of the opposition party. Another big challenge to the policy emerged in the 2008 
elections, when the NDC promised to transform the NHIS into a “one time premium” (NDC, 
2008, p. 6). Although its precise nature is still unclear, the NDC’s plan is generally believed to 
resemble the NHS system discussed in the Chapter Four of this study.  
Nevertheless, the NHIS has been sustained. There are a number of reasons why this has 
been so. The first factor involves the government’s high level of political commitment to the 
policy over time. For instance, as indicated, the NHIS has been directly linked to the country’s 
poverty reduction strategy (NDPC, 2003). The government has stood by the policy despite the 
criticism of key international actors, mentioned above. For example, when Oxfam’s (2011) 
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report was released, the NHIA quickly reviewed its processes and, when it found that the report 
was not completely accurate, issued a rejoinder. The government has also been consistent with 
its budgetary allocation to the scheme, although this process has recently been challenged by 
the Ministry of Finance’s inability to release the NHIL in a timely manner (Akor, 2013).  
The second reason for sustainability is the scheme’s ability to create new constituencies, 
something it does far quicker than expected. The World Bank confirmed this unexpected 
achievement in a 2012 report: 
When the [NHIS] fund was created, earlier estimates (World Bank, 2007) had 
suggested …that registration into NHIS would be much lower. However, registration 
has grown faster than expected, and credit for this goes certainly to the exemption 
policy to capture the vulnerable population, and to the efforts made by the DMHIS, 
who being at the district levels, benefit from subsidies for coverage of the exempt 
groups. They had all the incentives to increase enrollment and increase them fast. 
However, as registration grew, so did use of health services, and claims (Saleh, 2012, 
p. 64) 
In fact, the above World Bank report not only confirms the high interest the NHIS has generated 
over the years, but also the design teams’ skills in ensuring significant policy change despite 
the odds. Over time, as indicated above, even key actors, such as the World Bank, labour, 
GNEHMO and the NDC, that were strongly opposed to the policy have shifted allegiance, 
becoming the policy’s key advocates. For example, a year after Oxfam’s report, the World 
Bank responded. Their report indicated not just their opposition to Oxfam’s recommendation, 
but also that the status quo be maintained. As it notes, 
replacing the NHIS with a national health service would not fix the system’s 
problems…the fundamental design features and operational policies of the NHIS share 
many of the advantages often attributed to a national health service (for example, 
progressive general revenue funding, coverage of vulnerable groups) and that current 
policy directions will endow the NHIS with the basic advantages of a formal health 
insurance model in terms of strategic purchasing and purchaser-provider splits. 
Refining the structural and operational features of the NHIS to ensure its evolution as 
an effective public insurance organization is a much more sensible approach than going 
back to a fully general revenue–funded national health service with free care to all 
provided through a publically owned and operated delivery system. (Schieber et al., 
2012, p. 9). 
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According to the Bank official interviewed on the subject, the Word Bank has also been 
supportive of the NHIS in financial, technical and logistical terms (Addo, 2013). This argument 
confirms that external actors have indeed taken over NHIS implementation overtime. In 
particular, the Bank established a five-year project with the NHIA in order to address some of 
the key bottlenecks which accompanied the implementation of the NHIS. This includes 
streamlining the financial and operational management systems by training the NHIC, the 
DMHISs and the health care providers on efficient financial management (Addo, 2013). The 
Bank is also helping to improve the claim management system. Indeed, its 2012 report was 
important inspiration for the policy’s 2012 amendment that converted the policy into a unified 
model and shifted the program from a fee-for-service system to a capitation system of claim 
payments. These amendments have reduced the bureaucracy involved in the management of 
the scheme and allowed it to reduce costs (Anane, 2013; Sorsey, 2013). They also “opened a 
window for the funds to be invested in improving the capacity [of the policy] … and to invest 
in any other facilitating program to promote access to health care services as determined by the 
minister” (Sorsey, 2013). Programmes such as call centres for members to share their 
grievances to the authorities have also been set up. A programme that seeks to engage a 
software developer to develop mobile phones that would remind the illiterates to renew their 
membership has also been proposed (Sorsey, 2013). Another proposal involves allowing rural 
people to pay their contributions using a “barter” system (Akosa, 2013). 
The extent to which the above technical amendments have contributed to the sustenance 
of the policy over time, however, is in doubt. For example, some respondents indicated that, 
despite its potential to reduce corruption, the 2012 reform has actually created a higher 
tendency for moral hazard (Adusei, 2013; Amoh, 2013). As Amoh (3013) states, “until we go 
back to the district mutual health insurance scheme where we had the boards, representation 
from the communities at the district level, who were helping in the management of the scheme, 
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we will never find any viable scheme. And right now the NHIS staff are condoning with the 
health facilities to dupe the system”. Another respondent confirmed this, claiming that the 
centralization project has limited the support of local authorities in terms of identifying people 
that truly deserve to be exempted under the policy (Adusei, 2013). It has also reportedly 
reduced the “local ownership” character of the policy, making it vulnerable to a possible 
reversal by opponents on the ground. Also, the suggestion discussed above which would allow 
rural people to pay their contributions using a “barter” system has not been implemented 
(Akosa, 2013). Consequently, the renewal rate of registrants continues to be low, leading to 
lower revenue than expected, as well as significant delays in reimbursing service providers 
(Nortey, 2013; Sorsey, 2013). As well, fraudulent behaviours on the part of officials of the 
NHIS have persisted despite the collapse of the DMHISs (Amoh, 2013). 
Besides the support from the World Bank, a majority of the respondents indicated that 
what has been keeping the NHIS alive over time is the bi-partisan support it has attained over 
the years (Akanzige, 2013; Akor, 2013; Kusi, 2013; Sorsey, 2013). For instance, as Andoh 
(2013) notes, “now there is this bi-partisan acceptance to health insurance and that is the 
strength that we have now”. Asking whether there would be a policy change anytime soon, 
Niitreb64 (2013) also responded that, “I don’t see that for now. There were other promises of 
one time premium [that failed] so it is very difficult to go back, and say that you are undoing 
all these”. The bi-partisan support for the NHIS is also clear in the parliamentary consensus on 
the 2012 amendment of the NHIS. Surprisingly, the NDC government, which had not only 
opposed the NHIS in 2003, when the policy was adopted, but also proposed to change it to a 
“one-time-premium” system if elected in 2008, proposed the amendment (Andoh, 2013). Also, 
since the last organized demonstration in 2005, labour and GNEMHO have stopped to openly 
                                                          
64 Niitreb is an officer of the WHO in Ghana. He was part of the key actors that were promoting community-
based health insurance schemes in Ghana.  
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oppose the policy. In fact, fear of labour reprisal led to the inability of both sides of the House 
to change the financial modality in the context of the 2012 reform (Parliament of Ghana, 
06/09/2012). As for the members of GNEMHO, “because most of them were without subsidy, 
they all joined the public system [DMHIS]” (Agyepong, 2013).  
 Another factor contributing to the sustainability of the NHIS involves the use of annual 
stakeholder meetings as principal venues to evaluate the policy. These non-partisan meetings 
have been organized consistently, providing opportunities for opponents and proponents as 
well as international and domestic actors to contribute to the scheme’s sustainability through 
dialogue. Indeed, much of the scheme’s success in withstanding pressure from the Oxfam 
report and the NDC’s one-time premium proposal can be attributed to the annual stakeholder 
dialogue and the authorities’ ability to incorporate stakeholders’ views and negotiate 
grievances (Adjei, 2013; Niitreb, 2013).  
 
6.4. Causal Analysis 
In this section, the author shows how various causal factors interacted over time to ensure the 
transition to NHIS, in spite of obstacles such as political ideology, vested interests, opposition 
from international actors and the popular assumption that health insurance was impossible in a 
developing country like Ghana. First, the NHIS was triggered by the crisis of the user fee 
model, particularly, its adverse impact on access to health care by the marginalised, some of 
whom had been detained in health facilities as a result of their inability to pay. The depth and 
gravity of the situation created urgency for change, bringing change agents such as government 
officials, politicians, researchers, civil society groups and health care experts to the forefront 
of the search for solutions to the problem. In the process, in the late 1980s, NHIS came on the 
agenda through the policy entrepreneurship of officials in the MoH and the CBHIS. This 
interacted with global public opinion so that, while health insurance was in line with both the 
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social democratic ideology of the government at the time and the fundamental African culture 
of solidarity and reciprocity, it was held back by the popular assumption that it was impossible 
given Ghana’s socio-economics structure. Although health insurance had gained so much 
popularity among communities and organisations by 2000, it had not been propelled to the 
front stage until after the change in government in 2001, when the new government moved the 
policy process along rapidly. A critical investigation into the matter suggested that the previous 
government’s decision to go slow was shaped not just by the general assumption about health 
insurance being impossible in Ghana, but also by expert advice that government involvement 
in health insurance was not advisable mainly because there was little evidence to suggest that 
the policy could be sustained (Agyepong, 2013). This situation, however, changed after the 
political transition, as the new government saw an opportunity to introduce SHI not only 
because it was an election pledge, but also because it was seen as a panacea to the crisis in the 
health care sector. It was believed it would reduce poverty and contribute to socio-economic 
development more generally. Hence, in constituting his cabinet, the president made NHIS the 
main agenda item of his Minister of Health.  
Charged with introducing the NHIS, the minister quickly constituted a seven-member 
design team to work on the technical details of the policy and advice the government on 
developing a legislative proposal on health insurance. The team’s composition and style of 
work shaped policy direction significantly. Initially, in constituting the team, the minister was 
influenced by notions of actors who had experience in exploring or implementing health 
insurance in the country. This situation, unfortunately, led to the total dominance of actors with 
potentially vested interests in the existing community-based health insurance schemes and a 
strong belief in the common assumption about health insurance being impossible in the 
developing world. Thus, the team recommended that the government simply maintain its role 
as promoter of the existing community-based health insurance schemes rather than changing 
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them. This situation suggests that, even in the face of a wide window of opportunity, as created 
by the crisis of the user fee model and the change in government, a path-dependent change may 
still occur when the change team is dominated by people with significant allegiance to the 
status quo.  
In order to pursue change that departed significantly from the status quo, the 
government pursued a number of strategies, including reconstituting the design team and 
bringing in trusted/political associates until the pendulum swung in favour of change. The 
dominance of the trusted/political associates on the new team made significant change 
favourable because it was then easier to marginalise opponents and reach consensus regarding 
the way forward. Hence, unlike the former team, the new team recommended that centrally 
regulated, district-wide health insurance schemes be instituted alongside the existing private 
sector based schemes such as PMHISs and PCHISs. Since a similar approach had been 
unsuccessful in the past, it may be that that recommendation was also shaped by policy 
legacies. The idea of offering the district-based schemes alongside the private-based schemes 
was also shaped by the rightist ideology of the government and the strategic choice of the 
reformers to layer the new policy on the top of existing ones so as to minimise opposition and 
build consensus for the change. As well, it reflected the manifesto pledge of the government to 
allow various agents to set up their own health insurance schemes under the regulation of a 
national body (NPP, 2000).  
Other aspects of the policy, such as the NHIF, benefit package, and exemptions, were 
largely influenced by lesson drawing or translation, as well as policy legacies and political 
strategies. For instance, the financial modalities under the policy were largely adaptations from 
the Germany’s payroll deduction approach; the UK’s tax-based system; and Thailand, Chile, 
Tunisia and Zimbabwe’s premium-based system. However, in place of direct payroll 
deductions, as in Germany, the design team applied the deductions to the workers’ social 
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security contributions. The team also replaced the general tax system that existed in Britain 
with an earmarked tax (NHIL) and added a premium that was politically rather than actuarially 
determined. Much of the content of the exemption scheme and benefit package was drawn from 
the existing user fee policy, as well as the manifesto pledge and strategy of the reformers to 
totally abolish user fees. 
After the design team completed its work, the draft policy was submitted to the cabinet 
for initial approval. This stage was also influenced by partisan politics and framing processes. 
In terms of partisan politics, the increase in VAT was framed as NHIL and the rate was reduced 
from 3.5% to 2.5%. The reason for this was that the government felt it was politically incorrect 
to request an increase in a policy that it had opposed so strongly when in the opposition. The 
framing was a way to conceal the reality of VAT and make it politically attractive before 
submitting the bill to parliament. Additionally, the existing schemes were layered on the newly 
proposed schemes in order to cause their demise without directly attacking them. That way, the 
reformers could limit opposition to the policy.  
At the parliamentary level, the approval process was marked by interactions among 
cognitive factors, institutions, public opinion, vested interests and reformers’ strategic choices. 
For instance, the bill was submitted under a certificate of urgency to be passed into law before 
parliament went on recess in a week’s time. Although that should have created a sense of 
urgency to such an extent that key parliamentary procedures were discounted, the extent of the 
influence of the certificate of urgency was limited by certain parliamentary procedures that 
required a bill of such magnitude to be referred to a committee for detailed study and 
stakeholder input. This created a window of opportunity for key opponents to veto certain 
aspects of the bill. For example, it allowed opposition party members on the committee to move 
the work of the committee beyond the borders of parliament into the regions to conduct further 
stakeholder consultations and dialogues on the bill, even though this was not part of the 
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legislative requirements. Labour, GNEMHO, the opposition party, and, somehow, external 
actors also tried to press their demands, putting pressure on government to find solutions to 
their concerns. In the process, labour was able to reach a compromise with government to be 
exempted from premium payment. Concerns raised by GNEMHO, the opposition party, and 
external actors, however, were rejected.  
A critical investigation into the matter revealed that labour’s success was shaped more 
by reformers’ strategy of ensuring that there was adequate legitimacy for the passage of the 
law than institutional influence in the strict sense of the word. For instance, the government 
could have rejected the requests of labour completely, as it did with GNEMHO, external actors 
and the opposition party, because they did not wield institutional power to veto the change. 
However, the government realized that the concerns of labour were credible and also that their 
support was important in enhancing the legitimacy of the policy. In any case, they also felt that 
reaching a compromise with labour would promote rather than affect the policy change. Thus, 
although the stakeholder consultations prolonged the committee’s work, they also enabled the 
committee to build consensus on the bill.  
Similarly, the implementation process was shaped by interaction among political 
strategies, the capacity of the implementation team and policy legacies. For instance, 
implementation was highly decentralised so that each district established its own scheme and 
appointed its own board of directors. This facilitated the implementation process and helped 
build a grassroots constituency for policy change. Also, instead of recruiting experts to 
implement the policy, the political associates on the design team were charged with overseeing 
the rollout of the policy. The implementation team, therefore, recruited individuals who would 
support the policy and ensure a rapid rollout rather than (necessarily) those with expertise in 
running the policy. Since they lacked the requisite training, a majority of the workers ended up 
blindly implementing the NHIS; many others, however, engaged in malfeasant and corrupt 
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practices that affected the policy’s sustainability. The strategy of using political associates and 
moving swiftly with the new policy also helped to mobilise additional support and build 
significant constituencies for the sustenance of the policy. For instance, within a matter of three 
years, more than half of the population had enrolled in the scheme, about 88% of whom were 
already benefiting from it (NHIA, 2009). The positive impact of increased enrolment on the 
utilization of health care made the policy attractive to international actors, particularly, the 
World Bank, the ILO and the WHO. These then promoted it across the developing world, 
sending several countries to study Ghana’s situation. Over time, annual stakeholder 
conferences were also instituted to sort out issues that could significantly affect the fate of the 
policy. 
 
6.5. Theoretical Implications 
The validity of the actor-based institutionalist perspective is once again confirmed in this 
chapter. It shows how significant policy change may be pursued through the interaction among 
contextual factors and actors across the various stages of the policy process, including agenda 
setting, formulation, adoption, implementation and sustainability. While the analysis was 
performed as though the stages were independent of each other that was only for the sake of 
convenience and simplicity. In a real world situation, the various stages are interconnected, as 
issues at one stage of the policy process affect the nature and/or outcome of politics at 
subsequent stage(s). For example, the urgency at which the Minister of Health was charged 
with instituting the NHIS had a significant impact on the fast-tracked manner in which it was 
carried out.  
The analysis also reveals how the NHIS was pursued within a context characterised by 
contextual factors such as the legacy of the user fee model, strong public opinion in support of 
change and health insurance, institutions, partisan politics and policy ideologies, as well as 
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vested interests. For instance, the accessibility crisis of the user fee model generated the need 
for change, which led to the idea of health insurance as a key policy recommendation. Over 
time, public support for NHIS increased remarkably. However, these factors only really began 
to matter after the 2001 change in government, which opened a policy window for change and 
allowed health insurance to move onto the decision agenda. Therefore, confirming Kingdon’s 
(2003) window of opportunity framework, this chapter argues that the combination of the user 
fee crisis, public support for health insurance and the 2001 political transition created a window 
of opportunity for the NHIS.  
Despite their significance, the above factors did not guarantee the creation of the NHIS. 
For instance, although the crisis situation was significant at the agenda setting stage, it only 
made the need for change obvious and did not dictate which change to pursue. This was 
subsequently pushed onto the agenda by bureaucrats from the MoH. Also, although the 2001 
political transition in Ghana was important, it only deepened the urgency for change by 
bringing a new government to power that had promised to introduce NHIS. However, the 
government was not bound to introduce NHIS merely because it promised to do so during the 
2001 electoral campaign. In fact, the NDC had made, and failed to keep, similar promises in 
1992 and 1996. As indicated, the NDC also failed to implement the onetime premium promise 
after it won the 2008 election. Additionally, members of the first design team, acting under the 
influence of vested interests and policy ideology or legacy, tried to tilt the policy towards path-
dependency until the team was reconstituted in favour of change. Although reconfiguration of 
the design team facilitated the policy development process, the democratic institutional 
configuration of the state prolonged the adoption process, at least compared to the adoption of 
the user fee model, which took place under an authoritarian regime. For instance, besides 
cabinet approval, the policy was also subjected to the approval of parliament, which widened 
the potential veto points available to vested interests to oppose change. For example, concerns 
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raised by labour, the NDC, GNEMHO and external actors generally received critical attention, 
leading to the various stakeholder discussions and negotiations meant to address their concerns. 
Such issues ended up delaying the passage of the law longer than expected. Yet, the principle 
of party-discipline within Ghana’s democracy enabled the government to mobilize its members 
of parliament to vote for the passage of the NHIS. 
This discussion supports the analysis that significant policy changes are more difficult 
to enact in democratic institutions than under authoritarian regimes. However, it fails to support 
the general assumption that concentrated institutions or institutions with fewer veto points 
necessarily avert opposing forces on their own. This is because, although Ghana’s democratic 
system still concentrates power in the hands of the government, it could not prevent interests 
from opposing the NHIS. This is why this study combines the window opportunity thesis with 
Grindle’s (2004) dynamic political process model that recognizes the importance of strategic 
choice in shaping path-departing policy change despite the odds. 
Key strategies employed to facilitate policy change include framing, labelling, layering, 
translation, negotiation, compensation, accommodation, decentralisation and even inaction, 
when necessary. For instance, for the sake of legitimacy, even where institutions made it 
possible to discount opponents’ concerns, such as those of the GNEMHO, the NDC and 
external actors, strategies such as framing remained necessary in order to make the 
government’s decisions appealing. For instance, the NDC’s concern that the NHIS would 
create hardship for the poor was framed as a mere political gimmick that was not in the nation’s 
interest. Additionally, besides the legislative principle of party discipline, which minimized 
opportunities for members of the main opposition party to build a coalition with members of 
the other parties, the reformers made a calculated effort to convince the majority in parliament 
to rubber stamp the policy by skipping key parliamentary procedures they should have been 
involved in passing the law. Similarly, to ensure a quick rollout of the policy, the authority over 
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implementation was decentralised to local governments, with strong backing from both the 
national government and core reformers, particularly the political associates who oversaw the 
implementation process across the country. A compromise was also reached with labour, while 
responses to GNEMHO’s concerns were framed in a way that appealed to some of their 
members. Apart from helping to ensure a quick rollout of the policy, the above strategies helped 
in building constituencies, which, in turn, made the policy more sustainable over time. 
Thus, despite the window of opportunity, policy reformers were not and must not be 
viewed as mere passive objects that just responded to the dictates of the policy environment. 
That is, their actions were not only motivated by the contextual factors that surrounded them. 
Rather, the decision to adopt, implement and sustain the NHIS was also conditioned by 
cognitive, ideational and rational analysis and strategic choices that cannot be strictly reduced 
to the contextual forces mentioned above. Thus, key actors also shaped the policy environment 
to either favour or oppose change and determined its outcome. That is why the policy was 
introduced, formulated and adopted, as well as implemented and sustained, despite the odds. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
The chapter examined the process of transitioning to NHIS in Ghana in the early 2000s, 
accounting for why and how it occurred despite the countervailing factors. As seen in Table 7, 
below, while contextual factors, such as the user fee crisis and the change in government, were 
critical in generating urgency for change, it was largely how they interacted with certain 
agential factors, such as the policy entrepreneurship of key reformers across the various stages 
of the policy process, that accounted for the successful transition to NHIS. Thus, while some 
contextual factors impacted policy change in significant ways, their influence was mediated by 
policy actors who actually determined the precise direction the policy change would take. The 
government’s main challenge at the time was that many of the key actors, including health 
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experts, international actors and some government officials whose help was needed, thought 
that NHIS was unsuitable for a developing country like Ghana, given its large informal sector 
and poor economic base. Consequently, CBHISes were generally suggested instead. At the 
formulation stage, this challenge manifested itself in how key ministry officials on the design 
team tried to tilt the policy towards the status quo. It also manifested itself at the adoption stage 
through the opposition of the NDC minority, labour unions and international agencies.  
Table 7 Summary of factors leading to the establishment of the NHIS 
Factors Specifics Contribution 
 
 
 
Conjunctures 
 Unaffordability of the health 
care system  
 Public opinion favoured change 
 The 2001 election, which led to 
the power transfer from the 
NDC to the NPP  
 These created windows of opportunity for 
policy change rather than bringing it 
about. 
 
 
 
 
Policy entrepreneurs 
 
 The CBHISes and the MoH 
 The Kufuor government 
 The seven-member design team 
 Cabinet and parliamentarians  
 Implementation team and 
service providers  
 The new stakeholders the policy 
developed overtime 
 
 They seized the open windows not only to 
propel NHIS onto the agenda, but also to 
see it through design, adoption, 
implementation and sustenance. 
 Different policy entrepreneurs playing 
different entrepreneurial roles were 
identified across various stages of the 
policy process.  
 What made them unique and relevant for 
the changes were their leadership, 
strategies and commitment to change. 
 
Institutions 
 Ghana’s party-disciplined 
parliament, with the 
government having majority of 
the seats. 
 
 These institutions minimized the veto 
points available to interests seeking to 
overturn the NHIS.  
 They also made it easier for policy 
entrepreneurs to adopt the policy. 
 
Fundamentally, the policy was introduced and sustained by reformers or policy entrepreneurs’ 
commitment to the change and their strategies to counteract challenges to that reform. These 
include reorganization, accommodation, framing, labelling, consultation, layering, inaction, 
and negotiation, as well as decentralization, the use of stakeholder conferences and other skills 
and tactics. These strategies were significant in countering international organisation’s 
predictions related to the policy’s collapse, among other things. While the contextual factors 
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were fundamental, they could not have achieved the observed change without the commitment, 
character and strategies of the policy entrepreneurs at each stage of the policy process.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
7.1. Introduction  
The primary goal of this chapter is to discuss the major findings, as well as the policy and 
research implications of the entire study. As indicated, the study was built on the premise that 
Ghana has manoeuvred across each of the world’s major health policy regimes within just four 
decades (1957-2003), despite the common wisdom in welfare state literature that radical, path-
departing policy changes are rare or that they occur only after long periods of stasis. This study, 
therefore, sought to explain these profound changes and, particularly, how and why they could 
have been achieved within such a relatively short timeframe.  
In line with the actor-centred institutionalist approach, it was hypothesized that to 
adequately explain the changes, one must pay close attention to the policy process, including 
how policies are introduced, formulated, adopted, implemented and sustained, as well as how 
reformers manage the entire process, seizing the opportunities when they come, creating 
platforms for changes and dealing with obstacles to reform as they emerge. Given the depth of 
information and analysis the above research agenda entailed, I employed a research approach 
that could address these objectives, an enterprise that led me to adopt qualitative case study 
research methods. The particular qualitative methods employed involved document reviews 
and semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key actors related to the changes. The interviews 
were then analysed using the computer-based software, NVivo.  
Based on the data analysis, I observed three main contextual and agential factors that 
mediated across the policy change process to ensure the radical health care changes in Ghana. 
These factors include the role of conjunctures or windows of opportunity, policy 
entrepreneurship of key policy actors, and the concentrated institutional configuration of the 
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Ghanaian state. While all these factors were significant, this study demonstrates that policy 
entrepreneurs were most important in why and how the changes were achieved. 
Contributing to the dynamic or actor-centred institutionalist literature, this study 
combined insights from various perspectives within this tradition, particularly Kingdon’s 
(2003) “window of opportunity” framework and Grindle’s (2004) “dynamic political process” 
model to explain the changes. In relation to Kingdon’s (2003) work in particular, this 
investigation showed how certain contextual changes, such as the crisis of the health care 
system, created windows of opportunity that were seized by key policy entrepreneurs before 
path-departing policy changes occurred. Relative to Grindle (2004), on the other hand, this 
study demonstrated the extent to which the policy changes faced strong obstacles that were 
surmounted through the commitment, leaderships and strategic choices of the policy 
entrepreneurs behind the policies. 
 In addition to revealing new ways by which policy entrepreneurs may pursue path-
departing policy change, this study also confirmed many of the findings of the existing 
literature with respect to the process and strategies of path-departing policy change. From an 
institutionalist standpoint it also revealed the extent to which the concentrated institutional 
configuration of a state may facilitate the adoption of a path-departing policy change, and limit 
but not necessarily crowd out interests, which may utilize other avenues to oppose change. 
Finally, this study found that, while policy entrepreneurs may be effective in achieving path-
departing policy change, the strategic behaviours of these policy entrepreneurs could have 
adverse ramifications in terms of fuelling the momentum for policy reversal within a short 
period of a policy’s establishment. 
In the following sections, a more detailed summary of the findings is provided. The 
next section discusses the policy changes explored in this study. Subsequently, the key findings 
with respect to why and how the path-departing changes occurred within the timeframe in 
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which they did despite the observed countervailing factors are addressed. The next section 
focuses on this study’s contribution to the existing literature on policy change in light of its key 
findings. Then, the core lessons that could be drawn from the study’s findings and their 
implications for public policy practice are highlighted. A discussion of the limitations of the 
study and its implications for future research is featured in the subsequent section, which leads 
to concluding remarks about the entire study.  
 
7.2. A Review of the Changes 
As indicated, the changes analysed in this study of Ghana’s health care system involve the 
establishment of a NHS-type system (with first dollar coverage) in the 1960s, the introduction 
of user fees in the 1980s, and the adoption of NHIS in the early 2000s. Before examining the 
causal factors underlying the changes, it  was deemed worthwhile to first and foremost examine 
the nature, character and magnitude of the changes so as to conceptualise what needed to be 
explained and why explaining them was necessary. Based on the criteria of spending and 
institutional changes, all three reforms were identified as path-departing in nature. For instance, 
public spending on health care for the population, including the marginalised, was found to 
have increased tremendously after the establishment of the NHS. Also, although nominal 
public spending on health care rose after the introduction of user fees in the 1980s, real public 
expenditure on health care was inadequate, resulting in much of the burden of health care 
falling on individuals and households, a significant majority of whom exited the public health 
care system as a result. With the adoption of NHIS in the early 2000s, public health care 
spending has not only increased, but a significant portion (about 70%) of the cost of health care 
has also been taken away from individuals and households.  
Besides the changes in public spending, changes in the institutionalisation of health 
care occurred with each shift in the health policy regime. For instance, the NHS system resulted 
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in a shift from a health care system that targeted the few Europeans in the country during the 
colonial period to one that made access to health care a universal right of all residents of Ghana, 
including foreigners. Having been significantly curtailed under the user fee model, the principle 
of universalism has been significantly restored under the NHIS. For example, through the 
mechanisms of prepayment, risk-pooling and cross-subsidisation, the NHIS provides a large 
exemption package for the majority of the marginalised, including children, the aged, 
pensioners, pregnant women and nursing mothers. By making a minimum contribution of 
between 7 cedis and 48 cedis per annum, the rest of the population is also covered for 95% of 
all diseases in the country. Hence, as indicated, public satisfaction in the health care system 
improved markedly after the introduction of the NHIS when compared to the satisfaction level 
under the user fee model.  
Despite their importance, however, none of these changes appeared to have taken the 
shape of the sudden and wholesale variety emphasized by the punctuated equilibrium thesis. 
This is because these policy changes occurred over a period of time and because some remnants 
of past regimes were carried forward onto the new regimes, a situation that also suggests that 
the path-dependency thesis may be hard to completely debunk even in circumstances of radical 
policy changes. 
 
 7.3. Examining the Causal Factors Underlying the Policy Changes  
As summarised in the table below, a cross-regime analysis revealed that three main contextual 
and agential factors were fundamental to accomplishing the changes in Ghanaian health policy 
after independence. These factors include the role of (a) conjunctural factors in creating 
windows of opportunity for the changes; (b) policy entrepreneurs in propelling the changes 
onto the political agenda and championing the changes through the design, adoption, 
implementation and sustenance of the policy over time; and (c) the concentrated institutional 
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configurations of the Ghanaian state, which both minimised the veto points for vested interests 
and allowed the policy entrepreneurs to pursue the adoption of the proposed changes. However, 
while all of the above factors were crucial for explaining the policy changes, the study observed 
that policy entrepreneurs’ commitments and strategies were key in why and how the changes 
occurred. 
Table 8 Summary of the factors underpinning the health care changes in Ghana 
Factors Specifics Contribution 
Conjunctures  The nature of the economy 
 The nature of the health care 
system 
 Change of government 
 The nature of the international 
environment  
 They created windows of opportunity for 
the changes rather than determined the 
policy changes. 
Policy entrepreneurs  Proposal actors 
 The government in power 
 The design team 
 The actors for adoption, including 
cabinet and parliamentarians 
 The implementers, including 
service providers 
 The new stakeholders of the 
changes 
 
 They seized the open windows to institute 
the changes across various stages of the 
policy process. 
 Different policy entrepreneurs playing 
different entrepreneurial roles were 
identified across various stages of the 
policy process. 
 What made them unique and relevant for 
the changes was their leadership, strategies 
and commitment to change. 
Institutions  The unitary state of Ghana 
 The party-disciplined parliament 
of Ghana 
 The military system with no 
parliament 
 These concentrated institutions minimized 
veto points for interests to overturn the 
policies.  
 They also made it easier for the policy 
entrepreneurs to adopt the new policies. 
 
7.3.1 Conjunctures and Windows of Opportunity 
  
 In his seminal study on agenda-setting, Kingdon (2003) coined the concept of “window of 
opportunity” to refer to those circumstances in which policy entrepreneurs obtain the leeway 
necessary to push through their favourite policy ideas for reform. In line with Kingdon (2003), 
this study found that, across all the three cases of major health care change studied, conjunctural 
factors related to the nature of the economy, the existing health care system and the political 
situation in Ghana created windows of opportunity for the changes to occur. The establishment 
of the NHS system, for instance, emanated from the open window created by the interaction of 
conjunctural factors, including the existing discriminatory and exorbitant health care system, 
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the 1960s economic boom, the attainment of political independence and republican status 
around the same period, the election into office of a socialist and nationalist leader in the person 
of Kwame Nkrumah and the global trend towards broad welfare state regimes. The creation of 
the user fee model was also triggered by the interaction among various factors, such as the 
economic bust of the 1980s and its effects on the health care system, the political transition in 
1982, the failure of earlier populist measures, efforts to solicit help from the Eastern Bloc and 
the expulsion in 1983 of Ghanaians living illegally in Nigeria. Later on, the accessibility 
challenges of the user fee model coupled with the 2001 election of a government that had 
campaigned on the promise of replacing user fees with a health insurance programme created 
the window of opportunity for the adoption of NHIS. The significance of the above factors was 
that they created the sense of urgency necessary to pursue the major changes to the health care 
system.  
 
7.3.2 Policy entrepreneurship  
As important as they are on their own, these open windows have to be seized by someone - key 
policy actors - before they can fully impact the process of policy change. In short, the mere 
existence of policy windows does not guarantee that certain policy changes will occur (Cortell 
& Peterson 1999; Kingdon, 2003; France & Taroni, 2005). Kingdon (2003) refers to these 
actors as policy entrepreneurs. According to Kingdon (2003), policy entrepreneurs are made 
up of “people who are willing to invest in pushing their pet proposals or problems, are 
responsible for prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling both 
problems and solutions and both to politics” (p. 20). Based on Kingdon’s analysis, this study 
observed the entrepreneurship roles of key political and bureaucratic actors such as officials of 
the Maude Commissions, the GMA and PSoG, the MoH and the CBHISes, as well as the World 
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Bank and the IMF played by pushing the path-departing changes onto the governmental 
agenda. 
 However, because of its “garbage can”65 undertone, as well as its disproportionate focus 
on agenda setting, Kingdon’s (2003) “window of opportunity” framework fails to provide 
enough analytical leverage with respect to policymaking beyond the agenda setting stage. 
Grindle’s (2004) “policy as political process” model complements Kingdon’s (2003) 
framework. In her study, which focused on policy change in Latin America, Grindle (2004) 
explains that path-departing change may still occur even in the absence of window of 
opportunity or despite obstacles to reform such as opposition from vested interests and 
institutional friction. To explain path-departing change, she suggested that scholars must 
examine the entire policy process to properly capture the extent of the challenges involved in 
path-departing policy change and how they are surmounted through the strategic choices of 
reformers at various stages of the policy process. Combining the frameworks of these two 
scholars, this study also noted that even when there are windows of opportunity, pursuing path-
departing policy change could be a difficult task, especially when post-agenda setting 
developments are critically considered.  
For instance, medical doctors and provider facilities seriously resisted the adoption of 
the NHS (Coleman, 1997; Arhinful, 2003). In the 1980s, the general public, the labour unions, 
some forces in the army and key members of the PNDC held public protests and press 
conferences, and even launched coup d’état attempts, to prevent the implementation of the user 
fee policy (Hutchful, 2002). The NHIS, however, appeared to have faced the most difficulties. 
Beyond opposition from interest groups (labour, GNEMHO) and the main opposition political 
party (NDC), international actors that are generally touted as the prime movers of policy reform 
                                                          
65 The theoretical assumption that decisions are not made through carefully calculated processes but as a result 
of chances, which are created when two or more independently operating factors accidentally converge at a 
conducive point such as in a garbage can. 
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in LICs, including in post-independence Ghana (Neuman, 1998; Grindle, 2000; Selin & Linnér, 
2005), were also vehemently opposed to its introduction (Rajkotia, 2007; Agyepong & Adjei, 
2008; Coleman, 2011). As Seddoh and Akor (2012) note, some international actors even 
decided to march on parliament to protest the passage of the NHIS law. Others also wrote 
letters to the president, asking him to fire the Minister of Health for pursuing the policy, while 
still others went to the extent of sponsoring certain national vested interests to overturn the 
policy (Rajkotia, 2007).  
But even beyond opposition from vested interests and global actors, most of the changes 
went against the ideology of the government in power, which posed further challenges. For 
instance, PNDC members, the majority of whom were strong leftists, had to be moved along 
by the reformers before the user fee policy could be successfully implemented (Arhinful, 2003). 
With its ideological affinity with the status quo (i.e., the user fee model), the rightist NPP also 
had difficulties in dismantling the user fee policy and replacing it with a solidaristic NHIS. The 
ideological conflict embedded in such decision is clear in the response given by PNDC’s 
members when user fees were first proposed by the MoH, as well as from the speech of the 
minister of health during the introduction of the NHIS. As indicated, the PNDC saw the MoH’s 
user fee proposal as politically unwise since it could have infuriated the support base of the 
party (Adibo, 2013).  On the floor of parliament, the minister of health during the Kufour 
administration also indicated that introducing a NHIS is “any socialist’s dream. But it took the 
Government of President Agyekum Kufuor to set this in motion” (Parliament of Ghana, 2003, 
p. 167).  
Finally, when compared to changes taking place in the developed world, the policy 
changes in the developing world tend to face extreme financial difficulties as a result of their 
limited financial bases. This was evident during the implementation of the NHS system after 
1964. A similar situation occurred during the user fee regime, as a result of the failure to 
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increase fee levels over time. It also occurred under the NHIS because of neglect by 
international agencies, which had been a reliable source of revenue for the health sector since 
the 1980s.  
Confronted with challenges like these, Pierson (1996) argues that politicians would 
shun path-departing policy change. Based on Pierson’s (1996) analysis, the governments of 
Ghana should have been expected to retreat from pursuing the changes underlying this study. 
The two occasions (1968 and 1969) on which Ghana’s NLC military regime withdrew its user 
fee proposals in the face of public resistance (Arhinful, 2003) reinforce this expectation. Yet, 
despite the above challenges, the governments in charge of the three major episodes of health 
care change never retreated from their initial decision to profoundly reform the health care 
system. For instance, despite economic challenges, the Nkrumah government introduced 
surcharges on imported goods to generate additional revenue rather than introduce user fees or 
dismantle the NHS system (Arhinful, 2003). Also, despite the numerous coup attempts against 
him, as well as the press conferences meant to dissuade him from introducing the user fee 
policy, and even members of his own political party’s opposition, Rawlings never retreated 
from pursuing the user fee policy. In reality, in spite of opposition from the public, vested 
interests such as labour unions and the World Bank and IMF, the Kufuor NPP administration 
went ahead with its NHIS proposal. In fact, beyond making it the main objective of his Minister 
of Health, as indicated in the preceding chapter, President Kufuor also made the NHIS a 
substantive part of the country’s growth and poverty reduction strategy (Seddoh & Akor, 2012). 
During the interviews, the minister in charge of the NHIS’ introduction recounted the critical 
role president Kufuor’s leadership and commitment to the change played. Hence, as he argued, 
“as far as health insurance is concerned, all credits go to him [President Kufuor]” (Afriyie, 
2013). In line with Grindle (2004), therefore, this study noted that additional policy 
entrepreneurship, including strong political leadership, commitment and strategic choices on 
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the part of the governments in power, were crucially important to the success of path-departing 
policy changes. 
Yet, even when they are combined with the policy window argument above, the 
political commitment and leadership of the governments alone cannot fully explain why and 
how the health care changes in question occurred. For example, Coleman (2011, p. 20) 
indicated how the NDC government put “immense pressure” on the MoH in 1995 to institute 
a health insurance policy, but in vain. Also, as seen in Chapter Six, it became clear how the 
first design team of the NHIS suggested the maintenance of the status quo, despite the NPP 
government’s clear commitment for bold change.  
Regarding the analysis of the three major policy changes considered in this study, it is 
clear political leadership and the governments’ commitment and strategies had to be buttressed 
with the policy entrepreneurship and effective policy commitment and strategies of the design 
team and all those involved in the adoption, implementation and sustenance of the policy 
changes. For instance, the design teams played a fundamental role in determining the content 
of the policies and in managing conflicts their decisions created before the policies were 
submitted for adoption. Besides the design teams, key actors at the cabinet and parliamentary 
levels oversaw the policies’ adoption, while service providers and specially established teams 
championed their implementation. In addition to the commitments and strategic choices of the 
governments in power, the vested interests or stakeholders the policies generated contributed 
immensely in sustaining the changes over time.  
Also, echoing Grindle (2004), this study found that the strategic choices of policy 
entrepreneurs were the fundamental reasons why and how the changes occurred despite the 
countervailing factors. These strategic choices are in different forms. Nevertheless, they may 
be broadly classified into two main categories – soft and hard. The soft strategies include the 
use of compensations (financial remuneration and other rewards), ideational processes 
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(framing, public education, consultations, and negotiations and compromises), underground 
mechanisms (layering, drift and translation) and others tactics (incremental vs. rapid scale out 
of policy, use of narrow vs. broad design teams or political associates, decentralising power of 
implementation, accommodation of diverse interests in the policy and strategic timing of 
reforms). Hard strategies involve the use of repressive mechanisms (brutality, arrests, 
detainment, ban of political groupings and media censorships).  
Hard strategies were often employed by undemocratic regimes, while the soft strategies 
were mostly used by democratic regimes. For instance, having employed compensation at the 
initial stages of introducing the NHS system, when his regime was democratic, President 
Nkrumah switched largely to hard, repressive strategies like media censorship and detention to 
quell opponents after 1964, when he had turned himself into a dictator (Kraus, 1979). Because 
it occurred during a stable democracy, the policy entrepreneurs of the NHIS essentially 
abstained from using hard strategies to pursue change. Also, while repression was the main 
strategy of the PNDC military regime during the transition to user fees in the 1980s, it was less 
used in the 1990s, after the PNDC had converted into a democratic party (NDC). Rather than 
repression, the NDC increasingly utilized soft strategies to fend off opposition. Democratic 
regimes often used compensation, for example, mostly in the face of labour resistance. For 
instance, as indicated above, the Nkrumah’s democratic government compensated mission 
hospitals and medical officers with annual allowances in order to secure their consent to 
introduce the NHS system. A similar reality occurred during the transition to NHIS and the 
user fee model.  
Underground approaches were employed in situations where changes needed to be 
made without necessarily attacking the existing policy. These changes were, therefore, indirect 
or incremental in nature. For instance, by quickly layering the NHIS onto the existing private 
insurance systems, almost all of these private schemes silently disappeared. By refusing to 
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increase the user fees after 1985 despite a changing context (i.e., policy drift), the fees were 
increased nevertheless, through the actions of the various service providers, with no direct 
intervention from reformers. Opposition could be prevented by using these underground 
approaches. However, reformers also used these approaches when ideological conflicts 
prevailed, such as during the transition to user fees, and the one to NHIS.  
Furthermore, ideational strategies such as public education and consultations were 
often employed to explain reforms’ content to the public, particularly where opposition to the 
reform appeared to derive largely from public misunderstanding. For example, the Minister of 
Health and Dr. Adibo went on national television and radio to educate the public on the user 
fee policy before its implementation, in order to address potential grievances and build 
consensus for the policy.  
Ideational frames were also utilised to legitimate certain policy choices and appease 
potential detractors. For example, the tax (VAT) component of the NHIS was framed as NHIL, 
which the reformers depicted as different from the former, although my interviews with them 
showed that they were known to be the same. Ideational frames were also employed to solidify 
decisions that had been reached through other strategies. For instance, policy entrepreneurs 
went beyond the compensation offered to labour to persuasively and consistently frame the 
NHIS as favourable to workers since it would protect them so they could enjoy the full benefits 
of their pension funds (Amoh, 2013). In fact, some of the reformers even cited Ghanaians’ 
average life expectancy at birth to justify their claims about how better health care could help 
more people enjoy their old-age pensions (Parliament of Ghana, 2003).  
In addition, ideational frames were employed to defuse the potential for ideological 
conflicts. For examples, by using terms such as obnoxious, inhumane, iniquitous and barbaric, 
the policy entrepreneurs described the user fees as unacceptable, meaning that the government 
had to push for health insurance despite it being at odds with the ideology of the regime 
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(Parliament of Ghana, 2003). Key members of cabinet also framed the NHIS as being in line 
with the NPP’s political ideology. As the Minister for Finance and Economic Planning, Mr. 
Yaw Osafo-Marfo, indicated, “we can only talk about the whole philosophy [behind the 
policy]… We are descendants of Professor Kofi Abrefa Busia [a forefather of the NPP] and we 
believe in each of us becoming each other’s keeper. You can become each other’s keeper when 
you go for a health insurance scheme” (Parliament of Ghana, 2003, pp. 160 -161). 
The policy entrepreneurs also employed policy learning and lesson-drawing. This 
occurred, mostly, in situations where specific foreign models and/or existing policy ideas were 
perceived as potentially relevant for addressing the health care situations at hand. For example, 
the policy entrepreneurs drew lessons from the content of the British NHS system, the colonial 
user fee model, and Germany’s SHI system. However, foreign and existing ideas were adapted 
to suit the prevailing context of the new policy.   
Other approaches used to divert opponents’ attention and to speed up the pace of the 
reform include strategic timing and decentralization. For instance, the PNDC government 
timed its announcement of the user fee policy during the 1983 budget, which distracted 
opponents from attacking the user fees per se. Beside the diversion,  in the face of opposition 
by external actors, the reformers under the NHIS cut out their official and unofficial 
relationships with them (Coleman, 2011). NHIS implementation was also decentralised in 
order to ensure a quick rollout of the policy and build new constituencies in support of its 
sustainability. 
 
7.3.3 The Concentrated Institutional Configuration of Ghana 
It must be emphasised, however, that reformers did not always face strong challenges. In the 
course of their work, particularly during the process of adoption, the policy entrepreneurs were 
almost always favoured by the concentrated institutional configuration of the state, which 
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limited the number and extent of the veto points available to interests opposed to the proposed 
policy changes. For instance, the user fee policy of the 1980s was approved by a military 
government, while the NHS and NHIS systems were approved under democratic institutional 
configurations with a unitary system of government and a unicameral legislature that enforced 
party discipline. For example, with the principle of party discipline in place, both the Nkrumah 
and Kufuor governments were able to compel their respective party members, who were the 
majority in the legislature, to support their respective agendas. In fact, had they gotten the 
majority of the seats in the legislature, the opposition NDC would definitely have voted to 
overturn the NHIS, instead of staging a walk-out, as it did. Because of this, I argue that the 
institutional configuration of the state was a major factor that facilitated the adoption of the 
changes in Ghanaian health policy over time.  
However, as indicated, this story must not be viewed as though the institutional 
configurations were solely responsible for the policy changes adopted. There were also weak 
policy legacies in the sense that, in Ghana, existing policies were not strongly entrenched, and 
vested interests were not as powerful as those of advanced industrialized countries, which 
meant they could not prevent change. Besides, using various strategies, the policy 
entrepreneurs were determined to cause change even where institutional and societal obstacles 
to change were strong. With respect to the user fee policy, for instance, reformers had to reduce 
fee levels in order to make them quite affordable and to limit opposition from key forces within 
the society such as labour (Waddington & Enyimayew, 1990). Similarly, the NHIS bill was 
submitted to parliament under a letter of emergency, which was timed five days before 
parliament would go on recess. That strategy expedited the adoption process, as it created a 
sense of urgency, which, in turn, limited debate and deliberations on the bill. But, although the 
parliamentary majority exerted a lot of power, opposition members as well as other opponents 
of the bill, such as labour unions, managed to delay adoption beyond the five-day period by 
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using the media and other strategies. In the face of the increased opposition to the NHIS bill 
and misinformation about it, both the design team and the parliamentary select committee on 
the NHIS bill decided to hold consultative meetings across the country to clarify key issues 
with the public before resuming the adoption process at a later date. Thus, while the 
institutional configurations of Ghanaian politics did help to bring about health policy change, 
this should be considered in conjunction with the analysis of the reformers’ strategies and 
commitment to reform. In other words, institutions do not explain everything on their own. 
While they were helpful in pursuing change, most of the above strategies ended up 
generating severe sustainability challenges, which, in turn, often fuelled momentum for further 
change further down the road. For instance, by 1964, Nkrumah’s socialist policies, including 
the recently-created NHS system, were already facing a funding crisis (Senah, 2001). By 1968, 
a movement for dismantling the NHS system had already captured the decision agenda, leading 
to the enactment of the 1969 NLC user fee legislation (Arhinful, 2003). Although the poor state 
of the economy at the time had been reported as the main factor behind this funding crisis of 
the NHS (Senah, 2001), the impact of the compensations offered to medical doctors and 
facilities also made a difference. Having been implemented under pressure in the mid-1980s, 
the user fee policy also generated remarkable policy challenges in less than a year’s time, a 
situation directly related to reformers’ strategies (Waddington & Enyimayew, 1990, 1989). For 
instance, the health care staff utilised the opportunity created by policy drift (the government’s 
lackadaisical attitude towards changing fees to reflect inflation and other contextual changes) 
to not only create artificial drug shortages, but also to set their own fees and extort bribes from 
patients. This situation aggravated the unaffordability of the user fee model and accelerated the 
need for further policy change (Nyonator & Kutzin, 1999). By 1986, for instance, the PNDC’s 
Minister of Health had already announced steps to replace the recently-adopted user fee policy 
(Coleman, 2011). 
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After being implemented nationwide in 2005, the NHIS had also generated a strong 
movement for its rollback in 2006, mainly because of the challenges posed by the strategies 
reformers used during the policy’s formation (ILO, 2006; Rajkotia, 2007; Apoya & Marriott, 
2011; World Bank, 2012). Policymakers discussed how to address the challenges these 
strategies posed, especially with respect to the compensation offered to labour. As indicated 
above, the current NDC government proposed steps to replace the NHIS with a one-time 
premium system right from 2008. The 2011 Oxfam report also backed this change, arguing for 
its replacement with a NHS system in the shortest possible time (Apoya & Marriott, 2011). 
However, no concrete action has yet been taken because of the fear of labour reprisal 
(Parliament of Ghana, 2012). Given that all the health policy transitions had been instigated, 
one way or the other, by negative feedback from the strategies employed before and during the 
reform process, this study suggests that these feedbacks must be considered when explaining 
why and how radical health policy changes occurred within a relatively short time frame. 
 
7.4. The Contribution of the Study to the Existing Literature on Policy Change.  
This study contributes to the dynamic or actor-centred institutionalist literature by showing 
how insights from various perspectives within it, particularly Kingdon’s (2003) window of 
opportunity thesis, Grindle’s (2004) “dynamic political process” or design team perspective, 
Hacker’s (2004) concept of policy drift, Thelen’s (2005) concept of layering and Campbell’s 
(2004) concept of translation, as well as the scholarship on ideational frames (Blyth, 2002; 
Campbell, 2004; Béland, 2010), can be combined to better explain the radical policy changes 
in an unusually short period of time. For instance, as argued, contextual factors such as the 
state of the Ghanaian economy, the crisis of the health system and changes in government 
interlaced to create windows of opportunity for change. The open windows were then seized 
by policy entrepreneurs such as the governments in power, which set up design teams to 
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develop policy initiatives for action. In the process of their work, the reformers encountered 
opportunities like Ghana’s concentrated institutional configurations, but also challenges that 
required political leadership, great strategies and commitments. Some of the strategies 
employed were compensations, strategic timing, drift, layering, translation, framing, 
decentralization, accommodation, negotiations and compromises, as well as consultation and 
public education. This study discusses additional policy change strategies involving the use of 
brutality, suspension, media censorship, co-optation of labour, the banning of opposition 
groupings and the colonisation of reform teams by political associates of the regime in power. 
However, these repressive strategies were often employed as a last resort and mostly by 
undemocratic governments. Another related contribution of this study to the dynamic 
institutionalist literature is that, besides being a medium for change, political strategies may 
create unsustainability challenges if they are not employed with caution. Compensations, for 
instance, could lock-in policymakers, as it is usually difficult to withdraw compensation even 
in moments of obvious unsustainability. These adverse effects could drive the momentum for 
further changes within a relatively short time frame. But, as indicated above, framing may be 
a cheaper and more effective option compared to compensation in bringing about more lasting 
policy change. 
This study also suggests some modifications to some conventional wisdom in the 
welfare state literature. The first involves the theory of path dependency. As indicated, the path-
dependency literature suggests that factors such as institutional friction, policy legacies, vested 
interests and the fear politicians have of losing elections in the face of unpopular policies would 
create policy stasis (Pierson, 1996). To some extent, my study observed the influence of the 
above factors. For instance, the legacy of the PNP’s user fee proposal in 1982 shaped the 
PNDC’s in 1983/1985. The existing community based health insurance systems also influenced 
the model that Ghana adopted for its NHIS. Vested interests such as labour unions and medical 
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doctors and facilities also protested widely in an attempt to quash the changes. As indicated, 
some of these groups even attempted to oust the PNDC through a coup d’état because of its 
market-based policies, including user fees. All these factors should have encouraged the 
governments in power to back out on their policy change agenda. The fact that the NLC 
withdrew its user fee proposal should make us understand, indeed, that the path-dependency 
thesis is tenable. However, this study suggests that the path-dependency thesis may be 
incomplete unless it accounts for additional factors, including political commitment and 
strategies. In the face of low commitments to reform and a lack of effective strategies, policy 
change initiatives may fail, leading to path dependency. But when a high level of political 
commitment is backed by effective strategies, not only could path-departing policy changes 
occur, but also they could occur within an unusually short period of time.  
Another important approach that may need revision in light of this study is the interest-
based perspective. This perspective argues that policy change is shaped by interest groups. 
According to this view, radical policy change may occur, but it must be supported by key vested 
interests. With respect to the reforms under consideration in this study, it was found that, 
indeed, interests shaped the observed outcome. For instance, they delayed the passage of the 
NHIS. Labour also managed to secure an exemption category in the law. With respect to the 
NHS, medical doctors also managed to secure some allowances. However, the contribution of 
vested interests to the overall reforms was minimal. In the case of user fees, direct influence of 
outside interests was imperceptible. In the case of the transitions to NHS system and to NHIS, 
compensations and framing were able to convince reluctant interest groups to support change, 
a situation that suggests the need to consider interests as malleable, to a certain extent. 
The partisanship perspective should also be modified in light of this study. Regarding 
partisanship, the general assumption in the welfare state literature is that left-wing parties build 
broad-based and redistributive health systems, while right-wing parties construct limited social 
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policies (Hick, 2011). This assumption is confirmed by the introduction of the NHS system, 
but not so much by the cases of the user fees and the NHIS. When dealing with partisanship in 
analyses of policy change, there may be a need to consider a modified perspective. While 
partisan ideology may appear as an important factor in policy change, it is not always the case. 
In the face of economic crisis, right-wing governments may pursue retrenchment; in the face 
of severe market failure, these governments may also pursue broad-based, redistributive 
policies despite internal opposition. In order not to lose support from their base, however, such 
decisions must be buttressed by framing processes, so as to make ideological U-turns seem 
more acceptable. 
Finally, the common wisdom within the globalisation literature is that the South follows 
the policy recipes of the North, which also uses its disproportionate political, economic and 
technical power to impose policy ideas on the Global South (Grindle, 2000l Selin & Linnér, 
2005). This view should be modified. Of course this perspective has a basis in the reforms 
under study. For instance, as indicated, a British citizen headed the commission that 
recommended the establishment of the NHS system. Also, Dr. David Bradchott, an Israeli 
citizen, designed the policy (Arhinful 2003; Coleman, 2011). In addition, as indicated above, 
the World Bank and the IMF pushed the user fee policy onto the agenda. Yet, at the same time, 
the involvement of the above actors was largely locally driven, rather than imposed. Also, 
international actors failed in their fervent resistance of the NHIS (Coleman, 2011). Thus, while 
it acknowledges the globalisation thesis, this study suggests that scholars within this tradition 
should broaden their perspective and consider factors that make global actors more or less 
influential in the developing world. In doing this, they should include domestic policymakers’ 
perceptions of the status quo and whether or not they could find credible solutions internally to 
address their own problems. In the 1960s, when external actors were involved, it was largely 
because domestic expertise on health care policy was inadequate, as discrimination under 
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colonialism did not encourage its emergence (Baidoo, 2009). Reliance on traditional medicine 
may have also prevented domestic actors from seeking training in allopathic medical care. Yet 
even external input into the reform, as indicated, was solicited domestically rather than imposed 
from abroad. In the 1980s, the poor state of the Ghanaian economy also warranted help from 
outside, but not necessarily to introduce user fees. In fact, the idea to introduce a user fee policy 
had been proposed long before the IMF and World Bank made it a loan conditionality for 
Ghana. 
International actors could not influence the NHIS because some domestic experiments 
in the communities had shown positive results. Therefore, the domestic policy entrepreneurs 
had concrete evidence to support their reform plan, despite international opposition. The 
principles of health insurance could also sync with certain local practices, so people could 
easily relate with it. Indeed, as indicated, the negative effects of user fees had reached appalling 
levels. Above all, the new government had promised to create the NHIS in the election 
campaign; failure to comply was perceived as being potentially disastrous for the government 
in subsequent elections. All these factors combined to encourage the government to reject the 
influence of global actors. Overall, this study suggests that the North-South interactions during 
policy change must move beyond the emphasis on the logic of external imposition to account 
for the domestic situations that make global support desirable rather than compulsory.  
 
7.5. Implications for Public Policy Practice 
The above findings provide crucial lessons for improving the practice of public policy. Much 
of the existing literature grounded in the path dependency perspective has created the false 
impression that it is always true that “institutions…condition political change…by empowering 
the beneficiaries of established arrangements, creating obstacles for challengers, and limiting 
the options for innovation” (Weyland, 2008, p. 282); or that it is unavoidable that “inefficient 
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institutions and technologies will persist, blocking or retarding social change” (Rico & Costa-
Font, 2005, p. 233). On the contrary, this study allows policymakers to understand that, even 
in the midst of the supposedly “sticky factors”, such as vested interests, ideological conflicts 
and opposition from global forces, no system is impossible to reform; significant policy 
changes that could ensure drastic improvements in health services can be achieved when, 
among other things, the requisite commitments and strategies are employed. In this regard, this 
study charges policymakers by viewing policy change as a dynamic rather than sticky political 
process where the strategies and commitments of policy actors matter significantly. 
At the same time, however, the findings of the study suggests that uncritical 
employment of political strategies could create major problems that could lead to further 
momentum for changes aimed at reversing the newly-established policy order. For example, as 
argued, compensation could create perpetual lock-in for reformers and significant costs for 
policy makers. Particularly, in the circumstances where opponents were compensated, such as 
in the creation of the NHS system and the NHIS (in the forms of annual allowances or free 
enrolment, respectively), it often became difficult for policymakers to disentangle themselves 
from those webs of interests, even when the available evidence supported the need to do so. 
However, where framing was employed, such as during the implementation of the NHIS, there 
was no further costs associated with this strategy, except that it might have involved more 
thinking and required greater political acumen. Particularly, as the process of introducing the 
user fee model made clear, an uncritical employment of drift or layering could also lead to a 
disproportionate rate of underground dealings and their attendant effects, such as artificial 
raises in fee levels and high costs of health care to patients. In addition, whereas repression was 
effective in dealing with opponents of change, it led a majority of the people to exit the public 
medical system rather than voicing their opposition to policy change. By adopting the “exit 
option” (Hirschman, 1970), most of these people chose to stay home with their diseases or to 
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resort to the unregulated informal health sector, which was dangerous for them. Hence, 
strategic choices aimed at bringing about policy change must be made with a high degree of 
caution, as their effects could prove costly over time. 
 
 7.6. The Limitations of the Study and Their Implications for Future Research.  
To be able to shape future research on policy change, specifically in the developing world and 
SSA, it is crucial to acknowledge the following limitations of the present thesis. The first 
limitation relates to the scope and context of the study. Particularly, this study focuses on health 
policy change in only one country, Ghana, which represents only a fraction of the many 
countries in the developing world. As “the beacon” for Africa (World Bank, 1993, p. ix) and 
the first SSA country to gain independence, Ghana undoubtedly holds a special symbolic place 
in Africa. Yet it is crucial to note that, in many significant ways, Ghana does not represent 
Africa, let alone the entire developing world. In SSA much like in the developing world in 
general, society is very complex and cross-country differences abound, in terms of economic, 
social and political factors. Hence, extending the scope of the study beyond Ghana would be 
helpful to better understand the conditions under which radical policy change takes place in the 
developing world. 
Second, beyond extending the scope of the analysis of policy change in general to other 
jurisdictions, future studies might also compare the health policies of multiple countries in 
order to compare findings. Besides comparing cases within the developing world, studies that 
compare cases across the developing and the developed worlds may yield additional insights 
to shape the analysis of health care change and, possibly, concretize the findings of this study.  
Also, since the theoretical underpinnings of the study focus on the welfare state in 
general and not just on health care, which is only one part of the welfare state, it may be crucial 
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that future studies also focus on other policy areas to both ascertain and compare findings about 
the sources of policy change in LICs.  
Additionally, as indicted in chapter 3, none of the people who directly participated in 
the development of the NHS system was still alive at the time the study was conducted to 
directly inform it. Although this problem was rectified through the review of numerous written 
documents on the subject and through interviewing people who were abreast with the politics 
at the time and/or witnessed the policy’s implementation, it would still have been enriching to 
interview those people who directly participated in the reform. Hence, the chapter on the NHS 
is quite limited in terms of the richness of the data employed.  Subsequent studies may provide 
additional enrichment to the discussion on policy change by considering, at least, memos and 
minutes of discussions leading to the establishment of the NHS system.  
Although the findings regarding the impact of global actors on policy change are 
relevant for future studies, they are inadequate for making definite conclusions about this issue. 
A deeper study on the role of external actors, using the health care sector and/or other policy 
areas, may help to further test conventional wisdom regarding the disproportionate impact of 
global actors on policy change in the developing world. In a similar manner, the discussion on 
the effects of political strategies remains purely qualitative. Thus, in the future, studies might 
also consider estimating, in financial or quantitative terms, how much political strategies might 
cost the health care system. Such studies would also be helpful in getting a better understanding 
of the role of political strategies in policy change. 
 
7.7. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has paid critical attention to the key underpinnings of this study, which involved 
explaining why and how Ghana could pursue the radical changes in health policy within an 
unusually short timeframe and despite certain countervailing factors. Our analysis revealed not 
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only that the mainstream understanding of policy change emphasising path-dependency is 
problematic here, but also that no one factor can adequately account for the occurrence of the 
health policy changes Ghana has witnessed since independence. In explaining these changes, 
the study argued that that we should pay particular attention to the interactive role key 
contextual and agential factors across the policy process play, such as the role of windows of 
opportunity, policy entrepreneurship by key policy actors and the concentrated institutional 
configurations of the state that facilitated the adoption of the changes. These findings provide 
a relevant framework for understanding policy change in the developing world, where radical 
policy change appears as relatively common. They also provide important lessons and 
strategies that policymakers in general can employ in their efforts to pursue policy change and 
improvements to their health care system. 
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